We have for review Paul v. State,
Paul
Charles Paul was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Paul,
After receiving an enhanced sentence under the violent felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, Paul filed a postcon-viction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in the trial court, disputing the validity of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion as untimely and successive. On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Paul disputed his enhanced sentence, claiming that his conviction was not a qualifying felony under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute. Paul,
The Fourth District affirmed the trial court order by summarily denying Paul’s rule 3.850 claim. Id. The court also found that even if the claim had been raised in a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), it lacked merit and had already been rejected on direct appeal. Id. The Fourth District concluded that “this offense necessarily includes the use of force or violence against an individual. To commit a violation of section 790.19, a vehicle must be occupied.” Id. The Fourth District noted that, as required by this Court’s decision in State v. Hearns,
The Fourth District distinguished Paul’s case from previous cases which involved shooting into a building, reasoning that under section 790.19 a building may be occupied or unoccupied and a conviction under that provision of the statute does not necessarily require the use of force against an individual. Id. The Fourth District recognized and certified direct conflict with the decision of the First District in Crapps, on the issue of whether the offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes, necessarily includes the use or threat of force against an individual. Id.
Crapps
Alander Crapps was convicted of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), which contained the same language as the 2001 version of the statute at issue in Paul. Crapps,
The First District did not state its rationale for this conclusion. However, its parenthetical explanations of the cited cases offer some insight. The parenthetical ex
Based on the parenthetical explanations, we can conclude that the First District applied the Hearns statutory elements test to Crapps’ offense of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle. Further, the First District implied that this offense did not qualify as a forcible felony under the Hearns test because force against an individual is not a necessary element of at least one portion of the statute.
ANALYSIS
The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether, as a matter of law, shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualified for enhanced sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, i.e. section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2001). This issue involves a question of statutory interpretation and thus is subject to de novo review. See State v. Burris,
In Hearns, this Court determined that only the statutory elements of an offense are to be considered in determining whether an offense qualifies as a forcible felony, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.
Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001) reads:
Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.— Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or private bus or any train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall*1062 be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.088, or s. 775.084.
At first glance, section 790.19 appears to be a conjunctive statute, where all elements merge to form one offense, because all offenses are listed in a single paragraph without the use of punctuation or subsections to indicate the legislative intent. If the statute were conjunctive in nature, then a violation of section 790.19 would never be considered a forcible felony, as a cursory reading of the statute may demonstrate circumstances where a physical threat of force to an individual would not be necessarily involved, such as shooting into an unoccupied building or shooting a vessel lying in the water. Although the entire statute is a single sentence, it punishes the shooting or throwing of deadly missiles at, within, or into four separate types of property, each including a modifier that specifies the particular instances where a defendant would be in violation of this section. These properties include: (1) public or private buildings, whether occupied or unoccupied; (2) public or private vehicles of any kind which are being used or occupied by any person; (3) watercraft which are lying in or plying the waters of this state; and (4) aircraft flying through the airspace of this state. The statute is written in a manner that proscribes distinct offenses, with the only connection being that the defendant wantonly and maliciously discharges an object in order to complete the offense. The fact that the statute uses two opposing modifiers, “occupied or unoccupied,” after referencing buildings protected by this statute, and more synonymous modifiers, “being used or occupied by any person,” after listing the vehicles protected under this statute, indicates that the statute is a disjunctive statute, which punishes multiple offenses, each with distinct elements.
