954 F.3d 23
1st Cir.2020Background
- In FY2017 the DOJ attached three new immigration-related conditions to Byrne JAG formula grants awarded to Providence and Central Falls: (1) a "notice" condition requiring advance notice of detainee release dates, (2) an "access" condition allowing federal immigration agents access to correctional facilities, and (3) a "certification" condition requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
- The Cities sued, alleging the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose those conditions; the district court enjoined enforcement and ordered disbursement of FY2017 funds.
- Byrne JAG is a congressionally mandated formula grant program governed by 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158; applicants must make specified assurances and certifications in their applications.
- The DOJ asserted authority to impose the conditions from (a) the Byrne JAG application provisions (information-reporting, coordination, and certification of "applicable Federal laws") and (b) the Assistant Attorney General duties provision, 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6).
- Multiple circuits split on these issues (Second Circuit upheld DOJ conditions; Third, Seventh, Ninth rejected them); the First Circuit affirmed the district court, holding the DOJ lacked authority to impose the challenged conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Byrne JAG's information-reporting (§10153(a)(4)) and coordination (§10153(a)(5)(C)) provisions authorize the notice and access conditions | Those provisions are limited to data and coordination directly tied to the grant-funded program and pre-application coordination; they do not permit unrelated immigration- enforcement conditions | Provisions authorize requiring programmatic information and coordination generally, including information/coordination needed for immigration enforcement | Held: Provisions are limited to information/coordination about the grant and programs it funds (and pre-application coordination). Notice and access conditions exceed that authority and are unauthorized. |
| Whether the certification requirement to comply with "all other applicable Federal laws" (§10153(a)(5)(D)) authorizes conditioning grants on compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 | "Applicable Federal laws" means laws that apply to states/localities in their capacity as Byrne grantees; §1373 applies more broadly and is not limited to grantee capacity, so it is not "applicable" here | "Applicable" should be read broadly to include federal laws germane to Byrne JAG (including §1373) and the Attorney General may identify which laws require certification | Held: "Applicable Federal laws" is confined to laws that apply to governments in their capacities as Byrne JAG recipients; §1373 is not within that scope and cannot be imposed via the certification condition. |
| Whether §10102(a)(6) independently authorizes the Assistant AG to place program-wide "special conditions" (i.e., to impose the challenged conditions on all grants) | §10102(a)(6) uses "including" illustratively and only permits the Assistant AG to exercise powers vested elsewhere or delegated; "special conditions" is a term of art meaning individualized conditions for high‑risk grantees | §10102(a)(6) expressly empowers the Assistant AG to place special conditions on all grants administered by OJP, authorizing the challenged program-wide conditions | Held: §10102(a)(6) is not an independent grant of sweeping authority; "special conditions" refers to individualized, high‑risk grantee conditions and cannot be used to impose the DOJ's broad, program-wide immigration conditions absent other statutory or delegated authority. |
| Remedy/disposition | Cities sought injunction and release of funds | DOJ appealed district court injunction | Held: First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment enjoining enforcement of the challenged FY2017 conditions and directing grant disbursement. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (agency lacks power beyond what Congress confers)
- Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (agency has no power to act without statutory delegation)
- Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (same term should not be assumed to have different meanings across related statutes)
- New York v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 951 F.3d 84 (Second Circuit upholding DOJ's grant conditions)
- City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (Ninth Circuit rejecting DOJ conditions)
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d 276 (Third Circuit invalidating similar conditions)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (Seventh Circuit refusing to enforce similar conditions)
- Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (declining broad agency authority where statute specifies limits)
- Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (statutes should not hide major policy shifts in ancillary provisions)