Christopher Michael Haynes v. the State of Texas, 03-19-00427-CR

Background

Shortly before 4:00 a.m., Officer Manuel Alvarado in marked uniform responded to reports of suspicious persons and fleeing suspects at an apartment complex; his body camera footage lacked audio at the start of the encounter.
Alvarado approached and called to an individual later identified as Christopher Haynes; Haynes turned, fled, was chased, tased, and handcuffed.
During a search after the arrest, officers recovered a white sunglasses case containing cash, baggies, and substances later tested as cocaine (≈2.1 g), and a handgun from Haynes’s waistband.
Haynes testified he did not know Alvarado was a police officer when he ran; the body-cam contains an exchange suggesting Alvarado said something like “Police, stop/freeze,” and Haynes at times both acknowledged and denied hearing that.
The trial court denied Haynes’s requested Article 38.23 jury instruction (exclusion/suppression instruction), the jury convicted him of possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and the judge later sentenced him to two concurrent eight-year TDCJ terms.
On appeal Haynes raised (1) denial of the Article 38.23 instruction and (2) the trial court’s alleged failure to consider the full range of punishment at sentencing.

Issues

Issue	Haynes' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by refusing an Article 38.23 instruction (suppressible-evidence jury charge)	Haynes argued the evidence raised disputed facts (whether Alvarado identified himself as police; lighting; whether Haynes knowingly fled a peace officer lawfully attempting to detain/arrest him), so the jury should have been instructed to disregard evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest/detention.	The State argued either no affirmative, material factual dispute existed about identification/lighting, or the disputes were legal questions (reasonable suspicion/probable cause) for the court, not the jury; in any event other undisputed facts supported lawful detention/arrest.	The court affirmed: no Article 38.23 instruction required because (1) some claimed disputes were not supported by affirmative, material evidence; (2) other matters (reasonable suspicion/probable cause) were legal questions for the judge; and (3) undisputed facts supported reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
Whether the trial judge prejudged punishment / failed to consider the full range of punishment at sentencing	Haynes argued the judge’s early comments indicated a predetermined rejection of probation and thus denied due process by not considering the full range of punishment.	The State pointed to the judge’s review of the PSI, the court’s extensive colloquy, sua sponte questioning of a probation officer about treatment options, and allowance of full adversary presentation.	The court held the record shows the judge considered the full range of punishment and entertained probation; no due-process violation or evidence of arbitrary predetermination.

Key Cases Cited

Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (standards for reviewing jury-charge error).
Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (framework for charge-error review).
Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (trial court duty to instruct on law applicable to case).
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (harm standards for charge error).
Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (three-predicate test for mandatory Article 38.23 instruction).
Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (what constitutes affirmative evidence creating a factual dispute).
Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reasonable-suspicion totality-of-the-circumstances analysis).
State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (probable-cause principles for warrantless arrests).
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Article 38.23 instruction required only when factual dispute exists about how evidence was obtained).
Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (due process requires a neutral, detached sentencing body).
Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (arbitrary refusal to consider full sentencing range violates due process).
Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (reasonable-suspicion/probable-cause are legal questions for the court, not jury).