*1 ORDER PER CURIAM. NOW,
AND of of the day August, this 18th Order Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.
977A.2d 1132 Gary SPAHN, Appellant
v. ADJUSTMENT, City Philadelphia ZONING BOARD OF of Associates, LLC., Appellees and R.G. Woodstock Society Blight (SCRUB), Mary Created to Reduce Urban Caw-
ley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Association, Civic Belmont Association, Village Community George David, Jr.
v. Zoning Adjustment City Philadelphia, Board of of the City Gillespie, and Patrick B. Outdoor, LLC
Jr./Shannon Appeal Society Blight (SCRUB), Created to Reduce Urban Mary Cawley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Civic Association Village Community
and Belmont Association. Society Blight (SCRUB), Mary Created to Reduce Urban
Tracy, CDC, Council, Wecaccoe Whitman Fred Hill,
Druding Appellants and Jovida Zoning Hearing Adjustment City Board of Philadelphia, City Philadelphia, Company BDB Keystone Advertising, Appellees. Outdoor
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Dec. 2008. Aug.
Decided *5 Stretton, Esq., Samuel C. Law Offices of Samuel C. Stret- ton, Chester, West for Gary Spahn, Society Created Reduce (SCRUB)/M.C. Urban Blight Tracy/Wynnefield Hghts. Civic Ass’n, Village Comm. appellants. Ass’n/Belmont Feder, Richard Gaston, Gerson Esq., Cheryl Lorraine Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Zoning Bd. of Adjust- ment/City of Philadelphia, appellee. Beller,
Joseph Beller, Esq., Orphanides, L.L.P., Stouffer & Associates, LLC., for R.G. Woodstock appellee. Nelson, III,
Lathrop Barrere Esq., Montgomery, McCrack- en, Rhoads, L.L.P., Walker & Philadelphia, for Patrick B. Gillespie, Outdoor, LLC, Jr. and Shannon appellee. Pollock, McCracken, Stephen G. Esq., Montgomery, Walker *6 Rhoads, L.L.P., Mancini, & B. Philadelphia, Esq., Vincent Law Associates, Media, Offices of B. Vincent Mancini & John M. Elliott, Greenleaf, Bell, Esq., Elliott Blue for BDB Co. and Inc., Keystone Co., Advertising appellees. Outdoor CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BEFORE: McCAFFERY, TODD and JJ.
OPINION Chief Justice CASTILLE.
The questions presented appeal this arose from the Assembly’s General enactment of Section 17.1 of the First (“Home City Act”), Class Home Rule Act Rule 53 P.S. § 13131.1.1The enactment occurred following introduction Bill 9, 2003, House No. 1954 on September which originally involved increasing the fines penalties for Philadelphia (“Code”) (Section bill). Code violations 1 of the The bill was then 19, amended on November 2004 and added 2 Section the bill providing for standing appeals from matters zoning as follows:2
In addition any aggrieved person, the governing body legislative vested with powers under charter any adopted pursuant to this act shall have standing to appeal any decision of a zoning board or hearing other board or com- mission created to regulate' within the development city. As section, used in this the term “aggrieved person” does not taxpayers include the city that are not detrimentally by harmed the decision of the zoning hearing board or other board or commission created to regulate development. added). §
53 13131.1 (emphasis P.S. The Act was signed into 20, law on November Section of the bill became Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act. 21, 1949, 65, 30, April §
1. Act of P.L. 17.1 added November 193, 2,§ P.L. immediately. No. effective 2. The full title of the Bill House was: (P.L. 155),
Amending April the act of No. entitled providing title of Home general [reiterates Rule further for the Act] grant power authority; AND PROVIDING FOR SPECIFIC POWERS. are whether the appeal The issues raised specific removed Assembly general taxpayer Pennsylvania 17.1 of the Home standing by enacting from the Code subject rule Act; single whether such action violated Rule Constitution; and whether Pennsylvania appellants of the under tradition- standing pursue zoning challenges have of standing. al notions following
The Court concluded Commonwealth 17.1, longer enactment was no taxpayer of Section Zoning viable The court under Ordinance. single concluded that the enactment did not violate the also not have For subject appellants standing. rule and did herein, affirm the the reasons stated we orders Com- *7 monwealth Court. the cases were consolidated before this
Although Court all involve a they challenge interpretation because and 17.1, constitutionality separate of Section the matters arose as and, therefore, the appeals procedural history facts and separately. each case are distinct and are discussed Zoning Adjustment Spahn v. Board of (25 2008) and 26 EAP (“Woodstock”) is the owner R.G. Woodstock Associates two vacant lots on The Bainbridge Philadelphia. Street lots are in an area R-10 In zoned residential district. June of filed two Phil- separate applications Woodstock with the I”) (“L adelphia Department Inspections Licenses & seeking three-story, to construct a home on each single family of the lots. L & I denied the because each permits residence not have a porch space did roofed-over front with usable underneath and meet open requirements failed to certain area of the the appealed Zoning Hearing Code. Woodstock to (“Board”) Board of a vari- seeking dimensional ance with to each lot. The Board conducted a respect hearing on August (one hearing, Gary
Prior to the of the Spahn appellants herein) a letter in opposition request. submitted the At the that the front not at hearing, parties agreed porch was but of a clerical/labeling issue was result error on the design plans proceeded and the matter on the solely question area The a mini- open requirements. requires Code mum area of 30% for lots in an area The open zoned R-10. plans only provided submitted Woodstock for an area open of 19% with to each lot. respect Spahn testified opposition to the granting of the dimensional variance at the hearing. Following the the Board hearing, granted a variance with lot, respect to each concluding Woodstock had presented sufficient evidence to meet the criteria necessary for a vari- ance. Spahn appealed grant of both variances and the trial court consolidated the appeals.
Before the trial court Woodstock filed a motion to
quash
appeals on the basis that Spahn was not an aggrieved person
having standing
appeal the Board’s decision. Woodstock
argued that the General Assembly’s addition of
17.1 to
the Home Rule Act eliminated the general standing granted to
any taxpayer under Section 14-1807 of the
appeal
Code
decision of the
The
Board.
trial court agreed with Wood-
stock’s interpretation of Section 17.1
pointed
out that
Spahn did not
evidence
present
to establish himself as an
Therefore,
aggrieved
party.
trial court granted Wood-
stock’s
quash
motion to
on
appeals
the basis that Spahn
not
did
have
to pursue
Spahn
them.
appealed.
appeal,
On
panel of
Commonwealth Court affirmed the
*8
al.,
trial court’s
Spahn Zoning
order.
Bd. Adjustment et
(Pa.Commw.2007).
Turning
provision
issue
17.1,
acknowledged
the court
supersedes
Code
Section
that the
of home rule
concept
gives municipalities
right
ordinances,
enact such
the home rule municipality
but
to,
“contrary
cannot exercise
or in limitation or en-
powers
of,
largement
granted by acts of the General Assem-
powers
13133(b)).
§
The
then
constitutionality
court
looked at the
17.1
Section
III,
under Article
3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution
subject
to the
pertaining
single
requirement. Relying on this
pronouncement
Court’s
in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling
Commonwealth,
Fund v.
