City of Dallas, Mike Rawlings, Scott Griggs, Adam Medrano, Casey Thomas II, Carolyn King Arnold, Rickey D. Callahan, Monica R. Alonzo, Tiffinni A. Young, Erik Wilson, Mark Clayton, B. Adam McGough, Lee Kleinman, Sandy Greyson, Jennifer S. Gates v. David S. Martin, James A. Braddock, Obie Cartmill, Robert Dale Martin, O.J. Adair, George G. Parker, Joe M. Gunn, Stephen W. Toth, Nathan Trammel, Todd A. Stratman, and Dallas Police and Fire Pension System
05-16-01227-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 20, 2017Background
- In 1979 Dallas voters approved a pay referendum and the City adopted Ordinance 16084, which (among other things) required maintaining the percentage pay differential between sworn ranks.
- Officers (current and former police, firefighters, rescue) sued in 1995 claiming the Ordinance created a continuing obligation to maintain post-1979 pay differentials; the Dallas Police & Fire Pension System intervened seeking contributions if back pay is awarded.
- Lower courts and this Court previously found the Ordinance ambiguous as to whether it was a one-time raise or a continuing obligation (Arredondo I), making intent a fact question for the factfinder.
- The City asserted sovereign immunity and filed multiple pleas to the jurisdiction; the Texas Legislature enacted a limited waiver of immunity for certain breach-of-contract claims (Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.152), prompting further litigation over whether the Ordinance constitutes a contract within that waiver.
- This Court (Arredondo II) held plaintiffs could plead a unilateral contract satisfying § 271.152’s requirements; on remand the City again challenged jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment, arguing no essential contract terms exist and the City code change precludes post-2002 contract claims.
- The trial court denied the City’s and City Officials’ pleas and summary-judgment motions; this interlocutory appeal challenges those denials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Officers pleaded a contract that invokes § 271.152 waiver of sovereign immunity | Officers rely on the referendum, Ordinance, implementing resolutions, and charter/code provisions to show a unilateral contract with essential terms | City argues Ordinance was a one-time raise so no ongoing contractual term exists and thus no waiver applies | Held: Officers alleged a unilateral contract satisfying § 271.152; waiver applies for adjudicating breach claims |
| Whether the court may resolve City’s merits argument (voter intent/one-time raise) at jurisdictional stage | Officers say voter intent and merits are fact issues for trial; pleadings and documents suffice to show a contract for jurisdictional purposes | City urges the court to decide the Ordinance was a one-time increase, defeating jurisdictional waiver | Held: Court cannot decide merits (voter intent) on accelerated jurisdictional review; merits reserved for factfinder |
| Whether a 2002 Dallas City Code amendment bars contract claims after April 1, 2002 | Officers (and prior Arredondo decision) say § 34-1 doesn’t apply to the Ordinance and does not affect the unilateral contract issue | City contends the code change disavows employment contracts and precludes claims after that date | Held: Rejected City’s argument; § 34-1 does not negate the Ordinance-based unilateral contract claim |
| Whether the Pension System pleaded a valid ultra vires claim against City Officials for future pension contributions | Pension System alleges officials have a ministerial duty (statutory) to cause contributions when wages are paid and seeks prospective relief to compel compliance | City Officials contend Pension System seeks retroactive monetary relief and cannot show an ultra vires ministerial failure | Held: Pension System pleaded an ultra vires claim for prospective relief to compel future contributions if back pay is paid; immunity does not bar that claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Arredondo v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002) (Ordinance ambiguous; intent is a fact question)
- City of Dallas v. Martin, 361 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2011) (sovereign immunity bars declaratory-judgment claims; remand to consider legislative waiver)
- Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth., 449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014) (plea-to-jurisdiction standards; evidentiary review when facts challenged)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (distinguishing immunity from suit and immunity from liability)
- City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2011) (defining essential terms for § 271.151(2): time, price, services)
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires exception to governmental immunity; limits on relief)
- City of Houston v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 513 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (pension system may seek prospective appropriation and budgeting relief)
- Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1996) (denial of summary judgment is generally not immediately appealable)