941 F.3d 931
9th Cir.2019Background
- Byrne JAG is a federal formula grant program administered by DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to fund state and local criminal-justice programs.
- For FY2017 OJP added two conditions to Byrne JAG awards: (1) a "notice" condition requiring recipients to honor DHS requests for advance notice of the scheduled release date/time of detained aliens held in local correctional facilities; and (2) an "access" condition requiring recipients to allow federal agents access to meet with detained aliens or individuals believed to be aliens.
- The FY2017 award letter characterized those conditions as an "authorized and priority purpose" of the award and threatened loss of funding for noncompliance; Los Angeles applied for the grant but declined to commit to compliance and sued to enjoin enforcement.
- The district court entered a preliminary injunction against DOJ’s use of the notice and access conditions; DOJ appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding DOJ lacked statutory authority under 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) to impose those conditions and that related Byrne JAG provisions (§ 10153(a)(4) and (5)(C)) did not authorize them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 10102(a)(6) authorized DOJ to impose the notice and access conditions as "special conditions" or "priority purposes" on Byrne JAG grants | Los Angeles: §10102(a)(6) does not grant DOJ independent authority to impose these conditions on all formula-grant recipients; conditions exceed statutory purposes. | DOJ: 2006 amendment to §10102(a)(6) ("including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants") gives Assistant AG authority to impose such conditions and declare them priority purposes. | Held: §10102(a)(6) does not authorize DOJ to impose these conditions. "Special conditions" are individualized, risk‑based measures; "priority purposes" must be among purposes listed in §10152(a). The immigration conditions fit neither definition. |
| Whether § 10153(a)(4) or § 10153(a)(5)(C) authorize the notice or access conditions | Los Angeles: These provisions require programmatic reporting and prior coordination related to Byrne-funded programs, not ad hoc compliance with DHS immigration requests or ongoing access obligations. | DOJ: §10153(a)(4) permits requiring programmatic information; §10153(a)(5)(C) requires coordination with affected agencies, supporting the access/notice conditions. | Held: Rejected DOJ. §10153(a)(4)’s "programmatic" reporting pertains to Byrne-funded programs, not DHS release notices; §10153(a)(5)(C) requires prior coordination relating to the funded program, not an ongoing obligation to allow DHS access as required by the access condition. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejected broad reading of §10102(a)(6) as stand-alone grant of authority to impose any condition).
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (similar rejection of an unconstrained delegation in §10102(a)(6)).
- City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (agency lacks power to act absent congressional authorization).
- La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) (an agency has no authority to act unless conferred by Congress).
- United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) (statutory construction canon: give effect to every clause and word of a statute).