Expansion
Finally, considering whether an Spahn aggrieved party, was the court agreed with the trial court’s review of the record evidence revealed that Spahn approximately lived one and a half blocks subject from the properties, but that he only Thus, every walked properties day. court conclud- Spahn’s ed that interest was no different from “the interest common to all citizens obedience to the law.” regarding Id. at
Judge Simpson concurred in the of the majority, result writing separately to note his view that may Section 17.1 have violated the “clear expression requirement” of title contained III, Constitution, in Article the Pennsylvania Section of but
93 concluding argument such an was not preserved. Spahn, J., A.2d at (Simpson, concurring). 31-32 This Court of to consider granted appeal allowance 17.1, statutory single subject construction of Section re- Spahn quirement, aggrieved party standing. Zoning (2008). Adjustment, Bd. Pa. A.2d 567 of (SCRUB) Society Reduce Blight Created to Urban Zoning Hearing et al. v. Adjustment Board of of (27 2008) County et al. EAP (“Shannon Outdoor”) Outdoor, Shannon sought LLC a vari- to erect a on ance billboard Lot C of the Washington House Apartment which is Building, directly adjacent Schuyl- kill Expressway. property The is owned a third by party and had previously accessory sign included an that was twelve feet feet, by twenty-four double-sided and illuminated. By sign had fallen into disrepair and Outdoor Shannon into a forty-year entered lease with property owner. Shannon Outdoor then applied use zoning permit and/or L from & I seeking foot, to erect fourteen foot by forty-eight double-sided L sign and illuminated on the I lot. & issued a (1) notice refusal because bottom edge sign was (2) surface; feet thirty-six above the road sign equal no or greater value had been or was to be removed credit for the (3) the sign; sign was within 300 feet residentially zoned (4) the within property; sign was 600 feet of an ingress or (5) egress ramp Schuylkill of the Expressway; the sign was within 660 feet of the outward edge any park under the jurisdiction Commission, Park Fairmount the Common- or the wealth National Service. Park
Shannon Outdoor appealed refusal to the Board and the Board conducted a public hearing on September 2005. At the outset of the Shannon hearing, requested Outdoor that the Board limit testimony only those “aggrieved persons” who had a direct interest detrimentally and could be harmed the Board’s The determination. Board not limit did such testimony, but permitted any Philadelphia instead taxpayer on speak the matter. opposing Those the billboard included *10 SCRUB, members representatives, its
appellants Association, Village Belmont the Civic Heights Wynnefield Association, City Planning the Commis- as well as Community testified, he owned David, stating that also George Jr. sion. the sign. objected to construction adjacent property and Out- granted the Board Shannon hearing, Following variance, that it had met its finding for a use request door’s alia, unnecessary hardship an inter that proving, burden of that finding not granted if the variance was would result interest. contrary public not use was proposed court, did not take the trial which appealed to Appellants court, the trial Shannon Outdoor evidence. Before additional standing had objecting parties that none of the argued Assembly’s following decision the General the Board’s appeal 17.1. enactment of Section reversed the deci- oral the trial court
Following argument, that and related agreed the Board. The court SCRUB sion of David, Mr. who standing, exception lacked with parties aggrieved person as a standing potentially did have merits, the court Considering the neighboxing landowner. in finding that the Board had abused its discretion concluded a vari- warranting had met its burden that Outdoor Shannon devoid trial further noted that the record was ance. The court conclusion regarding the Board’s any justify evidence interest. Out- public and the Shannon unnecessary hardship reconsideration, that asserting Mr. door filed a motion for respect an of sale with to his agreement David had executed Both The trial court denied the motion. adjacent property. or- the trial court’s appealed SCRUB and Shannon Outdoor der. affirmed the panel of the Commonwealth Court appeal,
On
Adjust-
Bd.
Zoning
trial court’s decision. SCRUB et al.
(Pa.Commw.2007).
case,
ment,
the Spahn
As in
The court then considered Mr. had as an determined that David correctly court the trial court did not and concluded that “aggrieved person” err, law, Lastly, he finding standing. as a matter of had err in concluding court found that the trial court did not the variance. granting the Board abused its discretion *11 in the result without separate Leadbetter concurred Judge opinion. allowance of to consider a granted appeal single
This Court
statutory
to the
construction of Section 17.1.
issue related
598 Pa.
Zoning
Adjustment,
et al. v.
Bd.
SCRUB
(2008).
denied the
of allowance of
petition
A.2d 567
We
et al.
of Shannon Outdoor on that same date. SCRUB
appeal
(2008).
Bd.
The Board held six on the matter. hearings Appel- SCRUB, director, CDC, lants its executive Wecaccoe Whitman Council, and two individuals entered their appearance at the hearings objections over the of Keystone and BDB. Follow- ing hearings, granted Board the use zoning and/or variance. appeal, Keystone
On and BDB filed a quash motion to appeals alleging appellants lacked under Section 17.1. The trial court agreed, citing the two prior cases addressed herein. Appellants appealed Commonwealth Court the same raising issues that collectively were raised in the prior Appellants cases. acknowledged that the prior cases did not their support position, and that in stated raising issues before the Court, Commonwealth they sought only to preserve the issues for appeal.
A Commonwealth
panel
Court
affirmed the trial court’s
order, explaining that the arguments of appellants failed un-
the prior
court,
der
case law. According to the
appellants had
they
show that
were aggrieved in order to establish stand-
The
ing.
so,
court concluded they did not do
appellants
since
or allege any
“fail[ed]
show
beyond
interest
the common
interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.” Id.
*12
at 403. The
rejected
court also
appellants’ argument
they had standing
they
because
were present and participated
in the hearings before the Board. Finally, the court was not
persuaded that appellants had standing
because
simply
they
had homes in the general area of the subject property. This
granted
Court
allowance of
to
appeal
consider the statutory
17.1,
construction of Section
the single subject requirement,
and aggrieved party standing.
et al.
SCRUB
v. Zoning
Hearing
(2008).
Bd. Adjustment,
Having set forth the background of the matters that
are the subject of this
it
appeal,
is clear that they share a
common issue related to the statutory construction of Section
17.1
of
Home Rule Act and its effect on the
grant
broad
of
14-1807(1)
under
of
taxpayer
Section
This
standing
Code.
issue provides
appropriate starting point
analysis,
for our
since not
it
also
only
pursued by
appellants,
is
all
but
this
Court as a
rule does
general
constitutionality
not address
Assembly
of an act of the General
if the
can be
question
Commonwealth,
decided on
grounds.
Dep’t
other
See
of
(2000).
1155, 1159
v.
Transp. McCafferty, 563 Pa.
A.2d
Appellants Spahn,
parties
SCRUB and related
make sub
stantially
arguments
appeals.
similar
in their
con
Appellants
14-1807(1)
tend that Section
of the Code creates
of
types
two
an
“aggrieved
“taxpay
of
and that of
person”
—that
er.”
appellants
that the
Additionally,
assert
Commonwealth
Court
upheld
concept
taxpayer standing
has
of
under
14-1807(1) as
aggrieved
Section
distinct from
person standing.
See
Zoning
Adjustment,
SCRUB v.
Bd.
A.2d 967
of
(Pa.Commw.2006);
Zoning
SCRUB v.
Bd.
