537 P.3d 1173
Haw.2023Background
- Plaintiffs (City & County of Honolulu and Honolulu Board of Water Supply) sued major oil and gas companies alleging they knew fossil fuels cause climate harm, concealed those dangers, and ran deceptive marketing that inflated consumption, causing local climate-related injuries in Hawaiʻi.
- Causes of action: public nuisance, private nuisance (with punitive damages allegation), strict-liability failure to warn, negligent failure to warn, and trespass — all premised on deceptive promotion and failure to warn about product risks.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for preemption (arguing federal common law governs interstate/international emissions and/or the Clean Air Act preempts state tort claims); case was removed, remanded, and remand affirmed by the Ninth Circuit; U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on removal issue.
- The First Circuit (circuit court) denied both motions to dismiss, finding Plaintiffs’ claims challenge marketing/failure-to-warn conduct (not direct regulation of emissions) and that jurisdiction and state tort law are permissible.
- Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed: specific jurisdiction exists based on Defendants’ in-state marketing/sales; federal common law governing interstate pollution was displaced by the CAA and does not preempt these state tort claims; the CAA itself does not preempt Plaintiffs’ claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction (specific jurisdiction) | Defendants purposefully availed themselves of Hawaiʻi markets by selling/marketing fuel here; Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of/relate to those forum contacts | Claims are global; injuries not traceable to in-state use of defendants’ products, so no nexus for specific jurisdiction | Court: contacts (marketing/sales/failure to warn in Hawaiʻi) satisfy "arise out of or relate to" under Ford; exercising jurisdiction is reasonable; no separate "clear notice" requirement beyond minimum contacts |
| Does federal common law govern/preempt Plaintiffs’ state tort claims? | Plaintiffs: their claims challenge deceptive marketing/failure to warn — traditional state torts — not regulation of emissions | Defendants: disputes implicate interstate/international emissions; federal common law governs such suits | Court: federal common law that once governed transboundary pollution was displaced by the CAA and therefore does not govern or preempt these state tort claims |
| Does displaced federal common law retain preemptive effect? | Plaintiffs: once displaced, federal common law ceases; preemption analysis turns to the statute (CAA) only | Defendants: displaced federal common law still preempts state law, then the CAA displaces that federal law leaving no remedy | Court: rejects two-step approach; displaced federal common law has no continuing preemptive force — preemption analysis focuses on the CAA alone |
| Does the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempt Plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims? | Plaintiffs: CAA regulates emissions sources and leaves room for state common-law tort claims; their claims target deceptive marketing/failure to warn, not emissions standards | Defendants: CAA occupies federal emissions regulation and preempts state claims that would regulate interstate/out-of-state emissions; large damages would effectively regulate emissions | Court: CAA does not expressly, nor by field or conflict, preempt these claims; no actual conflict or impossibility — claims target deceptive marketing/failure to warn, which CAA does not regulate |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (specific-jurisdiction standard: claims must "arise out of or relate to" forum contacts; causation not always required)
- Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (CAA displaced federal common law governing interstate air emissions suits)
- Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (limitations on general jurisdiction and on linking forum contacts to specific claims)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (fair warning / purposeful availment principles in jurisdictional analysis)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (minimum contacts and reasonableness analysis for specific jurisdiction)
- Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (federal common-law public nuisance claims for greenhouse gases displaced by the CAA)
- City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) (discussed federal-common-law preemption of some climate suits; treated critically by this court)
- Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 31 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2022) (characterizing claims that challenge marketing/failure-to-warn rather than emissions regulation)
- Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 25 F.4th 1238 (10th Cir. 2022) (federal common law of nuisance for transboundary pollution displaced by the CAA)
- In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (CAA does not necessarily preempt state tort claims tied to non-emitting conduct like additives or warnings)
- City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law for interstate water pollution) and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (remedial federal common law displaced where Congress enacted comprehensive statutory scheme)
- Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (scope of federal regulation of emissions sources)
- City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, 39 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2022) (Ninth Circuit affirmed remand; framed complaint as challenging marketing/failure-to-warn)
- City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (relevant Ninth Circuit authority addressing similar claims)
- Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (Clean Water Act preemption of affected-state nuisance claims; distinguished where state claims rest on additional tortious conduct)
- Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that CAA does not occupy entire emissions field and states retain traditional regulatory roles)