39 F.4th 523
8th Cir.2022Background
- In 2005 Christopher Jones pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and (2) brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count Four (the § 924(c) count) referenced Counts One, Two, and Six as predicates; the plea agreement tied the § 924(c) predicate to the conspiracy charged in Count One and dismissed other predicates.
- At plea and sentencing Jones admitted facts: conspiring to rob a clothing store, taking employees hostage, driving them to the store, and using a nine-millimeter firearm.
- Jones originally received a life sentence based on prior violent-felony findings; on direct appeal the court ordered resentencing and Jones was re-sentenced to 216 months (conspiracy) + 84 months (§ 924(c)), affirmed on appeal.
- After the Supreme Court decided Davis (holding the § 924(c) residual clause void for vagueness), Jones moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his § 924(c) conviction, arguing his predicate offenses do not qualify as crimes of violence without the residual clause.
- The Eighth Circuit held Jones established cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default, found Davis is retroactive as a substantive rule, concluded none of the charged predicates (conspiracy, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, felon-in-possession) qualify as crimes of violence, and reversed to vacate Count Four and remand for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jones may raise a Davis-based challenge on collateral review despite not raising it on direct appeal | Jones: Davis was not available earlier; he shows cause and prejudice (or actual innocence) to excuse default | Government: Claim is procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct review | Court: Jones established cause and prejudice; default excused |
| Whether Davis applies retroactively on collateral review | Jones: Davis announced a substantive rule changing the statute’s reach and thus applies retroactively under Teague | Government: Davis should not necessarily apply retroactively on collateral review | Court: Davis is substantive and retroactive; applies to § 2255 review |
| Whether the predicate offenses charged support a § 924(c) conviction after Davis | Jones: Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, aiding/attempted robbery, and felon-in-possession are not crimes of violence without the residual clause | Government: At least one predicate supports § 924(c); suggested alternative predicates (e.g., carjacking) | Court: None of the charged predicates qualify as crimes of violence post-Davis; Count Four lacks a valid predicate and must be vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (residual clause in ACCA is void for vagueness)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
- Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016) (new substantive rules apply retroactively on collateral review)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (cause-and-prejudice standard for procedural default in § 2255 proceedings)
- Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (prejudice standard for collateral attack requires actual and substantial disadvantage)
- Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (when a legal claim was not reasonably available on direct appeal, cause for collateral review may exist)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (prior treatment of residual-clause issues)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (prior precedent upholding a residual clause)
- United States v. Clark, 563 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2009) (felon-in-possession is not a crime of violence under § 924(c))