City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
977 F. Supp. 2d 944
D. Minnesota2013Background
- The City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band entered a joint-venture casino agreement in 1986; IGRA (1988) requires tribes to have “sole proprietary interest” in Indian gaming.
- The Band sued in 1989; after NIGC review the parties negotiated new 1994 Agreements (incorporated into a consent decree) that the NIGC initially approved; the Band paid the City substantial rent under those agreements through 2009.
- The Band withheld rent beginning in 2009 claiming certain expenses offset gross revenue; the City sued to enforce the 1994 Agreements; the district court found the Band barred by res judicata from challenging the consent decree and ordered arbitration on future-term issues.
- In July 2011 the NIGC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) reversing its earlier view and declaring provisions of the 1994 Agreements violative of IGRA, ordering cessation of performance; the Band moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to dissolve the consent decree and for retrospective relief.
- The district court granted prospective relief (Rule 60(b)(5)) but denied retrospective relief for unpaid 2009–2011 rent; the Eighth Circuit affirmed prospective relief but reversed and remanded the Rule 60(b)(6) retrospective question for further factored analysis.
- On remand the district court again denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief for the 2009–2011 period, concluding the circumstances were not sufficiently extraordinary to vacate the executed consent decree; it also denied the City’s motion to stay as moot and ordered proceedings on contra-revenues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retrospective relief under Rule 60(b)(6) should be granted for unpaid rent (2009–2011) | The City: uphold consent decree; changes in law generally not retroactive; finality and reliance weigh against relief | The Band: NIGC NOV changed law and made continued performance illegal; extraordinary circumstances justify vacatur and recovery | Denied — relief under 60(b)(6) not warranted for 2009–2011; change in NIGC position alone insufficient; decree execution and party reliance weigh against vacatur |
| Whether the NIGC NOV qualifies as an "extraordinary" change in law for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes | The City: NOV is a change but does not retroactively invalidate past payments; not enough for retrospective relief | The Band: NOV directly contradicts prior NIGC approval, making the decree illegal to continue or obey | NOV is a significant change and closely related to the decree, but by itself insufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances for retroactive relief |
| Effect of parties’ voluntary agreement and prior NIGC endorsement of the 1994 Agreements | The City: parties and NIGC knowingly approved agreement; reliance justifies finality | The Band: voluntariness is irrelevant because the agreement is now illegal under IGRA | The court held voluntariness and initial NIGC endorsement weigh heavily against granting 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether the City had notice that NIGC views might change (relevance to retroactivity) | The City: prior advisory letters differ factually and the City reasonably relied on approval | The Band: NIGC advisory letters and public materials put the City on notice that NIGC stance could change | Court found City was on notice (factor favoring relief) but it was outweighed by other factors; overall denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (discusses modification of consent decrees and Rule 60 relief)
- Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (standards for extraordinary equitable relief under Rule 60)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (denial of Rule 60 relief where party made deliberate, counseled choice)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (retroactivity of administrative rulemaking)
- Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (Rule 60(b)(6) as equitable power; factors for extraordinary relief)
- Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398 (factors for Rule 60(b)(6) relief)
- Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (refusal to reopen executed judgments after intervening change in law)
- City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147 (8th Cir. 2013) (mandate reversing denial of retrospective Rule 60(b)(6) relief and remanding for factor-based analysis)
