Christopher Jack v. State
01-15-00848-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 4, 2016Background
- Defendant Christopher Jack was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and sentenced to three years’ confinement, probated for five years. Appeal from Harris County, 183rd District Court (Trial Ct. No. 1283618).
- Victim Ernest Dunn testified Jack struck a street light with a tire iron, returned later waving two tire irons overhead, shouted threats to kill Dunn’s family, approached Dunn’s gate, and during a struggle Dunn sustained a bleeding head injury.
- Dunn and an eyewitness (Marvin Dickens) testified Jack struck Dunn with a tire iron; law enforcement testified a tire iron can be a deadly weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury.
- Jack and his girlfriend offered a different account: Jack denied striking Dunn and said he only retrieved the tire irons; Meeks testified Jack did not hit anything with them.
- Trial court admitted testimony that a tire iron could severely hurt someone and Dickens’s testimony recounting Dunn’s statement, admitted under the excited-utterance exception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal sufficiency of evidence (actus reus) | State: testimony showed Jack voluntarily wielded tire irons in assault | Jack: no voluntary act proved | Held: Sufficient evidence of a voluntary act (jury resolved credibility) |
| Mens rea for aggravated assault | State: threats and conduct showed intent/knowledge to cause SBI | Jack: insufficient proof of intent | Held: Evidence supports purposeful/knowing intent to cause serious bodily injury |
| Tire iron as deadly weapon | State: testimony and manner of use supported deadly-weapon finding | Jack: intent nonexistent or negated, so definition improper | Held: Jury could find "manner of use" and "intended use" supported deadly-weapon submission |
| Jury charge wording and deadly-weapon definition | Jack: charge wording (use of "unlawfully") and deadly-weapon definition caused egregious harm | State: charge as a whole correct; definition tracks statute | Held: No egregious harm; charge and definition proper in context |
| Admission of testimony about dangerousness and excited utterance | Jack: testimony speculative/irrelevant and hearsay (Confrontation Clause) | State: testimony admissible; excited-utterance exception applies; no Confrontation objection preserved | Held: No reversible error — objection on appeal not preserved; excited-utterance admission proper; any error harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional sufficiency review standard)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (applicable Texas sufficiency standard)
- Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642 (jury as factfinder on credibility)
- Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (no reweighing evidence on sufficiency review)
- Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630 (voluntariness requirement for criminal acts)
- Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (egregious-harm standard for unpreserved jury-charge error)
- Huddleston v. State, 661 S.W.2d 111 (charge language considered in context; no fundamental defect)
- Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727 (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571 (scope of appellate review for evidentiary rulings)
- Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531 (some evidence supports trial court decision suffices)
- Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713 (harmlessness when same evidence admitted elsewhere)
- Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589 (timing and stress factors for excited utterance)
- Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Rule 803(2) eliminates independent-evidence requirement)
- Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173 (hearsay objection does not preserve Confrontation Clause challenge)