OPINION
for the Court.
Thе plaintiff, 1112 Charles, L.P. (1112 Charles or plaintiff), appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Fornel Entertainment, Inc. and Anthony Lancellotta (Fornel, Lancellotta, or defendants). This case came before the Supreme Court on March 30, 2017, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hеaring counsels’ arguments and reviewing the parties’ memoranda, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide this appeal at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This case concerns a lease dispute between 1112 Charles, a Rhode Island limited partnership that owns property at 1112 Charles Street, North Providence, Rhode Island, and Fornel, a Rhode Island corporation doing business under the name Lan-cellotta’s Banquet Restaurant, located across the street at 1113 Charles Street, North Providence. On December 30, 1999, Fornel, through its president Lancellotta, entered into a lease agreement (original lease) with Joseph Simone, the then-owner of the property and a bakery located at 1112 Charles Street. Simone, lessor, agreed to lease a portion of his property to Fornel “for use solely by Lessee as a parking lot.” The original lease stated that its term was to run from January 1, 2000, through “December 31, 2114.” Under the original lease’s terms, Fornel agreed to keep the premises in good condition, pay the cоst of repaving and improving the parking lot, and pay $1.00 per month for the term of the lease. 1
In September 2002, Simone entered into an agreement with Karam Properties, LLC (Karam) to sell the property. Prior to the sale, however, errors in the original lease were discovered wherein the building on the property was included in the lease agreement and the lease term erroneously stated that it expired on December 31, 2114. On September 24, 2002, Simone, Lancellotta, and Karam executed an amended lease to clarify that the lease term expired on December 31, 2014, not 2114, and to exclude the building located on the premises from the original lease.
Karam subsequently fell into receivership. In September 2005, the receiver agreed to sell the property to Eltahan Properties, LLC (Eltahan). Prior to closing, however, Sovereign Bank, Eltahan’s lender, expressed concern with the original lease and, among other things, questioned whether it provided Eltahan with the right to park any cars on the property. To address these concerns, on September 29, 2005, Eltahan and Fornel entered into a “Second Lease Extension аnd Modification Agreement” (second lease extension), which extended the lease for another ten years, through December 31, 2024. It also clarified that the lessor could use five parking spots in front of the bakery between the hours of 7 a.m. to 7 p,m. 2 The second lease extension added the following provision (release provision) to the original lease: “Lessor and Lessee acknowledge the validity of the Lease and Amended Lease * * *. Lessor and Lessee have no defenses, setoffs, or counterclaims against the other in connection with the Lease and Amended Lease.”
Further, as a part of the financing agreement with Sovereign Bank, Eltahan and Fornel entered into' a “Non-Distur
After Eltahan defaulted, the property was again sold at auction on October 6, 2010 to Bennie Sisto. According to defendants, Sisto knew about the lease agreement prior to the auction because the receiver and Lancellotta had announced it at the auction. Additionally, Sisto signed the “Terms of Sale” agreement, which stated that the property was “sold subject to prior mortgages and other encumbrances of record, if any, including that certain Lease dated December 30, 1999 * * After the purchase, Sisto then assigned his property interest to 1112 Charles.
On March 24, 2011, 1112 Charles filed a four-count complaint against defendants, alleging fraud and misrepresentation (count 1), a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (count 2), and seeking a declaratory judgment (count 3), and the quieting of title in the plaintiff (count 4). With respect to the declaratory-judgment count, plaintiff sought declarations: (1) as to the parties’ rights, duties, and obligations; and (2) that the original lease was void ab initio.
On October 22, 2012, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment count pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In supрort of its motion, plaintiff argued that the original lease did “not reflect the agreement of the parties to the Original Lease on three material points, to wit:” (1) the original lease term was intended to end on December 31, 2014, not December 31, 2114, as the original lease stated; (2) the term “premises” as used within the original lease was not intended to include the building on the property, although the original lease included buildings and improvements in defining the term; and (3) Fomel’s rights under the original lease were not intended to be exclusive.
On January 11, 2013, defendants objected to the motion for partial summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In support of its motion—and in objection to plaintiffs—defendants argued that plaintiff lacked standing to contest the original lease or any subsequent amendments thereto because plaintiff was not a party to the original lease or any of its amendments. Neither Sisto nor Stefania
The defendants also challenged plaintiffs complaint because Mardo attested to the allegations set forth in it; defendants, however, maintained that she lacked personal knowledge as to what she attested. Thus, defendants averred that the allegations undergirding the complaint were unsupported. The defendants also contended that plaintiffs complaint lacked particularized facts that supported its allegation of fraudulent conduct by defendant, as required under Rule 9(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shаll be stated with particularity.”). Lastly, defendants argued that plaintiffs count alleging a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was not an independent tort—it only gave rise to a breach-of-contract claim.
The plaintiff objected to defendants’ summary judgment motion. It conceded that it was not involved in the execution of the original lease or any subsequent amendmеnts, but it asserted that it nonetheless had standing because, as the property owner, it was the assignee of the rights and obligations under the original lease. The plaintiff also challenged defendants’ argument that its complaint was not based on personal knowledge; it maintained that the averments in its complaint were based on the sworn testimony of Simone and Eltahan. The plaintiff disagreеd with defendants’ contention that its fraud allegations failed to comply with Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement, and maintained that its “fraud allegations could not be more specific.” With respect to the argument that the breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was not an independent tort, plaintiff argued that it asserted this claim as a contract claim, not as a separate tort.
