Christopher Norman v. Christopher Henkel and Lisa Henkel, 407 S.W.3d 502

Background

On January 9, 2010 (below-freezing hard-freeze warning in Houston), USPS carrier Christopher Norman delivered mail to Lisa Henkel at the Henkels’ front door and slipped on ice while walking away from the house.
Norman says Lisa gave no warning about ice and he saw no ice as he approached; he concedes she said only “Don’t slip” after receiving the mail.
Norman sued Christopher and Lisa Henkel for premises liability, negligence, and gross negligence based on the icy walkway; the Henkels moved for traditional summary judgment arguing Lisa explicitly warned him seconds before the fall.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Henkels and rendered a take-nothing judgment; Norman appealed.
The court of appeals reviewed de novo, treating Norman as an invitee owed a duty to protect against unreasonable risks of which the owner knew or should have discovered, discharged by an adequate warning or making premises safe.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lisa’s statement “Don’t slip” was an adequate warning as a matter of law	"Don’t slip" was too general and did not identify the condition (ice), its location, or whether to avoid entry; therefore a factual issue exists about adequacy.	The admonition warned of the specific hazard (slipping) that caused the injury and was therefore adequate as a matter of law.	Majority: "Don’t slip" is a general warning insufficient as a matter of law to warn of ice on the walkway; summary judgment improperly granted.
Whether a general admonition can discharge duty for slipping conditions generally	Norman: Adequacy requires warning directed to the particular dangerous condition (ice).	Henkels: A warning of slippery ground need not identify the specific cause (ice).	Majority: Owner must warn of the specific dangerous condition known or discoverable; slipping is not the condition—ice is—so a general admonition may be inadequate.
Whether the adequacy of a warning is a question of law or fact on summary judgment	Norman: Adequacy here raises a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.	Henkels: The evidence conclusively shows adequate warning; summary judgment appropriate.	Majority: The record does not conclusively establish adequacy; summary judgment improper.
Whether an occupier may discharge duty by general warnings across premises	Norman: Allowing general warnings would let owners discharge duty universally (improper as a matter of law).	Henkels: Not specifically argued beyond asserting sufficiency here.	Majority: Rejects allowing blanket discharge by generalized warnings; warning must be directed to the dangerous condition.

Key Cases Cited

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (summary-judgment de novo review principles)
Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (movant’s burden in traditional summary judgment)
Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) (quantum of evidence for genuine issue: more than a scintilla)
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997) (defendant must negate an element or establish an affirmative defense conclusively)
Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Briggs Equip. Trust, 321 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (burden-shifting after movant establishes right to summary judgment)
Malcomson Rd. Util. Dist. v. Newsom, 171 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005) (viewing evidence in nonmovant’s favor on summary judgment)
W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2005) (premises-liability duty depends on entrant’s status)
Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2010) (owner’s duty to invitees: reasonable care to protect against known or discoverable unreasonable risks)
CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2000) (same duty framework for premises liability)
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) (duty discharged by warning or making premises reasonably safe)
Bill’s Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean, 77 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002) (a warning that identifies the dangerous condition can discharge duty)
Pipkin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 383 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (owner must warn of risks known or discoverable)
TXI Operations, L.P. v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2009) (general “be careful” warnings may be insufficient to identify particular hazard)
Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. 2006) (identifying the specific dangerous condition that caused a slip)
Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983) (slipping condition tied to specific source on the floor)
Coffee v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 536 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1976) (typical slip cases identify the particular dangerous item)