City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 161 A.3d 160

Background

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) represented Pittsburgh police under Act 111 and PLRA; their collective-bargaining agreement covered 2010–2014 and allowed reopening if legislature acted on residency rules.
Pennsylvania repealed a mandatory city-residency rule for second-class cities in 2012 (Act 195), replacing it with permissive language: a city may require officers to be residents.
Pittsburgh voters approved a home-rule charter amendment (Nov. 5, 2013) requiring all city employees, including police, to domicile within the city.
The parties reopened bargaining; arbitrators issued a supplemental interest-award (Mar. 14, 2014) replacing the city-only residency rule with a 25‑air‑mile residence radius; the City objected to arbitrability and sought review.
The trial court enforced the award, holding residency is a mandatory bargaining subject under Act 111 and the Home Rule Charter Law does not permit a charter to override Act 111; the Commonwealth Court reversed, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (FOP)	Defendant's Argument (City)	Held
May a home rule charter amendment remove a mandatory subject of bargaining (residency)?	Charter conflicts with Act 111 and Home Rule Charter Law; charter cannot curtail Act 111 bargaining rights.	Charter amendment is an exercise of home-rule power and, after Act 195, residency is a local managerial prerogative.	No — charter may not remove a mandatory subject of bargaining; Act 111 and Home Rule Charter Law preempt the charter.
Does Act 195’s permissive language (“may require”) allow the City to place residency beyond arbitration?	No; granting authority to act does not eliminate arbitral power to impose or remove residency.	Yes; Act 195 delegated authority to the City to decide residency, so arbitrators cannot compel contrary action.	A municipality’s statutory authority to choose does not prevent arbitrators from imposing or removing the restriction; arbitrators may act where employer could act voluntarily.
Are home rule charters preempted where they conflict with statutes of statewide application (Act 111)?	Yes; Home Rule Charter Law (§2962) expressly prohibits municipal provisions inconsistent with pre‑1972 statutes affecting employee rights and bars modifying uniform statutes.	No; charter amendments adopted by the electorate have statute-like force and can define local conditions unless expressly prohibited.	Yes; express preemption applies—statutes of general application (Act 111) supersede conflicting home rule provisions.
Did the arbitration panel exceed jurisdiction by replacing the residency rule?	Arbitral modification was within Act 111 authority because residency is a mandatory bargaining subject.	Panel exceeded authority because it ordered the City to do what its charter forbids.	Panel acted within its limited authority; the award was reinstated.

Key Cases Cited

Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon, 498 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1985) (residency is a mandatory bargaining subject)
Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newtown Township, 544 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1988) (statutory grant of authority to employer allows arbitrator the same scope)
Washington Arbitration Case, 259 A.2d 437 (Pa. 1969) (arbitration may require employer to do what it could do voluntarily)
Borough of Ellwood City v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 998 A.2d 589 (Pa. 2010) (managerial prerogatives vs. mandatory bargaining subjects framework)
In re Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 483 A.2d 488 (Pa. 1984) (statutory interpretation framework for competing state and local authority)
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia, 101 A.3d 79 (Pa. 2014) (Ogontz analysis applied to determine preeminence between state statutes and local action)
Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2009) (home rule powers are subject to limitations the General Assembly may impose)