City of Phila. v. Sessions
309 F. Supp. 3d 289
E.D. Pa.2018Background
- Philadelphia sued the U.S. Attorney General challenging three conditions attached to FY2017 Byrne JAG grant funds: (1) ICE access to City prisons to interview inmates, (2) advance notice to ICE of inmate releases upon ICE request, and (3) certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The City sought injunction, declaratory relief, and mandamus to obtain its $1.598M award.
- The court held a preliminary injunction, conducted discovery, appointed a Special Master, and held a four-day bench trial. The court adopted many of the Special Master’s factual findings.
- City evidence showed City policies limit inquiries about immigration status, require inmate consent for ICE interviews in City prisons, and provide advance notice to ICE only upon presentation of a judicial warrant; databases (PARS, AFIS/NGI, Lock and Track) provide some information to ICE but often only self-reported and not reliably actionable.
- DOJ relied primarily on a Backgrounder, press releases, and a 2007 OIG report as justification for the new conditions; the administrative record did not contain contemporaneous, persuasive factual support tying the conditions to Byrne program purposes.
- The court found the Access and Notice conditions exceeded statutory authority (ultra vires), violated separation of powers, and were arbitrary and capricious under the APA; it also held § 1373 (the certification condition) unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment in light of Murphy v. NCAA, while alternatively finding Philadelphia substantially complies as to criminal aliens.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOJ had statutory authority under the Byrne/JAG statutes to impose the Access and Notice conditions (ultra vires / APA Count I) | DOJ lacks authority in 34 U.S.C. §§ 10102/10153 to attach substantive conditions to formula Byrne grants | DOJ argues broad delegations let the Assistant Attorney General attach conditions to advance grant purposes | Court: Access and Notice conditions exceed statutory authority and are ultra vires; summary judgment for City on those conditions |
| Whether imposing the conditions violated separation of powers (Count II) | Conditioning federally-appropriated Byrne funds on local execution of federal immigration enforcement intrudes on state/local functions | DOJ contends conditions are policy choices within executive authority to administer grants | Court: Conditions violate separation of powers; unlawful |
| Whether DOJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adding all three conditions (Count III) | DOJ failed to examine relevant data or provide reasoned explanation for departuring from prior practice; administrative record is inadequate | DOJ points to press materials and OIG reports as justification | Court: Decision to impose the three conditions was arbitrary and capricious under the APA; vacated/ enjoined |
| Whether certification under 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is constitutional and/or enforceable as a grant condition (Tenth Amendment / Spending Clause / Counts IV–VI) | § 1373 (and conditioning funds on compliance) commandeers local governments and is unconstitutional post-Murphy; alternatively City asserts it substantially complies regarding criminal aliens | DOJ argues immigration is federal and § 1373 is a valid information-sharing statute and permissible preemption/condition | Court: §§ 1373(a)-(b) invalid under the Tenth Amendment in light of Murphy; certification condition also arbitrary and capricious; alternatively Court finds Philadelphia substantially complies for criminal-aliens scenarios and will adopt procedures for judicial orders for transfers |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (district court preliminary-injunction opinion addressing Byrne JAG conditions)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming preliminary injunction; AAG lacked authority to impose Access and Notice conditions)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (Tenth Amendment anticommandeering holding; informed court’s invalidation of § 1373 conditions)
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens; discussed in relation to federal detention/removal authority)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (statutory construction of immigration detention provisions; informs treatment of "criminal alien" detention)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anticommandeering precedent invalidating direct federal orders to state officers)
- Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (Driver's Privacy Protection Act upheld; court distinguishes its facts from § 1373)
- NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Spending Clause coercion analysis referenced in Spending-Clause discussion)