City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern
174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67
Cal.2014Background
- Los Angeles and others recycled municipal biosolids on Kern County farmland; Kern enacted Measure E (2006) banning biosolids in unincorporated Kern.
- Los Angeles sued in federal court asserting federal (dormant commerce, equal protection) and state-law (preemption, excess of police power) claims; district court entered judgment for plaintiffs on federal grounds.
- Ninth Circuit reversed for lack of prudential standing on the dormant commerce claim and vacated the judgment, leaving only state-law preemption; the case was remanded and the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
- Los Angeles refiled in state court 78 days after federal dismissal; Kern argued the refiling was time-barred under § 1367(d).
- The Court of Appeal adopted a “suspension” reading of § 1367(d) (tolling suspends the limitations clock for the entire federal pendency and restarts it 30 days after dismissal); California Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split and interpret § 1367(d).
- The California Supreme Court held § 1367(d) provides a 30-day grace period to refile otherwise time-barred claims (the “grace period” approach), reversing the Court of Appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "tolled" in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) | § 1367(d) suspends the statute of limitations during federal pendency and restarts it 30 days after dismissal (suspension) | § 1367(d) provides only a 30-day grace period to refile in state court when a claim would otherwise be barred (grace period) | Adopted the grace period reading: § 1367(d) gives plaintiffs a 30-day safe harbor to refile state claims that would otherwise be lost; reversed Court of Appeal |
| Proper interpretive aids when text is ambiguous | Rely on the statute's plain text favoring suspension | Consult legislative history, ALI model, and federalism canons favoring narrower preemption | Where text is ambiguous, legislative history and presumption against preemption support the narrower grace-period interpretation |
| Federalism/preemption concern from § 1367(d) | Suspension is consistent with federal interest in preserving claims | Suspension/substitution unduly preempts state limitations and expands federal intrusion | Applied clear‑statement/presumption against preemption to prefer least intrusive (grace period) construction |
| Effect on plaintiffs who file early | Suspension best preserves plaintiffs’ rights regardless of when filed | Grace period protects plaintiffs who would otherwise lose claims without unduly extending state limits | Grace period balances preserving claims and minimizing interference with state statute‑of‑limitations regimes |
Key Cases Cited
- United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims sharing a common nucleus of operative fact)
- Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (§ 1367(d) prevents limitations period from expiring while plaintiff pursues federal forum)
- Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (apply clear‑statement/preemption principles when federal law alters state limitations)
- Carnegie‑Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (forum choice and coordination of federal/state proceedings; context for § 1367 concerns)
- Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal.App.4th 402 (California Court of Appeal adopting the grace‑period interpretation)
- Bonifield v. County of Nevada, 94 Cal.App.4th 298 (California Court of Appeal adopting the suspension interpretation)
- People v. Leiva, 56 Cal.4th 498 (discussing the common understanding of "tolling" as suspension)