Christopher Sullivan v. Sam Benningfield, 920 F.3d 401

Background

In May 2017, White County Judge Sam Benningfield issued a standing order granting a 30‑day jail credit to inmates who submitted to sterilization (vasectomy for men; Nexplanon for women) after completing a NAS education program. Several inmates accepted and some received credits.
After public outcry, Benningfield issued a July 26 rescinding order stating the program would end but that inmates who had already signed up would still receive the 30‑day credit regardless of whether they ultimately underwent the procedure.
A November clarifying order reiterated that only those who had complied or signed up before the rescission would get the credit and that new promises after the rescission would not qualify.
Plaintiffs Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry—who refused sterilization (and allege Gentry never received the credit despite signing up earlier)—sued under the Equal Protection Clause seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to obtain the same 30‑day credit.
Tennessee later enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40‑35‑217 (S.B. 2133), banning sentencing determinations based on consent or refusal to sterilization; defendants argued the law change and the rescission made the case moot.
The district court dismissed as moot; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding plaintiffs had standing and their claims were not moot and remanded for merits adjudication.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to sue under Article III	Plaintiffs: denial of equal treatment (sentencing credit) is an injury in fact tied to burdens on procreative right and sex discrimination	Defendants: no constitutional right to a sentencing credit; offering contraception is not an injury	Court: Plaintiffs had standing; injury is denial of equal treatment and alleged ongoing adverse effects made it redressable
Whether the orders impermissibly burdened a fundamental right (procreation)	Plaintiffs: credit conditioned on waiving procreative rights; burdens a fundamental right	Defendants: offering a benefit does not coerce or burden rights; no constitutional impairment occurred	Court: Allegations plausibly show the orders conditioned benefits on surrendering procreative rights, a cognizable Equal Protection injury
Sex‑based discrimination under Equal Protection	Plaintiffs: program made it harder for men (vasectomy irreversible) than women (removable implant), creating sex‑based disparate treatment	Defendants: all inmates were offered the same choice; no disparate treatment	Court: Allegations and evidence (few men signed up vs many women) adequately alleged a sex‑based barrier to benefits
Mootness after rescission and state statute	Plaintiffs: rescission and statute did not remedy the continuing differential treatment because credits already awarded remained in place and statute applies prospectively	Defendants: voluntary cessation, rescission, and new law eliminate controversy; plaintiffs released from jail so relief would be meaningless	Court: Not moot—rescission and statute did not eradicate the existing differential effects; collateral consequences (e.g., earlier expungement eligibility) and ongoing effects kept dispute live

Key Cases Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete injury, causation, redressability)
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (standing and mootness timing distinctions)
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (past exposure to illegal conduct insufficient absent continuing adverse effects)
Northeast Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (injury can be denial of equal treatment stemming from a governmental barrier)
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (equal protection applies even when plaintiff lacks entitlement to the benefit if denial is discriminatory)
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (procreative interests implicate fundamental rights)
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (voluntary cessation doctrine and heavy burden to show no reasonable expectation of recurrence)
Already, LLC v. Nike, 568 U.S. 85 (a dispute is moot when no actual controversy remains affecting plaintiffs' legal rights)
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (collateral consequences can preserve a live controversy after release)