In Re Bell
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court,
In this original mandamus proceeding, Kevin H. Bell asks this Court to require the Harris County Republican Primary Director and the Harris County Republican Party Chair to certify -him as a candidate for Justice of the Peace, Precinct 4, Position 1, on the March 12, 2002, Republican primary election ballot. We must decide whether certain signatures on Bell’s petition for a place on the ballot are invalid because the signers omitted their city of residence from their address. We conclude that the signatures are not invalid due ' to this omission and conditionally grant relief.
I
On December 28, 2001, Bell submitted his application for a place on the Republican primary ballot, along with a fifing fee and a petition containing voter signatures. By letter dated January 4, 2002, respondents rejected Bell’s application due to “insufficient signature requirements,” citing Texas Election Code section 141.063.
Bell sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals concerning respondents’ action, which the court summarily denied. Bell now seeks mandamus relief from this Court. See
II
For a place on the ballot, Bell needs 250 valid signatures on his petition, see
Without these disputed signatures, Bell concedes that his petition does not contain the required 250 signatures. Moreover, respondents do not dispute that Bell meets the requisite number if these disputed signatures are counted. Thus, we must decide whether the disputed signatures are invalid under the Election Code, because some signers failed to identify their city of residence or their city of residence and zip code when providing their addresses.
III
Texas Election Code section 141.063(a), most recently amended in 1997, provides that a signature on a petition is valid if: “the signer, at the time of signing, is a registered voter of the territory from which the office sought is elected.... ”
Section 1.003(a), which was added to the Election Code in 1985, states that “[t]he Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision in this code.” Id. § 1.003(a); Act of May 9, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 211, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 802, 805 (codified at
A few cases decided after the Code Construction Act was incorporated into the Election Code appeared to follow these earlier decisions. See, e.g., Shipley v. Harris County Democratic Executive Comm.,
The more recent decisions to discuss the issue under
In Reese, for example, the court held that “the failure to include the zip code will not invalidate an otherwise valid petition signature” where “inclusion of the zip code will not help verify the eligibility of those
We believe that these most recent decisions apply a rationale that furthers one of the principal purposes behind the Election Code — the prevention of election fraud— and produces a “just and reasonable result.” See
The Election Code itself recognizes that omitting certain information in the definition of “residence address” will not necessarily invalidate a signature. For example,
IV
Bell’s petition is a form the Secretary of State promulgated and is used in a variety of elections. The petition has spaces for the following information with respect to each signer: (1) the date of signing; (2) printed name; (3) signature; (4) address (city, state, zip code); (5) county of residence; (6) voter registration number; and (7) date of birth. The only information missing from the disputed signatures is
Bell’s petition contains a statement that he is running for Precinct 4. That statement must be read to each individual before they sign the petition. See
The way to verify that a signer truly resides in Precinct 4 is to examine the voter registration records maintained in the Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector’s office. The information provided by each person with a disputed signature— birth date, street name and number, county, and voter registration number — is sufficient to allow verification of the signer’s voting eligibility for this particular election from the Tax Assessor Collector’s records. Respondents do not contend otherwise. Nor do respondents contend that any verification efforts would be impeded because certain signers did not provide their city of residence.
We therefore conclude that omitting the signers’ city of residence from Bell’s petition does not undermine the purpose behind the Election Code’s “residence address” requirement, because there is enough other information to allow voting-eligibility verification for this particular election. Respondents do not contend that the individuals who omitted the city from their “residence address” do' not reside within Precinct 4, which is readily verifiable based upon the information provided. Thus, we conclude that the disputed signatures must be counted, and that Bell’s petition is sufficient to entitle him to a place on the ballot. Because of this holding, we need hot consider Bell’s constitutional arguments.
.Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant the writ and order respondents to certify Bell as a candidate for the upcoming Republican primary election and to place his name on the primary ballot. See Tex.R.App. P. ,52.8. The writ will not issue unless respondents do not comply with this opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
joined by Justice HANKINSON, dissenting.
