City of Warren v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 156 A.3d 371

Background

Thomas Haines was a career firefighter (1970–2003) who died of metastatic colon cancer in 2009; his last documented firefighting exposure was December 25, 2002.
Sharon Haines (widow) filed a fatal claim petition in 2012 asserting her husband’s cancer was an occupational disease caused by firefighting exposures; the Estate filed for medical bills.
Employer contested timeliness (claim barred by the 300-week statute of repose in effect at decedent’s death) and challenged causation, offering expert testimony disputing a work nexus.
The WCJ credited Claimant’s expert (Dr. Singer), denied Employer’s Frye challenge, and granted the fatal claim; the Board affirmed, applying Act 46’s 600-week provision for firefighter cancers.
The Commonwealth Court held Section 301(f) (600-week period created by Act 46) is a statute of repose and a substantive change that cannot be applied retroactively to revive rights already extinguished under the prior 300-week repose; it reversed the Board.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Act 46’s 600-week period (Section 301(f)) applies retroactively to revive extinguished claims	Act 46 clarifies existing law/procedure and thus may apply to pending claims	Act 46 creates a new substantive statute of repose and cannot revive claims already extinguished	Act 46’s 600-week provision is a statute of repose and cannot be applied retroactively to revive a claim extinguished under the prior 300-week repose; claim barred
Whether the fatal claim was timely under Section 301(c)(2) (300-week rule) given decedent’s last exposure and date of death	Claimant relied on McKeesport to argue fatal claims are timely if disability occurred within 300 weeks, so filing date/death timing may be irrelevant	Employer: no evidence decedent was disabled within 300 weeks; death occurred after 300 weeks, so claim was extinguished	No evidence decedent was disabled within 300 weeks; death occurred outside 300 weeks, so claim barred under pre-Act 46 law
Whether Act 46 altered only procedure versus substantive rights	Claimant: Act 46 provided a procedural alternative for firefighters already able to seek occupational-cancer relief	Employer: Act 46 created a new occupational-disease category and new repose period for firefighters (substantive)	Court treated the 600-week rule as substantive (statute of repose), so it cannot be retroactive without clear legislative intent
Whether Frye admissibility challenge to Claimant’s expert required reversal (did expert use generally accepted methodology?)	Claimant: Dr. Singer’s methodology and research satisfied Frye and was a proper WCJ credibility/weight determination	Employer: Dr. Singer’s methods lacked generally accepted scientific methodology; Frye exclusion warranted	Court did not reach Frye issue because it disposed of the case on timeliness; WCJ/Board’s Frye rulings left unreviewed

Key Cases Cited

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishes general acceptance test for scientific expert evidence)
City of Philadelphia Fire Dep’t v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sladek), 144 A.3d 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (construing Section 108(r) and evidentiary requirements for firefighter cancer claims)
City of McKeesport v. Miletti, 746 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2000) (Section 301(c)(2) permits fatal claim benefits if disability occurred within 300 weeks)
Fargo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 148 A.3d 514 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (held Section 301(f)’s 600-week limitation operates as a statute of repose)
Antonucci v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (U.S. Steel Corp.), 576 A.2d 401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (recognizing Section 301(c)(2) as a statute of repose)