309 F. Supp. 3d 271
E.D. Pa.2018Background
- Philadelphia applied for and routinely received Edward Byrne JAG formula grant funds and planned to use FY2017 funds for police training, youth programs, and naloxone distribution.
- In 2016–2017 DOJ/Office of Justice Programs announced three conditions for FY2017 JAG grants: (1) Certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (Certification Condition); (2) advance notice to DHS of certain inmate releases (Notice Condition); and (3) federal immigration agents' access to local detention facilities (Access Condition).
- Philadelphia has city policies limiting immigration-status inquiries and disclosures (Police Mem. 01-06, Confidentiality Order, Exec. Order 5-16, ICE interview consent protocol) and alleges these policies are consistent with § 1373 as constitutionally construed.
- The City sued Attorney General Sessions challenging the three conditions across six counts: ultra vires/APA, separation of powers/APA, arbitrary and capricious/APA, Spending Clause, Tenth Amendment (commandeering), and a declaratory judgment that the City complies with § 1373.
- The district court previously granted a preliminary injunction and, on the instant motion, denied the Attorney General’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all counts, finding the City’s allegations sufficient to state plausible claims and that the controversy is ripe.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to impose conditions (APA/ultra vires) | DOJ lacks statutory authority to impose the three conditions on formula Byrne JAG grants | DOJ cites 34 U.S.C. §10102(a)(6), §10110(2) and §10153(a)(5)(D) to support placing conditions and requiring compliance with federal laws such as §1373 | Denied dismissal — close question on statutory authority; factual allegations plausibly state ultra vires claim and survive 12(b)(6) |
| Separation of powers (APA) | AG usurped Congress’s appropriations power by imposing unauthorized conditions and withholding funds, violating Take Care and Presentment principles | DOJ acted within delegated authority in administering grants | Denied dismissal — City plausibly alleged executive overreach inconsistent with faithful execution of laws |
| Arbitrary and capricious (APA) | DOJ failed to provide reasoned explanation linking conditions to Byrne program purposes and did not consider alternatives; policy reversal unexplained | DOJ had rational justifications and explanation for imposing conditions related to information sharing and public safety | Denied dismissal — pleadings and documents show plausible claim that DOJ’s explanations are inadequate under the APA |
| Spending Clause | Conditions are not germane to Byrne JAG’s criminal-justice purposes and are ambiguous, thus violating Spending Clause limits | Immigration enforcement relates to criminal justice; conditions reasonably relate to federal interest in program | Denied dismissal — City plausibly stated Spending Clause claim, particularly as to Access and Notice conditions; Certification is a closer call but remains plausible |
| Tenth Amendment / Commandeering | Conditions would compel local officials to enforce federal immigration law or alter local policies, amounting to unconstitutional commandeering | The City can decline the discretionary grant; no direct federal compulsion | Denied dismissal — City plausibly alleged coercive pressure (Hobson’s choice) and potential unlawful federal direction/supervision under 34 U.S.C. §10228(a) |
| Declaratory relief re §1373 compliance | City asserts its policies already comply with §1373 and seeks a declaration so it may lawfully certify | DOJ contends City’s policies conflict with §1373 and that declaratory relief is improper | Denied dismissal — City alleged sufficient facts to sustain a declaratory-judgment claim that its policies comply with §1373 |
Key Cases Cited
- Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (improper for Executive to withhold or refuse to spend congressionally appropriated funds)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (standing/ripeness principles for review of agency action)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (definition of final agency action under the APA)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (arbitrary and capricious standard for agency action)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (Spending Clause limits: relatedness, clarity, and other constraints)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (anti-commandeering principle; limits on Congress offering an unconstitutional choice to states)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (federal direction of state officers unconstitutional under anti-commandeering)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (Spending Clause conditionality treated as contract-like obligations)
- Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (limits on conditional spending and federal coercion in grant programs)
- Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir.) (immigration detainers cannot compel local agencies to detain; anti-commandeering implications)
- City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa.) (earlier PI opinion discussing merits and ripeness)