“Once more into the breach, dear friends, once. more.... The game’s afoot!” Thus, the Fix-It Gang rides again.1
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Does the Texas Election Code (the Code) require a petition filed with a candidate’s application for a place on the ballot to include a city name as part of the signer’s residence address? The Court answers this question no. But the Code’s plain language and well-established statutory construction rules require the oppo
I.BACKGROUND
Kevin Bell filed an application to place his name on the Republican Party primary election ballot for Justice of the Peace, Precinct Four, Position One, in Harris County, Texas. With his application, Bell paid a filing fee and submitted a petition with voter signatures. See
On January 11, 2002, the court of appeals denied Bell’s mandamus petition seeking to compel Haigler and the Harris County Republican Party Chair
II.THE ISSUE AND THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The only issue to decide today is whether the information on a candidate’s petition must identify the city in which the registered voter resides. Bell contends that the signer’s city is wholly irrelevant to determine if that person resides within Harris County Precinct Four and that the only purpose in requiring the signer’s address and voter registration number is “to allow verification, if desired.” See Cohen v. Strake,
In response, Haigler does not dispute Bell’s argument that the only signatures on the petition she believes are defective are those without a city. Instead, Haigler simply contends that she rejected Bell’s ballot for “insufficient signature requirements.”
III.APPLICABLE LAW
A. Election Code
This Court has repeatedly recognized that “‘statutory requirements concerning candidacy for political office are mandatory and are to be strictly enforced.’ ” Wallace v. Howell,
Before the 1997 amendments,
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This Court has held:
It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose. Likewise, we believe every word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.,
IV. ANALYSIS
We need only look to the plain language of the pertinent Code provisions to resolve the issue here.
Bell and the Court cite cases holding that, although the petitions at issue omitted certain information, this did not render the signature invalid. Reese v. Commissioners’ Court of Cherokee County,
But the cases Bell and the Court rely upon cite no authority — other than each other — to support the conclusion that the residence address’s sole purpose is to verify the voter’s eligibility. And these cases do not hold that, as the Court’s leap in logic suggests, the sole purpose in verifying a voter’s eligibility is to preclude election fraud. Moreover, these cases issued before the Legislature’s 1997 Code amendments. And one amendment states that a petition’s signature is valid even if it omits the signer’s state and zip code. See
The Court argues that
Additionally, the Court suggests that, in amending
The Court cursorily concludes these cases are immaterial because they relied upon a prior version of the Election Code that did not expressly state that the Code Construction Act applies. However, this rationale entirely ignores that Article 10 of the revised civil statutes, now at Chapter 312 of the Government Code, governed how to construe that previous version of the Election Code. Notably, Article 10 provided that “[i]n all [statutory] interpretations, the court shall look diligently for the intention of the Legislature, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil and the remedy.” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 10, § 6 (current version at Tex. Gov’t Code § 312.005). Thus, the Election Code’s purpose — or, in the Code Construction Act’s words, the object the Legislature sought to attain — was pertinent to the courts’ holdings in Gray, Pierce, and Shields, just as it was in Strachan, Reese, Love, and Bacon.
Furthermore, the Court’s illogical conclusion that a petition’s signatures are valid even if they omit the signer’s city flies in the face of the rule that we must not insert words in a statute unless it is to give effect to the Legislature’s clear intent. See Laidlaw,
Additionally, Bell misplaces his reliance on Fitch,
Finally, the Court contends that the purpose of the residence address, or the “object sought to be attained,” is solely to ensure there is enough information to verify the signer’s eligibility to vote. Based on this, the Court argues that the signer’s city of residence does not demonstrate the signer’s eligibility to vote in this election, because Precinct Four comprises more than one city. But this ignores the converse. If the signer’s city of residence is not within Precinct Four, then that information would conclusively demonstrate the voter’s ineligibility to vote in this election.
Moreover, the Code, both before and after the 1997 amendments, requires more information than the minimal amount necessary to verify the signer’s eligibility. If the Code’s “residence address” purpose is only to provide voter-eligibility verification, then arguably no Information except the voter’s name and voter-registration number would be necessary. But “[t]he Election Code does not require just a petition which may be verified. It requires specified information which this petition admittedly did not contain.” Shields,
V. CONCLUSION
The Code establishes specific requirements a candidate’s petition must meet so he or she is entitled to a place on the ballot. Although courts, in the past, have held that substantial compliance will suffice, the Legislature has expressly determined what information is mandatory. The Code’s mandates are not onerous, unfair, or unduly restrictive. Indeed, Bell concedes that all the residence address information can be obtained through the Harris County Tax Office. Moreover, the Code allows persons other than the signer to fill in such information. See
Notes
. Shakespeare, W., Henry V, III:I. With apologies for the added text.
. Neither Bell nor Haigler tell us the Chair’s name. Accordingly, I collectively refer to the chair and the Primary Director as Haigler.