City of Treasure Island v. Tahitian Treasure Island, LLC
253 So. 3d 649
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2017Background
- Treasure Island (the City) hosts civic events on a wide central Gulf beach, sometimes up to ~30 events/year, involving temporary structures and occasional beach parking for attendees (as many as ~130 cars). The City charges fees for these temporary beach parking areas.
- The City allows vehicles related to event operations (e.g., food trucks, carnival trucks) to drive onto and park on the sandy beach; its ordinance permits limited driving/parking for event set-up/support staff.
- The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has a coastal construction control line through Treasure Island; the City obtains coastal construction control line permits for events occurring seaward of that line and the permits authorize certain activities (including, in some permits, parking).
- Hoteliers (owners of nearby beachfront hotels) sued under Fla. Stat. § 161.58(2), alleging the City’s hosting/allowing of driving and parking at events violates the statutory prohibition on vehicular traffic on coastal beaches; they sought declaratory relief and an injunction.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hoteliers, declared the City’s hosting/allowing of vehicular parking and driving on Treasure Island Beach unlawful under § 161.58, invalidated the conflicting portion of the City ordinance, and permanently enjoined the City from hosting or allowing any parking/driving on the beach. The City appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the beach driving/parking at events constitutes "vehicular traffic" under § 161.58(2) | Hoteliers: any driving/parking on a coastal beach in connection with public events is "vehicular traffic" and thus prohibited | City: § 161.58 targets only public-road–style driving ("Daytona Beach-style"); event set-up driving or limited permit-authorized movements are not the statute's target | Court: "Vehicular traffic" means movement of vehicles as though along a public street/highway; event-related crossing/parking for public access (access paths into public parking) can be vehicular traffic, but limited, permit-authorized construction/activity movements are not. |
| Whether the term "vehicular traffic" should be narrowly read as only "Daytona Beach-style" beach driving | Hoteliers: statute prohibits use of beach as a thoroughfare regardless of place-specific characterizations | City: legislative history and context show the statute meant Daytona-style continuous/public roadway use | Court: rejected the Daytona-only reading; such a limitation is neither textually supported nor workable for criminal enforcement. |
| Whether DEP permitting authority under part I allows vehicle movements that would otherwise be prohibited by § 161.58 | Hoteliers: § 161.58 prohibition applies even to movements permitted under part I | City: permitting authority contemplates necessary vehicle movements for construction/events; § 161.58 should not nullify DEP permits | Court: construed to avoid conflict—§ 161.58 does not sweepingly ban all vehicle movements; DEP permits can authorize necessary vehicle movements for permitted activities, but public-access driving that treats the beach as a thoroughfare remains prohibited. |
| Scope of injunctive relief granted by trial court | Hoteliers: broad injunction necessary to stop all beach vehicle uses complained of | City: trial court injunction is overbroad, enjoining activity beyond the complaint and summary-judgment record | Court: injunction was overbroad—affirmed only insofar as it enjoins vehicular traffic (as construed) for public-access parking paths/uses tied to the events; reversed to the extent it banned vehicle movements necessary for permitted construction/event operations or unrelated lawful uses. |
Key Cases Cited
- Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362 (Fla. 2013) (plain-meaning statutory interpretation principle)
- Deltona Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1969) (statutory grants carry implied powers necessary to effectuate them)
- Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981) (statutes covering same field must be harmonized)
- Brock v. Board of County Commissioners of Collier County, 21 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (implied powers doctrine applied to statutory authority)
- Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983) (contextual reference to beach driving; court declined to treat it as narrowly controlling statutory meaning)
- Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2013) (rule of lenity is a last-resort canon when statute remains ambiguous)