Cindy Adair v. ConAgra Foods
728 F.3d 849
| 8th Cir. | 2013Background
- ConAgra operates a frozen-food facility in Marshall, MO where hourly production and maintenance laborers (union-represented) must wear employer-furnished, laundered protective uniforms kept on site.
- Laborers change into/out of these uniforms in on-site changing stations and then walk to a time clock to punch in; at day’s end they punch out then walk back to doff uniforms.
- ConAgra does not pay for time spent changing clothes or for walking between changing stations and the time clock.
- Plaintiffs sued under the FLSA seeking pay for changing time and for walking time between changing stations and the time clock; district court granted summary judgment to ConAgra on changing-time exclusion but held donning/doffing are principal activities that start/end the workday and denied summary judgment on walking-time, certifying that issue for interlocutory appeal.
- This court granted interlocutory review and reversed the district court as to walking time, holding that clothes-changing excluded under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) is not an activity the employees are "employed to perform," and therefore is not a "principal activity" that begins or ends the workday.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether time spent walking between changing stations and the time clock is compensable as part of the workday | Walking time is compensable because donning/doffing are principal activities that begin/end the workday, so the walk falls within the workday | Changing time is excluded by collective-bargaining custom under §203(o); because employees are not employed to change, those activities (and associated walks) are outside the workday | Reversed: where clothes-changing is excluded under §203(o), donning/doffing are not activities the employees are employed to perform and thus are not principal activities that start/end the workday; walking time is not compensable |
Key Cases Cited
- Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956) (activities otherwise part of principal work may be excluded by agreement)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (an activity "integral and indispensable" to a principal activity may itself be a principal activity)
- Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590 (7th Cir.) (discussing interplay of §203(o) exclusion and principal-activity analysis)
- Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010) (contrasting view on whether excluded changing time can be a principal activity)
- Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining deference to shifting DOL opinion letters)