In re Kevin H. BELL, Relator.
No. 02-0034.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Jan. 22, 2002.
91 S.W.3d 784
Jared Ryker Woodfill, Houston, for respondent.
Justice O‘NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice ENOCH, Justice OWEN, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ.
In this original mandamus proceeding, Kevin H. Bell asks this Court to require the Harris County Republican Primary Director and the Harris County Republican Party Chair to certify him as a candidate for Justice of the Peace, Precinct 4, Position 1, on the March 12, 2002, Republican primary election ballot. We must decide whether certain signatures on Bell‘s petition for a place on the ballot are invalid because the signers omitted their city of residence from their address. We conclude that the signatures are not invalid due to this omission and conditionally grant relief.
I
On December 28, 2001, Bell submitted his application for a place on the Republican primary ballot, along with a filing fee and a petition containing voter signatures. By letter dated January 4, 2002, respondents rejected Bell‘s application due to “insufficient signature requirements,” citing
Bell sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals concerning respondents’ action, which the court summarily denied. Bell now seeks mandamus relief from this Court. See
II
For a place on the ballot, Bell needs 250 valid signatures on his petition, see
Without these disputed signatures, Bell concedes that his petition does not contain the required 250 signatures. Moreover, respondents do not dispute that Bell meets the requisite number if these disputed signatures are counted. Thus, we must decide whether the disputed signatures are invalid under the Election Code, because some signers failed to identify their city of residence or their city of residence and zip code when providing their addresses.
III
Texas Election Code section 141.063(a), most recently amended in 1997, provides that a signature on a petition is valid if: “the signer, at the time of signing, is a registered voter of the territory from which the office sought is elected....”
Section 1.003(a), which was added to the Election Code in 1985, states that “[t]he Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision in this code.”
Some courts of appeals have considered the effect of omitting the city or city and zip code from a signer‘s address under earlier versions of the Election Code and concluded that such omissions invalidate the signature. See, e.g., Pierce v. Peters, 599 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, orig. proceeding); Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, orig. proceeding); Gray v. Vance, 567 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, orig. proceeding). However, these cases were decided under a prior version of the Election Code that did not specifically incorporate the Code Construction Act. Nor did these decisions consider the issue in light of the Election Code‘s purpose or “object sought to be attained” by the petition signature requirement. We also note that these cases were decided under an earlier statutory provision that affirmatively stated, “[t]he petition must show the following information with respect to each signer: His address (including his street address if residing in a city, and his rural route address if not residing in a city) ....” (emphasis added). Act of May 22, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2046, 2048 (repealed 1985) (current version at
A few cases decided after the Code Construction Act was incorporated into the Election Code appeared to follow these earlier decisions. See, e.g., Shipley v. Harris County Democratic Executive Comm., 795 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), overruled sub nom. and subsequently vacated as moot Correa v. First Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); Atkinson v. Carter, 785 S.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), overruled sub nom. Carter v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 789 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); Dunn v. Slagle, 783 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), overruled sub nom. Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding). However, these cases did not consider the alleged signature defects in relation to the objects “sought to be attained” by the Election Code, one such object being to prevent election fraud. Moreover, we directed the courts of appeals to withdraw their writs in each of these cases, although not on this particular issue which we did not consider. Thus, their precedential value is questionable.
The more recent decisions to discuss the issue under section 141.063 recognize that the statutory purpose in requiring each signer to list his or her “residence address” is to provide a basis for verifying the voter‘s eligibility (i.e. county residency, qualified voter, etc.) to participate in a particular election. See, e.g., Strachan v. Lanier, 867 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding); Reese v. Commissioners’ Court of Cherokee County, 861 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding); Love v. Veselka, 764 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding); Bacon v. Harris County Republican Executive Comm., 743 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding). These courts concluded that, if this purpose is served, petition signatures are not invalid even though they omit certain information contained in the Election Code‘s definition of “residence address.”
