City of Forest Hill, Texas, and Brigette Mathis v. Michielle Benson, in Her Official Capacity and Individually
02-17-00346-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 21, 2017Background
- Michielle Benson filed first for Forest Hill City Council (Place 3) and later filed for the Forest Hill Library Board trustee seat, both to be voted on the same day; she won both elections and was sworn into Council first, then Library Board, on May 17, 2016.
- The city sought an Attorney General (AG) opinion about incompatibility; the AG concluded the two offices were incompatible and that Benson "effectively resigned" her Council seat when she later took the Library Board oath. The AG opinion did not address Tex. Elec. Code § 141.033.
- The City Council, acting on the AG opinion, declared Benson’s Council seat vacant on January 6, 2017 and appointed Brigette Mathis to replace her. Benson sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.
- The trial court (bench trial on agreed facts) held that Election Code § 141.033 barred Benson’s second application (Library Board) because it was filed after her first application, so she was never validly elected to the Library Board; the City’s removal and appointment were void.
- The court entered a permanent injunction restoring Benson to the Council seat and awarded attorney’s fees; the City appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Benson) | Defendant's Argument (City/Mathis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the AG opinion’s retroactive effect should invalidate Benson’s second ballot application or only operate at the time of oath | AG incompatibility relates back to the second filing: §141.033(b) makes any later application invalid, so Benson was never lawfully elected to the Library Board | The AG opinion only operates prospectively/back to the time Benson took the second oath; Election Code §201.025 (acceptance of another office) and §141.034 (challenge limitation) control the result | Court held §141.033 governs: Benson’s second application was invalid, so she was never properly elected to the Library Board; no incompatibility existed to vacate the Council seat |
| Whether Election Code §141.034 barred post-election challenge to candidacy | §141.034(b) excludes determinations of eligibility; therefore time limits for challenging form/content don’t prevent application of §141.033 to invalidate a second filing | City argues ballot-challenge timing made it too late to contest Benson’s dual candidacies | Court held §141.034 does not apply to candidate eligibility determinations; §141.033 controls |
| Whether taking the second oath automatically resigned Benson’s Council seat under §201.025 and common-law "automatic resignation" doctrine | Because the second filing was invalid under §141.033, Benson was not lawfully a Library Board trustee; thus §201.025’s resignation rule and automatic-resignation precedents don’t apply | City relies on §201.025 and older auto-resignation cases (e.g., Pruitt) to justify vacancy upon qualification for second office | Court held those authorities are inapplicable here because the candidate was never validly elected to the second office under §141.033 |
| Whether permanent injunctive relief and attorney’s fees were appropriate | Injunction needed to prevent City’s wrongful interference; fees recoverable under Declaratory Judgment Act | City disputed underlying legal basis but did not challenge fee amounts | Court upheld permanent injunction and awarded attorney’s fees as reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Howell, 707 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1986) (strict enforcement of Election Code §141.033 and invalidation of subsequent filings)
- In re Ducato, 66 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002) (statutory construction should avoid unreasonable or unjust results)
- In re Bell, 91 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. 2002) (related to just and reasonable statutory construction in election contexts)
- Pruitt v. Glenrose Indep. Sch. Dist., 84 S.W.2d 1004 (Tex. 1935) (automatic resignation where an officer later takes a conflicting higher office)