Christopher Young v. Lorie Davis, Director
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10892
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Christopher Young kidnapped, sexually assaulted a woman, stole her car, then entered a mini-mart and fatally shot owner Hasmukh Patel; surveillance and witness evidence led to his arrest and conviction for capital murder.
- At punishment, Texas statutory special issues were submitted to the jury; the court omitted the statutorily mandated instruction that jurors “need not agree on what particular evidence supports an affirmative finding” for the mitigation issue.
- The jury unanimously answered the mitigation special issue “No” (i.e., no sufficient mitigating circumstance warranting life), and Young was sentenced to death.
- Young exhausted state remedies, pursued federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and obtained COA on (1) a Mills claim (jury may have thought unanimity on particular mitigating evidence was required) and (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed under AEDPA deference and concluded the Texas courts’ rejection of both claims was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether omission of statutory instruction that jurors need not agree on particular mitigating evidence violated Mills v. Maryland | Young: omission created substantial probability jurors believed unanimity on which evidence was mitigating was required, preventing individual juror consideration | State: instructions, voir dire, counsel argument, and unanimous “No” answer show no reasonable likelihood of such confusion | Court: No Mills error as applied; state courts reasonably concluded instructions did not create substantial probability of juror misunderstanding |
| Whether juror affidavits (post-trial) showing juror belief of unanimity should be considered | Young: affidavits show jurors misunderstood unanimity requirement, corroborating Mills error | State: juror statements about deliberations are barred by no-impeachment rule and affidavits were not presented to state courts | Court: Did not consider affidavits under Pinholster and refused to extend Pena-Rodriguez beyond racial-bias context; affidavits not considered on AEDPA review |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to omitted instruction (Strickland) | Young: counsel’s failure to object was deficient and prejudiced him because correct instruction could have led to life sentence | State: even assuming deficiency, Young cannot show prejudice—no reasonable probability outcome would differ | Court: State courts reasonably applied Strickland; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (substantial probability jury thought unanimity on particular mitigating factors required)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence)
- Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139 (upholding jury forms/instructions under Mills where no reasonable likelihood jury thought unanimity on individual mitigating factors required)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (federal habeas review under §2254(d) limited to record before state court)
- Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (narrow exception to jury no-impeachment rule for juror statements showing racial bias)