Adjustment
of
(Procacci),
(Pa.Commw.1999). According
Alternatively, ask Court to appellants address whether 14-1807(1) Section superseded 17.1 Ac Code. cording to appellants, zoning always has been as a treated local uniquely issue and the Assembly power has no overrule standing zoning cases in it is a Philadelphia, since matter of local purely concern. also that the Appellants assert relevant provision the Home Rule Act expressly must ordinances, authorize preemption local especially those ordi nances involving issues Brief unique Philadelphia. See Appellants et al. at 27 EAP 2008 at SCRUB 43-45 and 28 48-50, EAP 2008 at citing Zoning Adjust- Bartle Bd. of Appellants City note that the Former Pedro Solicitor A. position January Ramos took this same in memorandum dated City Councilperson 2005 to a stated that when he Section 17.1 "does grant not purport on its face to cut on the back Code's broad *13 taxpayer standing.” Appellants See Brief of 27 SCRUB et al. at EAP 2008, Exhibit K. 98 (1958); City Ebald v.
ment,
A.2d 239
Pa.
137
391
Addison,
(1957); In re
407, 128
352
Pa.
A.2d
Philadelphia,
(1956).
point
Similarly, appellants
48,
The also standing the bill to include was “last that the amendment of legislators The that the City speculates minute” amendment. legislation superseded taxpayer that the did not understand which the statute was “speed because the with nearly impossible any makes it amended and enacted reviewed and considered Assembly carefully members of the City Brief of Philadel- Appellee of the bill.” the content constitutionality contest the City at 24. The does not phia, constitutionali- bill, use the of its question but asks we *14 99 (as issue) will be ty discussed under next as a tool for intent. discerning legislative
Appellee replies Woodstock the amendment pointedly removes while taxpayer standing confirming that being “ag is the grieved” general Woodstock, standard. According not is the only language and effect of the “crystal amendment clear,” but also such an amendment is entirely consistent with Pennsylvania’s and statutory constitutional scheme regarding access to state courts. Woodstock asserts that the amend ment brings Philadelphia in line "withthe statutes governing judicial action, review of local 2 agency Pa.C.S. § which exceptions make no for home rule municipalities, but instead applies to “all local 2 agencies.” § Pa.C.S. 751. Likewise, the Home Rule Act itself is clear that a home rule municipality’s subject authority is to the prescribed limitations by the §§ General 53 Assembly. P.S. 13131 and 13133. Fur thermore, Woodstock posits case law has any clarified confusion that might by arise if providing that there is any conflict between a local home rule charter and the Home Rule Act, “the Act Enabling precedence takes prevails.” and See Brief Appellee Woodstock at citing Cali v. City of 290, 177 Philadelphia, (1962). A.2d BDB Appellees and Company Keystone Outdoor assert that the plain language of the amendment limits standing to the “governing body” and “aggrieved persons,” while expressly removing taxpayers as a separate class entitled to standing.4 Woodstock, Like BDB Company Keystone and argue that the amendment to the Home Rule Act brings accord with statewide law by making the Code consistent with local agency They law. assert that a uniform standard of “standing” is so that necessary every Pennsylvanian has an equal right of access to courts.
BDB Company Keystone and then question turn to the the ability of the General Assembly to limit the City’s broad grant of taxpayer standing. They point out that the instant matter and, is not of local strictly IX, concern under Article Appellees Gillespie join Patrick and Shannon Outdoors in this Brief. Constitution, a home rule munic- Pennsylvania any power perform any “may or function exercise
ipality Constitution, by rule charter or by denied its home not any Assembly time.” Brief of Appel- See Outdoor, citing BDB and PA. Company Keystone lee added). IX, CONST., Company § art. BDB (emphasis conclude, ... so articulated in Cali Keystone eloquently “[a]s very owes its breath of life and its existence first the Charter Pennsylvania, secondly to the Constitution birth, Act which it its its and its Enabling gave powers *15 limitations, Home Rule Act.... namely City the First Class gives City Section 17.1 amends the Act which [Home Rule] birth, powers passage its its and sets its limits. After the of 17.1, limitations the City’s power one of those is to to confer board Brief for standing appeal zoning decisions.” BDB Appellees Keystone and Outdoor Having parties’ set forth the we turn to the arguments, involving first issue the construction of Section 17.1. An issue statutory of construction of law and presents pure question scope our standard of review is de novo and our of review is Assoc., plenary. Lynnebrook and Woodbrook L.P. v. Borough Millersville, (Pa.2008). 1261, 1263 The Act Statutory provides Construction that a court’s proper role in a statute interpreting construing is to determine the intent of the Assembly. Pa.C.S. 1921(a). § Generally, when the of a statute is clear language and free from all ambiguity, a court should not disregard letter of the statute in order to its pursue spirit. Pa.C.S. 1921(b). § statutory
As is often the case with construction questions, the parties conflicting offer constructions of the same statute. The with difficulty accepting appellants’ City’s and the statuto- ry argument they construction is that to believe that appear our should take into analysis taxpayer consideration stand- of the ing provision construing plain language Code when of Section 17.1. an would be mistaken since analysis any Such involving by issue the construction of a statute must begin Therefore, focusing only on its words. we look to the plain 17.1, part, of Section which states in relevant plain language section, “aggrieved used in does person” “[a]s this term not that are taxpayers detrimentally include not city or zoning hearing harmed the decision of the board other or regulate development.” board commission created to Furthermore, § P.S. 13131.1. section is within contained relating the Article author- general grants power and ity and Rule Act limitations Home and is entitled “Specific powers.”
The
this section
The
language of
is clear.
intent of Section
17.1
give
specific
appeal
was to
power
decision
zoning hearing
of a
board within a
the first
city of
class to the
with
governing body
legislative
vested
powers
“aggrieved
persons.” Notably, the statute does not define
the term “aggrieved person” except to state
an ag-
what
grieved person
not—a
that has not
taxpayer
is
been detrimen-
decision, i.e.,
tally
aby
harmed
zoning
taxpayers generally.
Moreover, Section 17.1 is
in the
contained
First
City
Class
Home Rule Act and Philadelphia presently
only city
is the
Thus,
the first
in Pennsylvania.
class
the plain language of
the section leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Gener-
*16
al
to
Assembly
standing
intended
limit
to
a
appeal
zoning
decision in the
and
City
two
governing body
classes-—-the
aggrieved persons
specifically excluding the broader
—while
category of
succinctly
As
taxpayers.
by
stated
the Common-
Court,
wealth
see
“we
no
of the
purpose
language of Section
17.1 of the [Home
Act other than to
Rule]
limit the broad
of
grant
general taxpayer standing provided in
14-
Section
1807(1) of the
Spahn,
Code.”