On March 11, 2013, a justice of the Superior Court granted plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the three declarations sought: that the original lease term expired on December 31, 2014, not December 81, 2114; that the term “premises” as used within the original lease was not intended to include the building on the property; and that Fornel’s right to use the premises was nonеxclusive. That day, the same justice also denied defendants’ summary judgment motion without prejudice.
On June 23, 2014, defendants again moved for summary judgment. The defendants raised arguments similar to those in their prior motion. This motion came before another justice of the Superior Court on September 9, 2014. By an order dated October 7, 2014, the justice denied defendants’ motion without prejudice. 4
The casе proceeded to trial. The plaintiff maintains that “[o]n the eve of trial,” a third justice of the Superior Court “reconsidered” and ultimately granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
5
As
“1112 Charles, LP is a third-party beneficiary of some of the provisions of the Non-Disturbance, Attornment and Subordination Agreement and Tenant’s Es-toppel. However, that status only permits it to enforce the benefits that inure to it under the lease. It does not create privity of contract such that 1112 Charles, LP can elect to avoid the underlying lease itself.”
The defendants state that plaintiff solely challenged the second lease extension at the hearing, and plaintiff argued that it had privity of contract to challenge it because of the attornment agreement, an argument that defendants characterized as “never before raised by [plaintiff] and for which [plaintiff] provided no supporting law.” The justice granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment because plaintiff was not in privity of contract with defendants and lacked standing to assert the allegations raised in its complaint. On April 6, 2016, the justice entered final judgment for the defendants.
On April 25, 2016, plaintiff appealed to this Court. On appeal, it argues that the justice erred in ruling that the attornment agreement did not create privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants and therefore finding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring its suit challenging the second lease extension. 7 The plaintiff also contends that the justice erred by not incorporating the partial summary judgment and the additional declaration into the final judgment.
II
Standard of Review
“We review a hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Tri-Town Construction Co. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC,
Ill
Discussion
A
Standing
“Standing is a threshold inquiry into whether the party seeking relief is entitled to bring suit.” Genao v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P.,
In addition to these requirements, we generally confine standing “to those plaintiffs asserting their own rights, not the rights of others.” Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
It is plainly apparent that plaintiff is not in privity of contract with defendants because it was not a party to the seсond lease extension, and therefore plaintiff lacks standing to challenge it. Although plaintiff concedes that it is not in privity of contract with defendants in the traditional sense, it maintains that the attornment agreement created the requisite privity of contract. We disagree.
An attornment agreement is defined as “[a] tenant’s agreement to hold the land as the tenant of a new lаndlord.” Black’s Law Dictionary 155 (10th ed. 2014). The purpose of an attornment agreement, such as the one present in this case, is to ensure that the lessee remains bound under the lease to a new lessor who purchases the property. There is no language in the attornment agreement here that indicates that it grants plaintiff privity of contract. Nor is there legal support
Nevertheless, even if plaintiff had standing to challenge the second lease extension, it is barred from doing so under the release provision, which states that “Lessor and Lessee have no defenses, setoffs, or counterclaims against the other in connection with the Lease and Amended Lease.” This provision makes it very apparent that plaintiff would not be able to assert the claims raised in its complaint.
Having concluded that the plaintiff is not in privity of contract either through the lease agreement or the attornment agreement and cannot challenge the validity of the original lease or any of its subsequent amendments, it is not necessary to address the plaintiffs remaining arguments.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record may be remanded to that tribunal.
Notes
. The рarties state that Fornel agreed to pay 100 percent of the cost of repaving the lot and demolishing a shed on the property at 1112 Charles Street, and Simone agreed to reimburse Fornel for 50 percent of the cost of the demolition and repaving. This agreement is not contained in the original lease, but appears within a promissory note wherein Simone prоmised to pay Fornel $9,125.
. Specifically, it stated:
"Lessee agrees to allow Lessor the use of five (5) parking spaces immediately in front of Lessor's bakery business (currently marked as such) during the hours of 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. and to use its best efforts to insure that its agents, employees and invitees shall not interfere with Lessor’s right to use the five (5) front spaces for its patrons and invitees for Lessor. Lessor agrees to use its best effоrt to insure that its agents, employees and invitees shall not interfere with Lessee's right to use the remaining parking spaces solely for Lessees agents, employees, patrons and invitees.”
. The attornment clause provides:
"Unless the Lease is terminated ⅜ * * if the interests of the lessor under the Lease shall be transferred * * * the lessee thereunder shall be bound to the Purchaser or Lender, as the case may be, under all оf the terms, covenants and conditions of the Lease for the balance of the term thereof * * * with the same force and effect as if the Purchaser or Lender were the lessor under the Lease, and Tenant, as lessee under the Lease, does hereby attorn to the Purchaser and Lender if it takes title to or possession of the Property, as its lessor under the Lease.”
. At oral argument, the parties stated that this motion for summary judgment was denied based on the law-of-the-case doctrine.
. Although defendants did not refile their motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not challenge its utilization by the justice. This Court notes that, generally, once a case has reached trial, it is not appropriate to entertain a motion for summary judgment. See Haxton's of Riverside, Inc. v. Windmill Realty,
. As this Court recently reiterated, "[t]he decision to pursue an appeal without ordering the full transcript of the Superior Court proceeding is ‘risky business.’ ” Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of Newport County,
. Although plaintiff was unclear about whether it was challenging the original lease or the second lease extension, at oral argument, it clarified that it was solely challenging the second lease extension.
. Privity of contract is defined as “[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing so,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1394 (10th ed. 2014).