Christopher Warfel v. Town of New Shoreham, 178 A.3d 988

In June–July 2016 the Town of New Shoreham executed an agreement to purchase two-thirds of Block Island Power Company (BIPCO) stock for $1.8 million; three council members voted for it and two dissented.
The town sought an advisory opinion from the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, which declined to require approval or to review the transaction.
Voters authorized issuance of funds at a September 26, 2016 financial town meeting; the stock sale closed on November 7, 2016.
On October 24, 2016 plaintiffs (town residents, taxpayers, and BIPCO ratepayers) sued in Superior Court seeking to enjoin the closing and alleging ultra vires action, voidability, and equitable estoppel; they asked for Public Utilities Commission review under RIGL 39-1-38.
The Town moved to dismiss on multiple grounds (jurisdiction, mootness, standing, failure to state a claim, Rule 8 and Rule 19 defects). The Superior Court granted dismissal based on Rule 8, Rule 19 defects, and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; final judgment entered November 22, 2016.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding plaintiffs lacked standing and declining to reach other arguments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge town's stock purchase	Plaintiffs claimed potential future liability and environmental harm from town ownership of BIPCO; asserted public interest in oversight	Town argued plaintiffs only alleged generalized taxpayer grievances and lacked a concrete, particularized injury	Court held plaintiffs lacked standing; alleged harms were speculative and generalized, not concrete or imminent
Use of public-interest exception to standing	Plaintiffs urged the Court to invoke rare exception permitting review on matters of substantial public importance	Town argued exception was inapplicable because local political safeguards existed and no fundamental question warranted bypassing standing	Court declined to apply the exception, distinguishing prior exceptional cases and finding no need to relax standing here
Appropriate standard on appeal of motion to dismiss	Plaintiffs contended dismissal improper under relevant standards	Town argued dismissal proper under Rule 12(b) and other procedural rules	Court applied standard: accept complaint allegations as true and affirm only if no set of facts would entitle relief; nonetheless affirmed dismissal for lack of standing
Whether merits should be reached after standing ruling	Plaintiffs sought merits review on statutory and equitable claims	Town urged dismissal without reaching merits	Court declined to reach remaining issues because lack of standing was dispositive

Audette v. Poulin, 127 A.3d 908 (R.I. 2015) (standard of review for motions to dismiss).
1112 Charles, L.P. v. Fornel Entertainment, Inc., 159 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury).
Cruz v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 992 (R.I. 2015) (standing elements described).
West Warwick School Committee v. Souliere, 626 A.2d 1280 (R.I. 1993) (taxpayer generalized grievance insufficient for standing).
McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217 (R.I. 2005) (speculative or hypothetical fears are insufficient to establish standing).
Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114 (R.I. 1992) (rare public-interest exception to standing where issue of broad significance required resolution).