The of appellants’ arises, heart challenge this case however, not from construing plain language of Section 17.1, but from appellants’ argument Section could 17.1 not properly taxpayer remove as provided by for Section standing 14-1807(1) of the Code because matters zoning is issue of an local concern. purely
102 14-1807(1) grants taxpayer specifically Code
Section as fol- board decisions zoning appeals standing respecting lows: by any severally aggrieved or jointly or
Any persons person officer, Board, any or taxpayer, of the any decision or by City, may appeal board or bureau department, Pleas---- to the Court Common presenting added). 14-1807(1) (emphasis Code Section Philadelphia Home is the provision The of this origin “Charter”), (hereafter City “all gave which Rule Charter “complete and self-government” of local authority and powers in relation to its legislation and administration powers enact ordinances functions,” as “the power as well municipal necessary proper and regulations and to make rules § 1.1- See 351 Pa.Code powers.” into execution its carrying IX, to Article pursuant was 1951 adopted 100. The Charter enabling and the Constitution5 Pennsylvania Section (hereafter “Home Act of 1949 City Home Rule First Class Act”), Pennsylvania The Consti seq. § 13101 et Rule P.S. govern with the of self municipalities power tution provides municipality that “[a] The also states ment. Constitution any power exercise or may a home rule charter which has Constitution, by its by function not denied perform any charter or Assembly any home rule by time.” General added). Thus, IX, CONST., “by § 2 (emphasis PA. art. mandate, limit the Assembly may constitutional municipalities.” home rule See functions to be performed (1996). Commonwealth, 152, 156 Ortiz the Home Rule the constitutional provision, In addition to adopt “frame and of the first class to city Act enables § 13101. Consis- government.” charter for its own P.S. Constitution, of the Home Rule tent with cities, authorities of first class powers Act limits the provision. we refer to the current constitutional 5. For ease of discussion authority for home rule Article Section 2 became the constitutional *17 adopted Prior to Pennsylvania Constitution was in 1968. when a new time, provision Article Section which was the relevant was substantively provi- current adopted was identical in 1922 and sion. “subject to the limitations hereinafter prescribed.” P.S. Furthermore, by introductory § 13131. as is made clear of first cities is language authority Section class not absolute. Section 13133 describes the limitations of such power authority, indicating city that “no shall exercise to, of, or in powers contrary enlargement limitation or powers acts of the granted by Assembly General which are ... applicable every ... part this Commonwealth [and] ” to all the applicable cities the Commonwealth.... 53 P.S. 13133(b) (c). §
This Court has had the opportunity to interpret
provisions
these
on other prior occasions and has explained
that the Act is “subordinate to
and is restricted”
acts of the
Cali,
Assembly.
General
at
A.2d
this is
“Although
clear and
it
indisputable,
is so often overlooked or emotionally
glossed over that we shall repeat: The
granted
Constitution
and reserved to the
Assembly,
and the General
turn,
Assembly in
in granting
i.e.,
home rule to Philadelphia,
Charter,
the right
adopt
to frame and
clearly and specifically
restrictions,
power
reserved
itself the
to impose
limitations
and regulations
any
on
First
City [Philadelphia]
Class
Home
Cali,
Thus,
Rule Charter.”
Considering appellants’ framework, challenge under this it 14-1807(1) is clear that Section must cede. We with disagree appellants’ attempt to cast the standing provision of 14-1807(1) as a provision dealing with a local purely zoning *18 be of zoning questions generally may
issue. While matters concern, a of question question local the instant is not purely standing but of to a in the zoning, pursue zoning appeal local question There can be no that who System. Unified Judicial standing appeal has to to a court of record is a substantive' question matter of statewide concern a of access to impheating CONST, See, courts of this PA art. e.g., Commonwealth. V, judicial Pennsylvania § 1 that the of shall (providing power in judicial system). light, be a unified Considered we liken this issue to one merely affecting personnel cannot as Moreover, of Philadelphia.6 and administration Section 17.1 defines the who have to parties standing appeal Philadelphia it zoning specifically taxpayers decisions and excludes who are not The aggrieved by provision directly decision. is of contrary Philadelphia grant taxpayer Code’s broader Thus, standing zoning appeals. the Home Rule Act takes and controls. In of the precedence light plain language of 17.1, the of 14- grant taxpayer standing under Section 1807(1)must cede.
The multitude of cases cited
not
by appellants
persuade
do
us to their position. Contrary
appellants’
arguments,
Addison, Ebald,
decisions of
and Bartle do not
compel
different result. Those decisions dealt with statutes that
spoke to matters
affecting
personnel and administration of
offices local to Philadelphia and which were of no concern to
Addison,
citizens
In
elsewhere.
the issue involved the admin-
istration of Philadelphia’s
regarding
civil service
the discharge
Addison,
Ebald,
City employees.
of
See
122 A.2d at
In
the issue dealt with
disability compensation
Philadelphia
Ebald,
Bartle,
policemen and firemen.
Appellants’ preemp- erroneous because are to the instant matter. principles inapplicable Appel- tion that, cite Nutter for the is no proposition lants because there matters comprehensive Pennsylvania Zoning zoning Code and *19 concern, 14-1807(1), are local purely issues Section involv- concern, ing preempted by a matter of local was not Section 17.1.
The issue in Nutter was whether
the Election Code
a local ordinance
preempted
limiting campaign contributions
occupied
because the Code
the field of elections.
held that
We
the Election Code failed
cam-
“materially
address itself to
limits,”
contribution
paign
and thus there was no manifesta-
tion of a
intent to
legislative
preempt
the field of campaign
regulating
contributions and the local ordinance
contributions
Nutter,
could stand.
938 A.2d at
Principles
of preemp-
tion, however, are
in
inapplicable
a case in which there is no
Rather,
comprehensive legislative enactment.
in such instanc-
es the fundamental
precepts
previously
were
discussed
and govern
relationship
the
between acts of the General
Assembly
is,
and municipal ordinances
That
apply.
“[u]nder
rule,
the concept of home
...
the locality
question
in
may
legislate concerning municipal governance without express
ordinance;
warrant
statutory
rather,
for each new
its ability
to exercise municipal
only by
functions is limited
its home rule
charter,
Constitution,
the Pennsylvania
and the General As-
Nutter,
sembly.”
Additionally, appellants’ citation to equally Procacci is un- persuasive. in While court Procacci confirmed taxpayer 14-1807(1) Code, of the it is of no
standing under Section today moment to our as Procacci Section holding pre-dated 17.1 never the issue of confronted whether in Assembly taxpayer standing provision could alter the Code.
Finally, City’s invitation to take into account the which process by passed discerning legisla the statute was tive intent is we have misplaced plain because found that language conveys Assembly’s statute the General intent. 1921(b) (c). § we Accordingly, See Pa.C.S. hold 17.1 plain language general taxpayer Section removed in the City Philadelphia.7 Appellants’ next relates to the challenge constitutional ity of the manner which Section 17.1 was enacted. Appel lants that House Bill argue No. which became Section 17.1, subjects contained two separate single violation III, subject rule of Article 3 of the Pennsylvania subject The Constitution. first of the bill increased fines for subject Code violations. The second of the bill *20 altered the provisions governing in in standing zoning appeals Philadelphia. subjects to According appellants, these were unrelated and amendment altered the standing original bill, purpose the house which existing increased fines and Furthermore, forfeitures. out that the title appellants point the statute not did discuss the elimination of taxpayer stand ing, but instead appeared “provide to not powers, take them away.” Appellant Spahn, Brief for at 44. invoke this
Appellants opinion Court’s and PAGE contend that is directly point PAGE on since it prohibits bills contain- ing a number of distinct independent subjects and to be Furthermore, PAGE, included in the same legislation. this Court indicated that there may be more than one amendment only to bill if the are germane object amendments to the Appellants bill. assert that the amendment removing statutory only 7. As the appeal construction issue is the issue on at 27 Opinion only EAP the remainder appeals of this is relevant to the 25, 26, at EAP and 28 fines and forfeitures increasing in a bill standing taxpayer germane were not subjects that two unrelated presented III, Pennsylvania Constitu- of Article Section 3 violation tion. that was used in procedure also to the point
Appellants amendment was and assert that the the bill passing early at or in the midnight to the bill at the last minute added to According appellants, before bill. morning passage give minute amendment to the bill did not the last the bill. Addi- opportunity an review Assembly adequate in the same bill it subjects if several are included tionally, that diminishes the procedure causes confusion and Gen- serious consid- Assembly’s responsibilities by precluding eral eration. respond BDB and Outdoor
Appellees
Company
Keystone
challenge
waived their
the constitu-
appellants
right
III,
Attorney
of Article
3 because the
Gener-
tionality
not
with notice or an
provided
opportunity
al’s Office was
BDB
Appellees
enactment.