In Reese, for example, the court held that “the failure to include the zip code will not invalidate an otherwise valid petition signature” where “inclusion of the zip code will not help verify the eligibility of those
We believe that these most recent decisions apply a rationale that furthers one of the principal purposes behind the Election Code—the prevention of election fraud—and produces a “just and reasonable result.” See
The Election Code itself recognizes that omitting certain information in the definition of “residence address” will not necessarily invalidate a signature. For example, section 141.063(d) states that the “omission of the state from the signer‘s residence address does not invalidate a signature unless the political subdivision from which the signature is obtained is situated in more than one state.”
IV
Section 141.063(d) states that omitting a zip code will not invalidate a signature. Therefore, the disputed signatures here are not invalid because they omit that information from the “residence address.” Accordingly, we must determine whether the disputed signatures are invalid because they omit the signer‘s city from the “residence address.” Under the Election Code, individuals signing Bell‘s petition must be registered voters of “the territory from which the office sought is elected.”
Bell‘s petition is a form the Secretary of State promulgated and is used in a variety of elections. The petition has spaces for the following information with respect to each signer: (1) the date of signing; (2) printed name; (3) signature; (4) address (city, state, zip code); (5) county of residence; (6) voter registration number; and (7) date of birth. The only information missing from the disputed signatures is
Bell‘s petition contains a statement that he is running for Precinct 4. That statement must be read to each individual before they sign the petition. See
The way to verify that a signer truly resides in Precinct 4 is to examine the voter registration records maintained in the Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector‘s office. The information provided by each person with a disputed signature—birth date, street name and number, county, and voter registration number—is sufficient to allow verification of the signer‘s voting eligibility for this particular election from the Tax Assessor Collector‘s records. Respondents do not contend otherwise. Nor do respondents contend that any verification efforts would be impeded because certain signers did not provide their city of residence.
We therefore conclude that omitting the signers’ city of residence from Bell‘s petition does not undermine the purpose behind the Election Code‘s “residence address” requirement, because there is enough other information to allow voting-eligibility verification for this particular election. Respondents do not contend that the individuals who omitted the city from their “residence address” do not reside within Precinct 4, which is readily verifiable based upon the information provided. Thus, we conclude that the disputed signatures must be counted, and that Bell‘s petition is sufficient to entitle him to a place on the ballot. Because of this holding, we need not consider Bell‘s constitutional arguments.
Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant the writ and order respondents to certify Bell as a candidate for the upcoming Republican primary election and to place his name on the primary ballot. See
Justice BAKER filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice HANKINSON.
Justice BAKER, joined by Justice HANKINSON, dissenting.
“Once more into the breach, dear friends, once more.... The game‘s afoot!” Thus, the Fix-It Gang rides again.1
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Does the Texas Election Code (the Code) require a petition filed with a candidate‘s application for a place on the ballot to include a city name as part of the signer‘s residence address? The Court answers this question no. But the Code‘s plain language and well-established statutory construction rules require the oppo-
I. BACKGROUND
Kevin Bell filed an application to place his name on the Republican Party primary election ballot for Justice of the Peace, Precinct Four, Position One, in Harris County, Texas. With his application, Bell paid a filing fee and submitted a petition with voter signatures. See
On January 11, 2002, the court of appeals denied Bell‘s mandamus petition seeking to compel Haigler and the Harris County Republican Party Chair2 to place Bell on the ballot. On January 14, Bell filed his petition for writ of mandamus with this Court. See
II. THE ISSUE AND THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The only issue to decide today is whether the information on a candidate‘s petition must identify the city in which the registered voter resides. Bell contends that the signer‘s city is wholly irrelevant to determine if that person resides within Harris County Precinct Four and that the only purpose in requiring the signer‘s ad-
dress and voter registration number is “to allow verification, if desired.” See Cohen v. Strake, 743 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding). Additionally, Bell argues that the Court must consider the entire petition to determine if it contains the requisite information. See Fitch v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 834 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). He urges that, if we do so here, it is clear the office he seeks lies within Harris County Precinct Four, and this is the only pertinent information for this election. Therefore, according to Bell, this Court should hold the signatures not including the signer‘s city valid as a matter of law.
