321 F. Supp. 3d 855
E.D. Ill.2018Background
- The DOJ attached three immigration-related conditions to FY2017 Byrne JAG grants: (1) Access (DHS access to local detention facilities); (2) Notice (48-hour notice of release of aliens when requested); and (3) Compliance (certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373).
- Chicago's Welcoming City Ordinance restricts city employees from asking/disclosing immigration status, complying poorly with ICE detainers, and spending on-duty time assisting ICE, though exceptions exist for dangerous individuals.
- Chicago sued seeking to enjoin the Conditions as ultra vires, Spending Clause violations, anticommandeering, APA and PRA claims, and a declaratory judgment it complies with § 1373.
- The court previously enjoined Notice and Access preliminarily; the Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the merits but granted rehearing en banc on the injunction’s nationwide scope.
- In this decision the district court (1) holds § 1373 facially unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine, (2) holds the Attorney General lacked statutory authority under Byrne JAG to impose Notice, Access, and (because § 1373 is unconstitutional) Compliance conditions, and (3) enters a permanent injunction against imposing the three Conditions but stays its nationwide scope pending the Seventh Circuit en banc review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are DOJ's Notice and Access Conditions authorized by the Byrne JAG statute? | Chicago: Byrne JAG does not authorize immigration-enforcement conditions; AG exceeded statutory authority. | AG: Statutory grant and program functions permit conditions on grantees. | Held for Chicago: Notice and Access conditions are ultra vires; summary judgment for Chicago. |
| Is 8 U.S.C. § 1373 unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine? | Chicago: § 1373 commandeers local policymaking and employee time, forbidding local nonparticipation. | AG: § 1373 merely requires information sharing and does not commandeer states; Spending/conditional arguments irrelevant to facial challenge. | Held for Chicago: § 1373 is facially unconstitutional under anticommandeering (Murphy/Printz analysis). |
| May the AG lawfully impose the Compliance Condition (certify §1373) as a Byrne JAG requirement? | Chicago: "all other applicable Federal laws" should be read narrowly or not to include unconstitutional statutes; Compliance fails because §1373 is unconstitutional. | AG: "Applicable" covers federal laws that apply to the grantee, so §1373 is within scope. | Held for Chicago: Even if "applicable" is broad, an unconstitutional statute cannot be required; Compliance condition unlawful. |
| Is injunctive relief appropriate and what is its scope? | Chicago: Irreparable harm to police-community trust; monetary relief inadequate; public interest favors injunction. | AG: Public safety and federal enforcement interests weigh against broad injunction; DOJ has interest in uniform conditions. | Held: Permanent injunction granted as to all three Conditions; nationwide scope entered but stayed outside Chicago pending en banc appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (final agency action ripeness test)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (anticommandeering; federal directives to state officers invalid)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (anticommandeering applies to prohibitions as well as commands)
- NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (Spending Clause limits; states may decline conditional federal funds)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (permissible limits on conditions attached to federal grants)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir.) (panel affirmed likelihood that Notice and Access conditions unauthorized)
- Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (distinguishing regulation of states as market participants from commandeering)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (anticommandeering principle)