Christopher James Glenn, M.D. and Northeast ob/gyn Associates, L.L.P. v. Joseph Leal and Dawn Leal, Individually and as Natural Parents, Next Friends and Legal Guardians of A.L., a Minor, 596 S.W.3d 769

Dawn Leal, a diabetic, established prenatal care with Dr. Christopher Glenn and scheduled an elective induction; during delivery shoulder dystocia and a nuchal cord occurred.
Dr. Glenn performed maneuvers in the hospital’s obstetrical unit to deliver the baby, who suffered a permanent brachial plexus injury.
The Leals sued Glenn and his practice for negligence; the jury was instructed on ordinary negligence and awarded $2.7 million.
Glenn sought a directed verdict and later JNOV arguing Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 74.153 (willful-and-wanton standard for emergency medical care) applied because the care was emergency care in an obstetrical unit.
The trial court refused to submit whether the care was “emergency medical care” or the willful-and-wanton standard; the court of appeals affirmed based on precedent treating obstetrical-unit care differently.
The Texas Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Denton v. D.A., held the court of appeals erred, found the charge error harmful, reversed, and remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Leal)	Defendant's Argument (Glenn)	Held
Does § 74.153’s willful-and-wanton standard apply to emergency care rendered in a hospital obstetrical unit when the patient was not first treated in an ED?	Care was not "emergency medical care" in the statutory sense; ordinary negligence governs.	§ 74.153 applies to emergency care in an obstetrical unit even if patient was not first seen in an ED; jury should decide whether care was emergency care and, if so, apply willful-and-wanton standard.	The Court holds § 74.153 can apply to emergency care in an obstetrical unit without prior ED treatment; failure to submit the issue was harmful.
Was the trial court’s refusal to submit the emergency-care/willful-and-wanton questions to the jury reversible error?	Any charge error was harmless; jury’s ordinary-negligence finding stands.	Refusal to submit the contested, critical question deprived Glenn of proper legal protection under § 74.153.	The Court finds the charge error harmful because the issue was contested and critical; warrants a new trial.
Were there legally sufficient proofs of willful-and-wanton negligence and of future medical expenses to support the verdict?	Evidence showed negligence and damages to support verdict.	No legally sufficient evidence of the higher (§ 74.153) standard or of future medical expenses.	The Court did not resolve sufficiency on the merits; because of harmful charge error, it remanded for a new trial.

Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2018) (statute § 74.153 covers emergency care in an obstetrical unit even if patient was not first treated in an ED)
Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. 2009) (charge error is harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue)
Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994) (defective jury charge with proper objection entitles party to new trial)
Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007) (when plaintiff’s theory is defectively submitted and defendant objects, remand for new trial is proper)
George Grubbs Enters., Inc. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1995) (reversal and remand appropriate where jury charge error is found)