In response, Haigler does not dispute Bell‘s argument that the only signatures on the petition she believes are defective are those without a city. Instead, Haigler simply contends that she rejected Bell‘s ballot for “insufficient signature requirements.”
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. ELECTION CODE
This Court has repeatedly recognized that “statutory requirements concerning candidacy for political office are mandatory and are to be strictly enforced.” Wallace v. Howell, 707 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1986); Painter v. Shaner, 667 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. 1984); Brown v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1964); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 181 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1944). Indeed, the Code uses mandatory language when describing the information that must appear in a candidate‘s petition. Specifically, the Code provides that, to be valid, a candidate‘s petition “must (1) be timely filed with the appro-
Section 141.063, entitled “Validity of Signature,” details the information that must be included with each signature on a petition: (1) the signer‘s residence address; (2) the signer‘s date of birth, voter registration number, and county registration number if the election involves more than one county; (3) the signing date; and (4) the signer‘s printed name.
Before the 1997 amendments, section 141.063 did not expressly validate signatures if they omitted information that section requires. However, in 1997 the Legislature amended this section to explicitly provide that “[t]he omission of the state from the signer‘s residence address does not invalidate a signature unless the political subdivision from which the signature is obtained is situated in more than one state.”
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This Court has held:
It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose. Likewise, we believe every word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) (citations omitted). We have upheld this rule on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Quick v. Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 123 (Tex. 1998); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995). This rule complements another general statutory construction principle that courts should not insert words in a statute except to give effect to clear legislative intent. Laidlaw, 904 S.W.2d at 659 (citing Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981)).
IV. ANALYSIS
We need only look to the plain language of the pertinent Code provisions to resolve the issue here. Section 141.063 requires that a petition include the signer‘s “residence address.”
Bell and the Court cite cases holding that, although the petitions at issue omitted certain information, this did not render the signature invalid. Reese v. Commissioners’ Court of Cherokee County, 861 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding) (signatures omitting zip code); Strachan v. Lanier, 867 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (signatures omitting city or zip code); Bacon v. Harris County Republican Executive Comm., 743 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding) (signatures omitting state); Love v. Veselka, 764 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 1988, orig. proceeding) (signatures omitting state). The courts’ rationale in these cases for validating the signatures without all the information generally turns on the ability to verify the signer‘s eligibility without the missing information. See, e.g., Reese, 861 S.W.2d at 284. Following the reasoning in these cases, the Court and Bell conclude that the signers’ city here is immaterial because the information provided is enough to determine the signer‘s eligibility to vote in this county election.
But the cases Bell and the Court rely upon cite no authority—other than each other—to support the conclusion that the residence address‘s sole purpose is to verify the voter‘s eligibility. And these cases do not hold that, as the Court‘s leap in logic suggests, the sole purpose in verifying a voter‘s eligibility is to preclude election fraud. Moreover, these cases issued before the Legislature‘s 1997 Code amendments. And one amendment states that a petition‘s signature is valid even if it omits the signer‘s state and zip code. See
The Court argues that section 141.063‘s language defining when a petition signature is valid is not mandatory. 91 S.W.3d at 787. However, section 141.062, which governs a petition‘s validity, does contain mandatory language. It explicitly states that “[t]o be valid, a petition must ... contain valid signatures in the number required by this code; and ... comply with any other applicable requirements for validity prescribed by this code.”
Additionally, the Court suggests that, in amending section 141.063 to validate signatures without a state or zip code, the Legislature merely codified some of the earlier case law. Consequently, the Court concludes, it can rely upon the reasoning in those cases to validate petition signatures without a city. However, this view wholly ignores that, although one case before the 1997 amendment held that omitting the signer‘s city is permissible, Strachan, 867 S.W.2d at 53, several others concluded that omitting the signer‘s city is a fatal defect. Gray v. Vance, 567 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, orig. proceeding); Pierce v. Peters, 599 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, orig. proceeding); Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, orig. proceeding).