In State v. Reddick,
Paul argues that even if section 790.19 proscribes a number of separate offenses, the “used or occupied” modifiers for vehicles are alternative definitions much like the “occupied or unoccupied” modifiers for buildings. He contends that the offense of shooting or throwing a deadly missile into a vehicle does not necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual because a vehicle can be “used” without a person occupying the vehicle. In support of this argument, Paul cites the Webster Dictionary’s definition of “use,” as “the privilege or benefit of using something.” See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1299 (9th ed. 1983). Paul offers
Legislative History of Section 790.19
This statutory section dates back to 1881, when the “Senate and Assembly” passed an act “for the better Protection of Passengers on Railroad Cars and the Employees of Railroad Companies.” Ch. 3281, Fla. Laws (1881). Section 1 of this statute prohibited throwing missiles at or into locomotives or other railroad cars occupied by passengers or railroad employees. Section 2 prohibited throwing deadly missiles or shooting into a locomotive or railroad car belonging to or being used by a railroad company. The Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, published in 1892, included two provisions related to throwing missiles at a railroad car. Section 2696 prohibited throwing deadly missiles or shooting at locomotives and other railroad cars belonging to or being used by a railroad company. Section 2697 prohibited the throwing of any missiles at a locomotive or railroad car “while the same are occupied by passengers or employees.” § 2697, Fla.Rev.Stat. (1892).
In 1901, the Legislature added dwelling houses, occupied houses, and steamboats to the spaces to be protected from missiles and shooting. Chapter 4987 made it unlawful to shoot a firearm at or into a dwelling house or steamboat “plying the waters of this State.” Ch. 4987, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla. (1901). A second act prohibited shooting a deadly missile “at or into any dwelling or any other house which is being used or occupied” or “any railroad car, street car or vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person or persons.” Ch. 4988, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla. (1901). In 1906, chapter 3281 of the 1881 Act and chapters 4987 and 4988 of the 1901 Acts were consolidated into a single one-paragraph statute that prohibited shooting or throwing deadly missiles into “any dwelling or any other house which is being used or occupied,” or a “vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person or persons,” or “any steamboat lying in or plying the [state] waters.” § 3628, Fla. GemStat. (1906).
The statute essentially remained the same until 1959, when it was amended to include “any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied” and added vessels, aircraft, buses, ships and barges to the list of vehicles that were protected. Ch. 59-458, § 1, Laws of Fla. While the 1959 amendment changed the building modifiers from “used or occupied” to “occupied or unoccupied,” the vehicle modifiers of “used or occupied” have remained unchanged since the 1906 version of the statute. The list of vehicles was amended again in 1974 to include “train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car.” Ch. 74-67, § 1, Laws of Fla. The 1974 amendment also inserted “or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance” to the actions prohibited. Id. The statute has remained unchanged since then and has been a single paragraph since its consolidation in 1906.
We can glean several things from this history of section 790.19. First, the consolidated statute originally only applied to occupied buildings, as evidenced by the 1959 amendment that prohibited throwing deadly missiles into both unoccupied and occupied buildings. Second, the language “used or occupied” as originally used in the consolidated statute required the presence of a person. Because the Legislature changed this language regarding buildings,
This conclusion is consistent with a case decided by this Court in 1909 that involved section 3628 of the Florida General Statutes of 1906 (the consolidated single paragraph statute). See Thomas v. State,
Where the Legislature does not define the words used in a statute, this Court first examines the plain language of the statute in order to detex-mine the parameters of a specific element of an offense. See Marrero v. State,
Our purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Instead, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an umreasonable l-esult or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.
State v. Burris,
Paul cites the definition of “use” as the “pi’ivilege or benefit of using something.” Merriam Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2523 (3rd ed. 1981). This definition would result in the statute being broader than the Legislature intended. Under this definition, vehicles would always be in use because someone would always have the “privilege or benefit” of using them. And thus, shooting into both occupied and unoccupied vehicles would be punishable under section 790.19. Paul ar
In holding that the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section 790.19 necessarily involves the threat of physical force or violence to an individual, we disapprove the apparent reasoning of the First District in Crapps,
In Crapps, the First District concluded that shooting into an occupied vehicle did not qualify for enhanced sentencing since the portion of the statute that outlines the elements of the charge of shooting into an occupied building does not require the threat of violence or force to an individual.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, approve the Fourth District’s decision below. We disapprove the opinion in the conflicting case of Crapps.
It is so ordered.
Notes
. The defendant in that case was Peterson Paul, a different individual than Charles Paul who is the subject of the instant case.