Brief of
legislative
defend
See
54-55, citing
Pa.R.C.P.
Company
Keystone
and
Outdoor
235;
Odyssey Contracting Corp.,
Maryland
No.
Cas. Co.
Furthermore,
assert
(Pa.Super.2006).
appellees
take notice of the contents of the bill. See Brief of Appellees
BDB Company
Keystone
58-59,
and
Outdoor
citing Com
Macelwee,
monwealth ex rel.
569,
Raker v.
294 Pa.
In this we need not address appellees’ challenge under Pa.R.C.P. 235 directly, since appellant Spahn gave proper notice of the issue to the Attorney General at each step of the proceedings.8 Therefore, the only question us, before on this requires 8. Rule Attorney "promptly” General shall be party alleges notified when a that a statute is unconstitutional. It however, appears that open question, there is an whether the rule case, applies generally, to this since the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply statutory appeals zoning statutory matters are considered Erie, appeals. See Human Dev. Zoning Hearing Inc. v. Bd. 675, Twp., (1991) (con- Millcreek 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 600 A.2d cluding zoning that a appeal statutory notice of appeal citing is a Churchill, Appeal Borough (1990) proposition apply statutory the rules do not appeals). In event, above, any as noted the record appellant Spahn shows that General, Quash served the Answer to the Motion Attorney on the *22 is House Bill 1954 of point, whether No. 2003 violated subject single requirement.9
There is a that en strong presumption legislative Constitution, actments violate the manner including do not PAGE, which is at by legislation enacted. 393. See Therefore, a will not declared statute be unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, plainly violates the Constitu Furthermore, tion. any Id. doubts are to be in resolved favor of finding passes enactment constitu challenged tional muster and there is a burden of heavy persuasion upon the party challenging the of a Id. constitutionality statute. III,
Article Section 3 Pennsylvania Constitu tion, bills, form relating to the of bill shall provides “[n]o be passed containing subject, more than one which shall be clearly CONST., Ill, expressed § its title....” PA. art. 3. Broadly, the of purpose provision this was to an “encourage deliberative, open, government” and accountable limiting the practice inserting a number distinct independent subjects PAGE, single into a bill. See A.2d 395. PAGE,
Most
recently,
had the
this Court
opportunity
III,
revisit Article
Section
much
reiterating
of what we
previously
City
stated
Commonwealth
(2003).
Pennsylvania,
Pa.
proceedings. Although appellants attempt challenge clearly to raise to the ex- III, pressed requirement title of Article Section a review of the records EAP at 25 & 26 2008 and EAP 2008 reflects that the issue Thus, preserved was not before the trial court. the issue See is waived. 302(a). Pa.R.A.P.
lio
Thus,
‘where
of the Constitution.
material
is violative
carry-
assist in
legislative process
during
added
provisions
germane
or are otherwise
objective
out a
main
ing
bill’s
title,’
requirements
reflected in its
subject as
bill’s
hand, this
the other
III,
3 are met.” Id. On
Article
that “no two
the fact
against
must be balanced
recognition
*23
a
brought
not
into
they may
that
be
subjects
apart
are so wide
back far
focus,
of view be carried
point
if the
common
creat-
the tension that was
Recognizing
Id.
enough.”
observations, we focused on whether
competing
ed
these
by
all
of
subject
provisions
to which
“single unifying
a
there was
this test to the
Applying
Id. at 397.
germane.”
the act are
PAGE,
in
we
subject
challenge
was the
of the
bill that
gaming
subject
single unifying
regu-
that there
“a
concluded
was
—the
PAGE,
then pointed
Finally, alternatively they contend that have appellants notions of pursue appeals under traditional i.e., as William as set forth in standing, “aggrieved” parties Penn Parking Garage City Pittsburgh, *24 (1975) A.2d 269 Before we turn to the substance (plurality). however, parties of we note that the appellants’ arguments, in standing overlook that 17.1 now controls the issue of Section appeals zoning from determinations.11 17.1 the
By enacting Assembly General has any party to designated through seeking door which a of a appeal zoning hearing decision board or “other board or regulate commission created to within the development city” must enter in order to have to standing appeal. Additionally, concurring dissenting by opinion posits 10. The and Baer that Justice single subject "Philadelphia government" home rule akin is more to subject "municipalities" constitutionally of that we found to be City Philadelphia, supra. agree infirm in While we with the dissent of and, City harmony, that and PAGE can be read in of indeed, be, subjects we should conclude that to be amended were germane single subject general grants powers of and limita- Philadelphia government tions on and the result in this case is conso- City Philadelphia. nant with both PAGE and Although party, not raised either the effect of Section 17.1 on standing question traditional notions of must because the be addressed they appellants’ assumption may attempt is so intertwined with standing invoke an alternative avenue of under William Penn.
112 previously, Assembly
as discussed gave standing a decision in appeal zoning Philadelphia to two classes of persons and entities —the governing body “any aggrieved and case, In this person.” appellants are not a “governing body” question and relevant for our is whether purposes they are “aggrieved person” an as set forth in Section 17.1. Once again, as stated previously, merely Section 17.1 states who an include, 1143, “aggrieved person” does not see but p. infra does not define who an “aggrieved person” is and we must turn to the tools of statutory construction to discern the question. answer to this
The provision relevant of the Statutory Construction Act states that “words and phrases shall be construed accord ing to rules of grammar according to their common approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired peculiar a and appropriate ... meaning shall be according construed to such peculiar and 1903(a). appropriate meaning § or definition.” 1 Pa.C.S. The latter concept “includes words or terms that acquired have particular meaning the law.” Toy Metropolitan See v. Life Co., 20, (2007) 186, Ins. 593 Pa. 928 A.2d (citing Semasek Semasek, 282, (1985)). 502 A.2d “Ag grieved person” has acquired particular in the meaning law. Penn, In William we explained the core concept was party that a “aggrieved.” had to be 346 A.2d at And, 280-81. “aggrieved” when used terms of standing is generally understood to mean that the person “has a substan tial, direct and immediate interest the claim sought be litigated” See, as set forth in William Penn. e.g., & Hospital System Health Ass’n Penn. v. Dep’t Welfare, Public (Pa.2005) Pa. (explaining that under *25 William Penn “where person is not adversely affected in any way by the matter challenged, he is not aggrieved thus has no standing judicial to obtain a resolution of that challenge.”); Kane, Bergdoll 72, 1261, 1269 v. 557 Pa. 731 A.2d (1999); see also Sparacino Philadelphia Zoning Bd. Adjustment, 445, (Pa.Commw.1999) 728 A.2d (explaining 752, § that 2 Pa.C.S. which provides “any that person ag- an of a grieved” by adjudication agency, local means that the Penn). must person By establish under William the employing person” term without further “aggrieved expli- of that conclude that phrase, Assembly cation we the General intended to use that as it is understood in phrase generally set forth in today law as Penn. conclusion may William Our be if the fit Assembly different General had seen to include a explanation “aggrieved further person” within Section 17.1. See, Subsidies, e.g., Against Gambling Citizens Inc. v. Penn- Board, sylvania Gaming Control 916 A.2d (2007) (explaining purposes § that of 2 Pa.C.S. notions traditional do not because aggrievement apply General Assembly expressly qualified “aggrieved” the term to a party mean a “direct in having proceedings).. interest” But, in the further guidance absence of from the General on Assembly meaning as “aggrieved person” contained n withinSection 17.1, we conclude that the Assembly intended to use phrase it has acquired particular meaning in the by law as defined William Penn.
