City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 443 P.3d 504

Background

In March 2015 Salsgiver was charged in Kalispell Municipal Court with partner or family member assault (PFMA) and criminal mischief; he was released on conditions requiring his personal attendance and warned that failure to appear would waive a jury trial.
A May 5, 2015 omnibus hearing was noticed; Salsgiver did not personally appear though counsel attended; the Municipal Court found he waived his right to a jury trial and set a bench trial, issuing a warrant for his arrest.
After arrest in October 2015 and arraignment, defense counsel moved for a jury trial; the Municipal Court denied the motion as waived due to the prior nonappearance; bench trial followed and Salsgiver was convicted of both charges.
Sentencing: PFMA — 364 days with 362 suspended and 2 days credit; criminal mischief — suspended 180 days, fines/fees totaling $400; Salsgiver entered a written installment agreement which included a $10 contract fee, 10% annual interest, and a prohibition on prepayment.
On appeal to the District Court the denial of the jury demand was affirmed; on further appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana the Court addressed (1) whether waiver by nonappearance deprived Salsgiver of his Sixth Amendment jury right for the PFMA (a “serious” offense), (2) legality of contractual installment terms, and (3) amount of jail credit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Salsgiver)	Held
Whether failure to appear at omnibus hearing waived jury right	Nonappearance after written/oral warnings constitutes waiver by conduct/default of appearance	Nonappearance did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, voluntary Sixth Amendment waiver for a serious offense	Trial court erred as to PFMA (serious offense); Sixth Amendment waiver not established — PFMA reversed and remanded for jury trial
Whether Article II §26 default-of-appearance doctrine applies to serious offenses	Article II §26 and prior Montana cases permit waiver by nonappearance	Article II §26 analyses (from petty-offense cases) cannot bypass Sixth Amendment § waiver standards for serious offenses	Article II §26 waiver precedent applies to petty offenses only; cannot substitute for Sixth Amendment waiver standard for serious offenses
Legality of $10 contract fee, 10% interest, and prepayment prohibition in installment agreement	Agreement and signature indicate acquiescence; prior cases allowed appellate waiver via acquiescence	These provisions lack statutory authority and are illegal even if defendant signed/assented	Illegal provisions reversed; remand to strike $10 fee, 10% interest, and prepayment bar (overruling prior precedent to the extent it permitted acquiescence to authorize illegal sentencing conditions)
Correct jail-time credit	Two days credited by municipal court; plaintiff concedes error	Salsgiver seeks four days credit	City concedes; Court orders additional two days credit (total four days)

Key Cases Cited

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (U.S. 1968) (federal guarantee of jury trial incorporated against the states)
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (U.S. 1930) (waiver of jury must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (U.S. 1938) (standards for effective waiver of federal constitutional rights)
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1970) (loss of confrontation/presence rights by disruptive conduct; discussed distinction from jury-waiver context)
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1996) (definition of “serious” offense for Sixth Amendment jury right)
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (U.S. 1970) (same: offenses with maximum imprisonment over six months are "serious")
City of Missoula v. Girard, 370 Mont. 443, 303 P.3d 1283 (Mont. 2013) (Montana cases holding nonappearance can waive jury right in petty-offense context; Court distinguishes for serious offenses)