372 F. Supp. 3d 928
N.D. Cal.2019Background
- California and San Francisco challenged five conditions tied to fiscal year 2018 Byrne JAG grants: (1) access, (2) notice, (3) certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373 (and §1644), (4) a new nondisclosure condition barring public disclosure of federal law‑enforcement information that could "harbor" fugitives or "aliens," and (5) an information condition requiring jurisdictions to collect and report subrecipient policies regarding communications with DHS/ICE.
- The 2018 conditions largely track conditions imposed for FY2017, which multiple courts (including this court) previously invalidated; the DOJ preserved prior arguments and added the two new 2018 conditions.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, APA review, and mandamus relief compelling disbursement of funds without the challenged conditions; DOJ moved to dismiss or for partial summary judgment as to the two new conditions.
- The court found (and incorporated prior findings about FY2017) that access, notice, and the §1373/1644 certification are ultra vires, violate separation of powers, exceed Spending Clause limits, and are arbitrary and capricious; it addressed the two new 2018 conditions (nondisclosure and information) in depth.
- The court held the nondisclosure and information conditions are ultra vires and violate the separation of powers; the nondisclosure condition is also unconstitutionally ambiguous under the Spending Clause and arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, awarded mandamus relief, and entered a nationwide injunction but stayed its nationwide scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority under 34 U.S.C. §10102 (AAG duties) to impose FY2018 conditions | §10102 does not authorize DOJ to place immigration‑related conditions; "maintain liaison" is ministerial, not a grant of broad conditioning power | §10102(a)(6) and (a)(2) empower the AAG to place special conditions and maintain liaison, which support nondisclosure and information requirements | Rejected DOJ: §10102 does not confer authority to impose these conditions; provisions interpreted as ministerial and not a basis for broad immigration‑oriented conditions |
| Authority under 34 U.S.C. §10153(a)(5)(D) ("applicable Federal laws") | "Applicable" is limited to laws related to the grant application/form; §10153 does not authorize sweeping immigration certifications | DOJ: §10153 allows requiring compliance with all applicable federal laws, including §1373/1644 and statutes referenced in conditions | Court reaffirmed that §10153's "applicable laws" is constrained by context; DOJ lacks authority under §10153 to impose these conditions |
| Constitutionality of §1373 and related certification | §1373 and forced certification are unconstitutional (anticommandeering/separation concerns) | DOJ argued certification is permissible and related to grant administration | Court held §1373 unconstitutional (incorporating prior findings) and that certification exceeded congressional grant authority |
| Spending Clause relatedness and unambiguous notice | Conditions must be reasonably related to Byrne JAG purposes and be unambiguous so states can make informed choice | DOJ argued nondisclosure and information conditions are related to law‑enforcement safety and program integrity and were adequately described | Information condition and certifications related to §1373 are unrelated to Byrne purposes; nondisclosure has some relation but is unacceptably ambiguous and thus invalid under Spending Clause principles |
| APA arbitrary and capricious review | DOJ failed to provide a reasoned explanation and relied on weak record (OIG memo, backgrounder, social‑media post) | DOJ contends the administrative record supports reasoned decisionmaking | Court found DOJ's explanations insufficient for the broad nondisclosure condition and held the conditions arbitrary and capricious |
| Injunctive and mandamus relief | Plaintiffs seek nationwide injunction and mandamus to compel disbursal without conditions | DOJ argued injunction scope should be limited and disputes standing; said awards mooted mandamus | Court granted permanent injunction in plaintiffs' favor, stayed nationwide scope, and granted mandamus to compel award issuance without the challenged conditions |
Key Cases Cited
- City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (earlier challenge to Executive Order and Byrne JAG conditions)
- City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) (appellate decision in related litigation)
- City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (prior decision invalidating FY2017 Byrne JAG conditions)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (invalidating notice and access conditions)
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (addressing applicability of §10153 and rejecting DOJ's expansive authority)
- States of New York v. Department of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding 2017 conditions ultra vires and arbitrary and capricious)
- Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (limits on delegation and appropriations principles)
- INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative process and separation of powers)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Spending Clause relatedness test)
- Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (requirement that spending conditions be unambiguous)
- Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (APA arbitrary and capricious standard)
- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (equitable factors for permanent injunction)