Having term by employing concluded that “aggrieved 17.1, person” the General Assembly intended use the term as understood generally and defined William Penn, we now parties’ turn to the arguments regarding whether appellants are “aggrieved persons” under the Wil- liam Penn standard.
Appellant Spahn out that an points is “aggrieved” party one is directly, who adversely, immediately, and substantially af- by fected a judgment, Penn, decree or order. See William 282-83. Spahn aggrieved asserts that he is since he lives a block away subject and a half from the property and walks the property every day. According to Spahn, the granting variance will have a negative effect on proper- value, aesthetics, ty neighborhood revitalization.
Appellants SCRUB and the civic organizations assert that have a track they historical record in community opposing zoning impact variances detrimentally com- munity. out Appellants point that there no neighbors are some areas of object zoning issues and *26 like groups unless be served interests will not
public policy
that case law
assert
Appellants
given standing.
are
SCRUB
as
parties”
“aggrieved
as
groups
of civic
standing
supports
in
and
improving
an interest
have
groups
as those
long
Ass’n v.
Society Hill Civic
a certain area. See
preserving
(Pa.Commw.2006);
I,&
Finally, appellants
members of
since
“aggrieved” parties,
are
they
contend that
sign
billboard
proposed
in the
vicinity
their
live
groups
Furthermore,
from their homes.
sign
see the
and could
that their
assuring
claim to have an interest
organizations
community
in fostering
by blight,
are unaffected
communities
signs.
billboard
opposing illegal
development,
has not
appellant Spahn
replies
Woodstock
Appellee
any way. Appellee
aggrieved
that he was
established
any adverse
no evidence of
Spahn presented
asserts that
before
position
the Board’s action. His
resulting
effect
from
comply
zoning
did not
with
the Board was that Woodstock
it
proof entitling
burden of
and did not meet its
requirements
and, therefore,
other than that
he has no interest
to a variance
meet the
in the area and does not
common to all citizens
standing.
definition of
“aggrieved” party
also filed
Company
Keystone
BDB
Outdoor
Appellees
definition set
aggrieved party
that under the
asserting
reply
Penn,
must estab-
seeking standing
a party
forth in William
concrete, rather than abstract.”
a harm that is “real and
lish
Penn). Appellees
at 34
William
Appellees
(quoting
Brief of
they
organizations also assert that
Appellants SCRUB and the civic
they
hearings
standing
participated in the
before
have
because
According
appellants,
Court has allowed
the Commonwealth
Board.
objectors
upon
before a
standing
party
participation
mere
to a
based
Hearing
Twp.,
Zoning
Bd. Richland
zoning
See Johnson v.
board.
(1986);
Hearing
Zoning
Bd.
A.2d 1117
Baker v.
Pa.Cmwlth.
Goshen,
(Pa.Commw.1976).
argument, howev-
This
West
BDB
and
Outdoor
that
Company
Keystone
argue
Society
Pittsburgh
grant general standing
Hill and
Trust do not
any
group
civic
whose mission is to
a certain area.
preserve
Rather,
cases,
the
groups
those
civic
had intimate involve-
projects
ment with the
and the members
in the
resided
Thus,
immediate
the
neighborhoods
projects.
affected
appellees conclude unless a civic association can show that one
of its members is suffering
injury
immediate or threatened
action,
a result of the
challenged
association does not have
standing. Brief of
BDB
Appellees
Company
Keystone
Outdoor at 41 citing
Pennsylvania
North-Central
Trial Law-
Weaver,
(Pa.Commw.2003).
Ass’n. v.
yers
Applying appel than greater any lants have not demonstrated an interest citizen the civic Philadelphia. Regarding other associations’ EAP appeal essentially associations admit the action purpose bringing zoning their is enforce Code, the erec provisions Philadelphia Zoning oppose billboards, community tion of and foster illegal development. laudable, while are no different from the purposes These that all in the abstract interest citizens have outcome of the proceedings. Additionally, although claim that appellants they *28 have members who live in the “vicinity” proposed sign, these a mile members reside over from the proposed sign. facts, appellants Under such cannot establish that have they an standing “aggrieved” party.
Turning appellant Spahn, appellee Woodstock cor that rectly points argument out his before the Board was a legal one—directed at whether appellee Woodstock estab lished there was an unnecessary hardship requiring the Therefore, of the grant variance. he failed to establish that he was “aggrieved” by granting variance. Accordingly, the lower courts appropriately concluded that did appellants satisfy not the traditional “aggrieved” notions common law party standing. concluded that
Having appellants have not established that they 17.1, are “aggrieved persons” under Section we will briefly address the civic association appellants’ remaining ar- guments.14 Appellants Hill and point Society Pittsburgh Pennsylvania Develop- 13. The full title of the act "The is Race Horse Gaming ment and Act.” regard appellant Spahn 14. This matter is concluded with as he is not aggrieved standing and does not raise the additional issues. Trust in support of their argument concept “ag- grievement” has been expanded when civic associations are involved and civic associations be granted should standing cases in which their mission or is purpose implicated. Howev- er, these cases factually are from distinguishable the matters before this Court. The lower courts determined that groups involved would be aggrieved by challenged decision under William Penn and did not indicate a grant to civic Thus, associations Society Hill generally. court pointed out that the association was in the intimately involved negotiations for the preservation of facades of the townhouses in the Society Hill area and that the associations had partici- in the pated public Furthermore, hearings. the association’s purpose was to promote preservation of historic buildings the Society Hill area Hill, of Philadelphia. Society Trust, at 587. In Pittsburgh the court relied on the fact that the location of the Trust offices were within 200 feet of the proposed relocation of an arcade and that the Trust had made a substantial financial investment in the area surrounding before the court found that the Trust had standing. Contrary to the suggestion of appellants, Society Hill or Pittsburgh Trust do not support the assertion that a civic association does not have to meet the William Penn “aggrieved” party re- quirements in order to have standing. upon herein,
Based our analysis we conclude that Section 17.1 limited the broad grant general taxpayer standing provided for in the Moreover, Code. appellants have not established that the enactment of Section 17.1 violated the *29 single subject rule or that they are entitled to as an “aggrieved persons” under Section 17.1. Accordingly, orders of the Commonwealth Court are affirmed.
