349 F. Supp. 3d 924
N.D. Cal.2018Background
- In 2017 DOJ (Attorney General Sessions / OJP) conditioned Byrne JAG and some COPS grants on three immigration-related requirements: (1) ICE access to local correctional facilities, (2) advance notice of inmate release dates to ICE, and (3) a chief legal officer certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
- California and the City & County of San Francisco sued, seeking declarations that their sanctuary laws comply with § 1373, injunctive relief against the conditions, and allocation of withheld Byrne/COPS funds; DOJ cross-moved for summary judgment.
- California and San Francisco rely on state statutes and local ordinances (e.g., TRUST, TRUTH, Values Act; SF Admin. Code Chapters 12H/12I) that limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement and protect confidential information.
- DOJ argues the Attorney General (and OJP) has authority under the Byrne JAG statutes and 34 U.S.C. § 10102 to impose the conditions and that § 1373 requires broad information-sharing with federal immigration authorities.
- The district court found the conditions unlawful (separation of powers/Spending Clause), held § 1373 unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine (alternative narrow reading adopted), found the agency action arbitrary and capricious under the APA, granted declaratory relief that California’s and San Francisco’s laws comply with § 1373 as construed, awarded mandamus to compel disbursement of funds, and entered a permanent injunction (nationwide scope stayed pending appeal).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOJ had statutory authority to impose access/notice/certification conditions on Byrne JAG/COPS grants | DOJ lacks authority in the Byrne JAG statute and §10102 does not independently authorize these substantive conditions | DOJ claims discretionary authority to place conditions under Byrne JAG and §10102(a)(6) | No statutory authority; §10102 does not authorize broad, substantive conditions beyond delegated, statutorily grounded powers |
| Whether conditioning grants on compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment/anti-commandeering principle | §1373 commandeers state and local policymaking and officers and thus is unconstitutional as applied/ facially | DOJ says immigration is a federal function and §1373 is a permissible regulation/ preemption of state law, not commandeering | §1373 violates the anti-commandeering principle; court finds it unconstitutional (but adopts narrow alternative construction for some relief) |
| Whether the grant conditions exceed Spending Clause limits (unambiguous notice and relatedness) | Conditions are ambiguous and not reasonably related to Byrne JAG’s criminal-justice purposes | DOJ contends conditions are clear and related to criminal-justice/public-safety objectives | Conditions fail Spending Clause tests: ambiguous and insufficiently related to Byrne JAG purposes; therefore invalid |
| Whether DOJ’s imposition of the conditions was arbitrary and capricious under the APA | DOJ relied on inadequate record, circular reasoning, and failed to consider important evidence of harm to local policing/community trust | DOJ contends record and OIG materials support its decision | Agency action arbitrary and capricious; injunction appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (federal supremacy over immigration but with limits)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (Sup. Ct. 2018) (anticommandeering doctrine explained and applied)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (federal government may not commandeer state officers)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (Spending Clause limits: general welfare, unambiguousness, relatedness, no coercion)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (vacating/affirming aspects of DOJ conditions; relevant parallel precedent)
- City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (found conditions arbitrary and capricious; §1373 violated Tenth Amendment)
- United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (parallel suit; held no direct conflict between SB 54 and §1373 and limited scope of §1373 interpretation)