The Court cursorily concludes these cases are immaterial because they relied upon a prior version of the Election Code that did not expressly state that the Code Construction Act applies. However, this rationale entirely ignores that Article 10 of the revised civil statutes, now at
Furthermore, the Court‘s illogical conclusion that a petition‘s signatures are valid even if they omit the signer‘s city flies in the face of the rule that we must not insert words in a statute unless it is to give effect to the Legislature‘s clear intent. See Laidlaw, 904 S.W.2d at 659; Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 540; Hunter, 620 S.W.2d at 552. Here, we know that the Legislature amended the Code to correct inconsistencies in applying the Code, to provide for more efficient operations of elections, and to preclude voter fraud. See HOUSE COMM. ON ELECTIONS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 331, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). Clearly, the Legislature intended that the 1997 amendments define the specific requirements candidates must follow to obtain valid signatures and to identify which information may be omitted without invalidating a signature. Because of this intent, the Court cannot—as it does here—read “city” out of the subsection that requires this information and then read “city” into the subsection that does not mention this information.
Additionally, Bell misplaces his reliance on Fitch, 834 S.W.2d at 337, to conclude that Haigler can consider the entire petition to determine whether a signer‘s residence address information is enough. In Fitch, this Court determined whether we should remove a candidate‘s name from the general primary election ballot because her petition stated only that she was running for the March 1992 primary and did not identify the Democratic primary. Fitch, 834 S.W.2d at 336. Relying on a Code provision stating that the candidate‘s petition is part of his or her application, we concluded that Fitch‘s petition was adequate because her application stated she was applying for the Democratic primary election. Id. at 337.
Finally, the Court contends that the purpose of the residence address, or the “object sought to be attained,” is solely to ensure there is enough information to verify the signer‘s eligibility to vote. Based on this, the Court argues that the signer‘s city of residence does not demonstrate the signer‘s eligibility to vote in this election, because Precinct Four comprises more than one city. But this ignores the converse. If the signer‘s city of residence is not within Precinct Four, then that information would conclusively demonstrate the voter‘s ineligibility to vote in this election.
Moreover, the Code, both before and after the 1997 amendments, requires more information than the minimal amount necessary to verify the signer‘s eligibility. If the Code‘s “residence address” purpose is only to provide voter-eligibility verification, then arguably no information except the voter‘s name and voter-registration number would be necessary. But “[t]he Election Code does not require just a petition which may be verified. It requires specified information which this petition admittedly did not contain.” Shields, 597 S.W.2d at 504. Furthermore, even if the residence address‘s sole purpose is to verify a voter‘s eligibility, the Legislature‘s 1997 Code amendments either validated or invalidated those prior cases that determined the necessary information for voter eligibility. The Legislature‘s choice to continue to require information such as the signer‘s city—even when such information may seem unnecessary to determine a voter‘s eligibility for a particular election—is a policy decision to which we should defer. Because the Court refuses to do so today, candidates and those charged with determining eligibility for a place on the ballot have no guidance in future elections for determining what information is mandatory to validate petitions. If the Court truly desires to uphold the Legislature‘s intent to preclude election fraud, then it would require that signatures on petitions adhere to the Code‘s minimum, clear, and express mandates.
V. CONCLUSION
The Code establishes specific requirements a candidate‘s petition must meet so he or she is entitled to a place on the ballot. Although courts, in the past, have held that substantial compliance will suffice, the Legislature has expressly determined what information is mandatory. The Code‘s mandates are not onerous, unfair, or unduly restrictive. Indeed, Bell concedes that all the residence address information can be obtained through the Harris County Tax Office. Moreover, the Code allows persons other than the signer to fill in such information. See
Keller, P.J., filed concurring opinion.