Justice participate GREENSPAN did not in consideration or decision of this case. EAKIN, TODD,
Justices and join Justice McCAFFERY opinion. opinion. concurring dissenting BAER files a and
Justice dissenting opinion. files a Justice SAYLOR BAER, dissenting. concurring and Justice lan- plain conclusion that the Majority’s I with the agree Rule Act City the First Home 17.1 of Class guage Section (“Home 13131.1, Act”), right § eliminated the Rule 53 P.S. appeal zoning absent Philadelphia taxpayers, aggrievement, which Philadelphia, facilities or locale impacting decisions 14-807(1) of the had been Section previously granted Nevertheless, ruling I would not find this Philadelphia Code. I that House Bill No. dispositive of this case because believe Act, 1954, 17.1 of the Home Rule which amended Section 3, III, subject rule of Article single violated the Section Pennsylvania Constitution. III, 3, Article sets forth Majority recognizes,
As the Section Assembly, precluding a dual mandate for the General subject, than one and of a bill that contains more passage subject be in the bill’s requiring clearly expressed that such Expansion title. Fund v. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling (“PAGE”), 275, 383, 394 877 A.2d Commonwealth (2005).1,2 The aim of is to general provision this constitutional an legislative process encourage restraints on the “place deliberative, at government.” and accountable Id. open, omitted). (citations III, Article specifically, More Section adopted practice inserting single was “to curb the into a bill subjects legislation a number of distinct and independent the real of the bill.” Id. at purposefully hiding purpose thereto, single subject requirement prohibits 395. Related III, Pennsylvania provides: 1. Article Section 3 of the Constitution containing subject, passed be than one which shall No bill shall more title, clearly expressed except general appropriation bill be in its or codifying part compiling or the law or a thereof. bill 3, § PA. CONST. Art. 3. any challenge clearly Majority correctly ex-
119 on their attachment of riders that could not become law re and ensures more considered popular legislation, own to Thus, Id. in legislation by view of lawmakers. proposed goals the constitutional and the it fur language accord with thers, we have held that the various provisions legislation objective assist in out the bill’s main or be carrying must “germane” principal subject pass otherwise to the bill’s (citing City constitutional muster. Id. v. (2003)). Commonwealth, 542, 566, 575 Pa. 587 scenarios, test to real-life Application germaneness however, difficult, has to be as the restrictions set proven III, forth Article do not lend themselves to a bright-line recently acknowledged rule. This Court has of this constitutional have interpretations provision historically constructions, fluctuated from fairly strict which constrain the as Legislature by striking presumably unconstitutional multi- subject legislation, interpretations, to more liberal which af- ford deference to the Legislature’s bill-drafting procedures. City Philadelphia, See A.2d at 587.
For ex rel. v. Hum- example, Commonwealth Woodruff (1927), 288 Pa. phrey, 136 A. this Court applied somewhat of a strict constructionist and viewed a approach bill that regulated surveyors professional land engineers subjects. rejected two containing separate We contention that the legislation single subject addressed the of the regula- tion of the engineering profession, which would encompass Instead, land as a minor branch surveyors thereof. the Court relied on the reference to the legislation’s repeated profession “or” land thus engineering surveying, conveying idea of two which separate professions, separate indicates two sub- jects of the bill.
Similarly, 581, 185 Mills Yardley Bogardus, Co. (1936), A. legislation this Court examined which contained (1) provisions, three which: relieved water canal companies obligation waterways to maintain obtained from the Com (2) monwealth; granted companies right such to sell the (3) water from these waterways purposes; commercial authorized the acquire Commonwealth to water canal lands
gift, portions and to sell of them. that all of Notwithstanding canals, the provisions pertained subject of water we *31 provisions held that the various were not sufficiently germane scrutiny single subject to one another to survive under the test. Id. at 221. Comm’n, in Fumo v.
Conversely,
Public Util.
Similarly, Schweiker, in City Philadelphia v. (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), the Commonwealth Court upheld leg- (1) Governor, islation which: authorized the rather than the to Mayor, appoint members of the Philadelphia Au- Parking (2) thority; and required to Municipal Authority transfer enumerated funds to the Philadelphia District. School Not- withstanding disparate nature of provisions, the Com- monwealth Court held that the bill at issue did not violate III, Article Section municipalities because and parking intertwined,” authorities are “inextricably and that the overall subject of the legislation was “authorities that benefit munici- palities.” Id. 1225.3
While I am confident that the
Assembly
can per-
form its
function
legislative
under either a strict or liberal
construction
it
paradigm,
clearly has the right to know the
standard under which it
required
is
to operate. As this case
presents an opportunity for this
to juxtapose
Court
two recent
PAGE,
pronouncements, City
Philadelphia and
on this
important
them,
constitutional issue and to reconcile
I offer
trend,
recognition
3.
In
expressed
of this
this Court
concern that this
III,
application of Article
"has resulted in a situation where
has,
effect,
germaneness
point
been diluted to the
where it has been
according
assessed
single,
to whether
the court can
fashion
over-
arching topic
loosely
subjects
to
relate the various
included in the
City Philadelphia,
under
statute
review."
In City Philadelphia, bill at issue amended Title (Municipal Corporations) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated alia, Statutes by, inter modifying governance local and related matters; administrative altering the size and composition of the Pennsylvania board; Convention Center’s governing re- pealing a portion of the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Co- operation Authority Class; Cities of the First and adding to Title a new “Chapter entitled “Contractor Bonds 58,” and Financial Security for Redevelopment Contracts.” Id. at In response challenge the legislation violated the single subject III, *32 requirement of Article Section the Commonwealth parties maintained that all of the provisions of the bill related to the single subject of “municipalities.” rejected
Our Court contention, this holding the vast subject of “municipalities” encompassed all virtually matters of local government, and was too broad to qualify for single- subject III, status under Article Section 3. Id. at 589. Finding object the of the bill to be an omnibus amendment of Title of the Pennsylvania Statutes, Consolidated we concluded that there was single no unifying subject to which all of provisions of the act were germane. Id. While recognizing that it was appropriate, degree, some under a “deference standard” to hypothesize broad reasonably of topics legislation in III, Article evaluating stated, Section 3 challenges, we “[tjhere limits, must be however, as otherwise all virtually legislation, no matter how substance, diverse in would meet the single-subject requirement.” Id. at 588. that,
We cautioned limitation, absent such “Section 3 would be rendered impotent to guard against evils that it was designed to curtail.” Id. Significant case, to the instant Court expressly discounted the constitutional significance of the fact that all of the provisions of the challenged statute were ultimately codified within Title Id. at 590. Specifi- cally, we stated: ultimately are provisions the statute’s that all of
Finally,
importance.
Title 53 is of little constitutional
codified within
[(Pa.Cmwlth.
Weaver,
364,] 370
[v.
DeWeese
Cf.
(“The
...
2003)]
in substantive law
changes
fact that the
not,
does
Code
forth as amendments
Judicial
were set
III,
Article
itself,
of
satisfy
requirements
in and
3.”).
