932 F.3d 789
9th Cir.2019Background
- Clarence Wayne Dixon was tried in Arizona for a 1977 murder after DNA matched him to evidence from the crime; he was convicted and sentenced to death in 2008.\
- Dixon previously had 1977 Rule 11 incompetency findings and an NGRI-related release, but a later 1977 psychiatrist found him competent; he had a 1985 sexual-assault conviction.\
- In the capital proceedings Dixon waived trial counsel and proceeded largely pro se with advisory counsel; there were lengthy mitigation-investigation delays and multiple continuances.\
- The trial court required Dixon to wear a stun belt and leg brace (county policy for in-custody defendants); the court did not make a particularized on-the-record finding justifying visible restraints.\
- Post-conviction and federal habeas claims raised: (1) ineffective assistance for failing to challenge Dixon’s competence to waive counsel; (2) trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing sua sponte; (3) denial of a final continuance to complete mitigation; and (4) use of visible restraints during guilt and penalty phases.\
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief under AEDPA, expanded the COA to include the shackling claim, but rejected all claims on the merits or as not overcoming AEDPA deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to move for competency hearing before Dixon waived counsel | Dixon: counsel should have challenged competency; there were indicia of serious mental illness rendering waiver invalid and a reasonable probability of a different outcome | State: record showed temporally remote mental-health evidence, competent behavior in 2006 colloquy, and no sufficient indicia to trigger a hearing | Denied — state PCR ruling applying Strickland was not unreasonable under AEDPA; no sufficient indicia of incompetence in the relevant time frame |
| Trial court's failure to hold sua sponte competency hearing before accepting self-representation | Dixon: prior 1977 incompetency, later expert reports, and his courtroom behavior raised a good-faith doubt requiring a hearing | State: trial record showed Dixon understood charges, responded coherently, and no substantial evidence of incompetence at the time | Denied — no AEDPA-reversible error; no ‘‘good faith doubt’’ supported by substantial evidence in 2006 |
| Denial of continuance to complete mitigation investigation before penalty phase | Dixon: denial cut off development of mitigation (mental health, social history), violating Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments | State: court considered case length, prior continuances, victims’ interests, and available mitigation; Dixon chose what mitigation to present | Denied — trial court’s discretion was not an unreasoning insistence on speed; Arizona Supreme Court’s factual crediting of counsel’s representations was not unreasonable |
| Visible shackling (stun belt and leg brace) in presence of jury | Dixon: restraints were imposed without individualized findings and were visible, violating Deck; prejudicial to fairness of trial | State: county policy required restraints; record lacks evidence that jury actually saw or inferred restraints; any error harmless given overwhelming evidence | COA expanded on this issue but denied relief — Arizona courts’ findings that restraints were not shown visible (and, alternatively, harmlessness) were not unreasonable under AEDPA |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)\
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (visible shackling prohibited unless justified by an essential state interest and case-specific findings)\
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; state-court decisions must be unreasonable to grant habeas)\
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence standard for waiver of counsel and self-representation framework)\
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (trial court discretion to require counsel when defendant lacks capacity to conduct trial proceedings)\
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (prosecution bears burden to show constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)\
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer may consider any relevant mitigating evidence)\
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider relevant mitigating circumstances)