Christopher J. Godfrey v. State of Iowa Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity Kimberly Reynolds, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in Her Official Capacity Jeffrey Boeyink, Chief of Staff to the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity Brenna Findley, Legal Counsel to the Governor of The
2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 79
| Iowa | 2017Background
- Christopher Godfrey, appointed Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner, alleges state officials (Governor, staff, and director of Workforce Development) pressured him to resign for partisan reasons and reduced his salary and reputation after he refused.
- Godfrey amended his petition to assert four Iowa constitutional claims: deprivation of property (salary) and liberty (reputation) without due process (Art. I, §9) and equal protection claims based on sexual orientation (Art. I, §6) against the State and individual defendants, seeking actual and punitive damages.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing (1) no private money‑damages cause of action exists under the Iowa Constitution (i.e., not self‑executing) and (2) the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216, preempts/provides the exclusive remedy.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants; this interlocutory appeal followed. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether Bivens‑style remedies are available under the Iowa Constitution and whether the ICRA provides an adequate/exclusive remedy.
- The Court (majority) held: due process (property and liberty) claims (Counts VI and VII) may proceed (Bivens‑type remedy available); equal protection claims asserting discrimination on sexual orientation (Counts VIII and IX) were dismissed because the ICRA provides an adequate remedy for those claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Godfrey) | Defendant's Argument (Branstad et al.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Art. I §§6 and 9 of Iowa Constitution are self‑executing such that a private damages action (Bivens‑type) exists | Constitutional guarantees are self‑executing; courts can imply damages remedies (historical/common‑law support; Bivens, Restatement §874A) | Article XII §1 requires legislature to pass laws “necessary” to carry the Constitution into effect; judiciary cannot create money remedies absent legislative action | Court: Due process and equal protection clauses are self‑executing; Bivens‑type remedy cognizable under Iowa law ( Counts VI & VII not dismissed) |
| Whether federal Bivens jurisprudence (and its retreat) controls recognition of state constitutional damages | Bivens, Passman, Carlson support judicially created remedies; later narrowing does not negate core precedents | Post‑Bivens federal decisions counsel caution; separation‑of‑powers and special factors argue against judicially creating new remedies | Court: Federal precedent persuasive but not binding; court finds the Bivens/Passman/Carlson line persuasive for Iowa constitutional claims in this context |
| Whether the Iowa Civil Rights Act preempts or provides an exclusive remedy for constitutional equal protection claims (sexual orientation) | ICRA differs from constitutional remedies; statute inadequate for partisan‑motivation/property/liberty claims; constitutional claims not preempted | ICRA is the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination and preempts parallel common‑law/statutory claims | Court: ICRA provides adequate remedy for sexual‑orientation discrimination here; Counts VIII & IX dismissed as to those claims against State/supervisory defendants |
| Whether courts should decline to create a constitutional damages remedy because of sovereign‑immunity, separation of powers, special factors, or availability of punitive damages only by judicial action | Courts must enforce constitutional rights; remedies (including punitive damages) may be necessary to vindicate and deter constitutional violations | Creating damages remedies against the State risks violating sovereign immunity and usurping legislative function; special factors advise caution | Court: Majority rejects special‑factors bar and finds remedy available; separate concurrence/dissent raise sovereign‑immunity and separation‑of‑powers concerns (disagreement on punitive damages and scope) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized an implied damages action for Fourth Amendment violations and framework for implied constitutional remedies)
- Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (recognized damages remedy under Fifth Amendment equal protection/due process in employment discrimination against a congressman)
- Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (held damages available for Eighth Amendment violation in federal‑prison context and emphasized inadequacy of statutory alternatives when punitive damages unavailable)
- Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (Iowa Supreme Court discussion of state constitutional enforcement and role of courts in protecting individual rights)
- McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (Iowa 1904) (early Iowa decision recognizing remedies for unlawful searches and seizures; cited for lineage of constitutional torts)
- Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (Iowa 1934) (trespass/search‑and‑seizure context; discussed availability of damages for unlawful entry under state/federal constitutional principles)
- State ex rel. Halbach v. Claussen, 216 Iowa 1079, 250 N.W. 195 (Iowa 1933) (contrasting precedent where certain constitutional provisions were held not self‑executing because implementation required legislative detail)
- Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (1996) (New York Court of Appeals recognized a state constitutional damages remedy for search/seizure and equal protection violations; used as persuasive authority)