Section
City Philadelphia, City when I was not a member of Court While and, in decided, I the decision by was am bound event, reasoning. with its sound any agree later, Court, exam- joined again after I we years Two III, opinion Article in a unanimous PAGE. ined Pennsylvania that authorized the legislation involved PAGE Racing and Horse Police to aid the State Harness State checks and veri- history criminal performing Commissions for licensure under the Race applicants fying fingerprints extensively Act 1981. The bill was Industry Horse Reform and, form, amended, Pennsylvania final created the its Board; of gambling addressed issuance Gaming Control casinos; machine dealt authorizing licenses the creation of slot and distribution of revenues from the generation with funds; provided and the creation of numerous licenses legislation, placing and enforcement of the administration jurisdiction gaming ap- our exclusive over enumerated Court peals. *33 based on Article upheld against challenge the statute
We 3, III, subject that the of most finding single unifying the of regulation gaming.4 of the bill at issue was provisions Thus, that of complex piece legislation we concluded the therein provisions constitutional muster because passed single subject gaming. related to the of We distin- logically of City Philadelphia, noting single topic guished “[t]he of subjects the limitless number of gaming encompass does not PAGE, funding addressing were provisions In a few of the bill issues rule, majority single subject of the violate the while the clear found to provisions upheld. were 123 heading ‘municipali- under the of could be encompassed which ” Id., at 396. ties.’ harmony to be in and Philadelphia I find PAGE City of subjects of the bills at purported the with one another because above, the in their As noted scope. distinguishable issue are Philadelphia simply in were City covered subjects different of PAGE, in at issue Conversely, legislation the too disparate. involved the complexity, the bill’s or length of regardless that for those few gaming (except provisions issue of single germaneness). struck for lack of properly this Court us, Legislature passed simple In matter before the the section, In its first the bill increased and understandable bill. In Philadelphia fines and forfeitures for violations of Code. bill, eliminated stand- taxpayer the second it provision zoning applicable part, in cases. In ing these two are provisions ger- before us is whether question words, other; in other whether these two mane to each subject. I am single are tied to a provisions legitimately faith, I to answer “no” because find that compelled, good Rule Act” or “Phila- subject of “amendment to Home in- constitutionally is more akin to delphia government” subject City Philadelphia, firm than “municipalities” of of subject “gaming” present the cohesive of PAGE. should not strike a fully recognize legisla-
I that this Court and violates clearly, plainly palpably tive enactment unless it Gaming Control Pennsylvania the Constitution. DePaul (Pa.2009). However, Board, 536, I hearken back A.2d Philadelphia, of which warned that sage City wisdom of here, home “Philadelphia acceptance “municipalities,” subjects authorized constitutionally single rule government” safeguards beyond recogni- the constitutional would stretch tion, little more protection the constitutional relegate 838 A.2d at City Philadelphia, than rhetoric. See citing, Payne Borough Coudersport, v. School Distr. (1895) curiam) (indicating (per Pa. 31 A. not be subjects apart they may
“no are so wide two focus, if view carried point into a common be brought enough”). back far
124 reasons,
For these I would for the clarify Pennsylvania Legislature that both City Philadelphia and PAGE were decided, correctly and that the statute under scrutiny herein falls under the precedent established in City Philadelphia, and consistent therewith should be stricken as unconstitution- al. SAYLOR,
Justice dissenting. the question On of whether Act 193 of 2004 violates the Pennsylvania rule, Constitution’s single-subject I find this to be a close case and believe that majority and Mr. Justice Baer both supply reasoned arguments in support of their respective positions. reasons, For however, the following I ultimately Baer, favor the view articulated Justice that the act subjects contains multiple III, in violation of Article Sec- tion join opinion his except noted below. true,
It is as the majority emphasizes, that both substantive sections of the bill amend the City First Class Home Rule Act to enhance or delimit the specific powers of first-class cities: Section increases the monetary ceiling for fines and forfei- tures resulting from ordinances, rules, violations of city regulations, and gives city’s legislative body challenge decisions of the zoning hearing board. Certainly, the first of these items constitutes a relatively minor modification Home Rule Act. The second one also appears, at first glance, to represent adjustment a slight to a city’s first-class powers. If that were the extent of the issue, that, I would conclude while the specific type of munici- pal authority addressed in each section is arguably unrelated other, they permissible are in one bill insofar as both pertain specifically to the local powers governing bodies in cities of the first class. See generally City Phila. v. Commonwealth, 542, 578, (2003) (“We believe that exercising deference by rea- hypothesizing sonably topics broad in this manner is appropriate to some degree, because it helps ensure that Article III does not become a license for the judiciary a pedantic ‘exercise tyranny’ over the efforts of the Legislature.” (quoting In re *35 Commonwealth, 620, 626, Dep’t Transp., 511 Pa. 515 A.2d of (1986))). 899, 902 me,
The
for
from
difficulty,
implications
arises
the broader
of the
in
2
the bill
change
standing. Section
of
(adding
Act)
17.1 to the Home Rule
class of parties
Section
alters the
pursue zoning
with
to
con-
appeals,
previously
as
14-1807(1)
by Section
of
Home Rule
Philadelphia’s
trolled
minimum,
It does
at a
by,
Charter.
this
to
granting standing
city’s legislative
§
the
See 53
body.
Additionally,
P.S.
13131.1.
according to the
of that provision adopted by
construction
both
Baer,
majority
the
and
it
power
Justice
removes the
of first
class cities
to
for
broadly
provide
taxpayer standing relative to
101-02,
zoning disputes.
Majority Opinion,
See
at
977
at
A.2d
1143;
118-19,
Concurring
Dissenting Opinion, at
977 A.2d
J.).
(Baer,
argument
against
1153
One
the
interposed
enforceability of the
is that
interpreted
act as
thusly
taxpayer
standing within a
of
city
purely
first class
is a matter
local
and, therefore,
concern
the
Home Rule Charter’s
in
provision
regard may
by
this
not be
state
superseded
law.
Brief for
at 39. The
Appellant
majority
See
answers this
contention
that
observing
standing to
pursue
zoning
in
appeal
the state’s
Judicial System
Unified
has a statewide
as it
dynamic,
defines the class of parties authorized to invoke
judiciary
whole,
resources
Commonwealth’s
including
appellate
its
Majority Opinion,
courts. See
at 103-
04,
Thus,
that,
one governing their bod- of first class cities—or powers specific interest, sense local a broader purely matters of ies—on (and matters of touches on only provision) that provision concern. statewide Assembly could never say
This is not to one has a single only in a bill where provisions include two Here, however, the two substantive sec- dynamic. statewide and the essentially topics, of Act 193 address unrelated tions access to a branch of the Com- only second section controls circumstances, these I monwealth’s Under government. too far simply conclude that the latter is provision would *36 test that satisfy germaneness removed from the former to III, in relation to Article 3’s developed Court has Section single-subject rule. I would find that the bill
Finally, analysis under above rule of whether single-subject regardless violates the Section was intended to “aggrieved person” 2’s narrow definition of 14-2807 of taxpayer standing granted by eliminate Section because, Home Rule This is either Charter. (the to a way, grants standing city entity City Council) previously standing. Accordingly, that did not have I decline to reach the construction issue. In all statutory would join I Baer’s respects concurring dissenting other Justice opinion.