City of Montebello v. Vasquez
1 Cal. 5th 409
| Cal. | 2016Background
- In 2012 the City of Montebello sued three former councilmembers (Urteaga, Salazar, Vasquez) and a former city administrator (Torres) under Gov. Code §1090, seeking to void a waste-hauling contract with Athens and to disgorge campaign contributions alleged to be tied to the contract.
- The Athens contract had been approved by a 3–2 council vote; Vasquez (acting mayor pro tem) later signed the contract. The contract was subsequently set aside in a separate citizen suit.
- Defendants filed an anti‑SLAPP motion under Code Civ. Proc. §425.16; the trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeal affirmed in part.
- Key legal disputes: whether the City’s suit falls within the anti‑SLAPP public‑enforcement exemption (§425.16(d)); whether councilmembers’ votes and related statements are "protected activity" under §425.16; and whether alleged illegality (Gov. Code §1090) defeats anti‑SLAPP protection at the threshold.
- The California Supreme Court held the public‑enforcement exemption did not apply (City did not bring the action "in the name of the People" by a public prosecutor) but reversed the Court of Appeal on the protected‑activity question, ruling the votes and deliberations were acts "in furtherance of" protected petition/speech and thus fall within §425.16; the case was remanded for the second‑step (likelihood of prevailing) analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §425.16(d) public‑enforcement exemption applies | City: its enforcement action to void contract and disgorge funds is a public enforcement suit exempt from anti‑SLAPP | Defs: action is not brought "in the name of the People" by AG/DA/city attorney as public prosecutor, so no exemption | Exemption does not apply — the statute is limited to actions "in the name of the People" and brought by the specified public prosecutors |
| Whether councilmembers’ votes/statements are "protected activity" under §425.16(b)(1)/(e) | City: voting is not protected (relying on Carrigan) so anti‑SLAPP inapplicable | Defs: votes and pre‑vote statements are acts "in furtherance of" speech/petition on a public issue under §425.16(e) | Votes and deliberative statements qualify as protected activity under §425.16(e); Carrigan is not dispositive because statute covers acts "in furtherance of" constitutional rights |
| Whether alleged illegal conduct (Gov. Code §1090) defeats anti‑SLAPP protection at step one | City: the votes were illegal as matter of law, so Flatley requires denying anti‑SLAPP at threshold | Defs: illegality is disputed factually and legally; not conceded or conclusively shown | Illegality defense is premature; Flatley applies only where illegality is conceded or conclusively demonstrated, so threshold protection stands and the court remands to consider second‑step merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53 (statutory two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework and scope of protected activity)
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (exceptions to anti‑SLAPP must be explicit; interpret statute per its plain language)
- Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (a legislator’s vote is not First Amendment‑protected speech)
- Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (illegal conduct not protected by §425.16 when illegality is clear or conceded)
- City of Colton v. Singletary, 206 Cal.App.4th 751 (interpreting §425.16(d) narrowly; exemption limited to actions in the People’s name by AG/DA/city attorney)