Christopher Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226

Gibbs received a conditional offer from Pittsburgh PD but was required to pass a psychological exam by Pennsylvania-licensed psychologists per 37 Pa. Code § 203.11(a)(7).
Of three psychologists who interviewed him, two recommended he was unfit; Pittsburgh withdrew the final offer.
Gibbs has ADHD (allegedly controlled), a history of youthful misconduct prior to treatment, and was hired by five other police departments after similar screenings.
Gibbs alleges the psychologists fixated on his ADHD and childhood conduct without assessing current fitness, and that Pittsburgh hired others with similar juvenile histories who did not have ADHD.
District Court dismissed his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, concluding Gibbs was unqualified because passing the psychological exam was a statutory prerequisite and noting Gibbs had not alleged that the City itself was biased.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding Gibbs plausibly alleged (1) he was regarded as disabled, (2) he was otherwise qualified notwithstanding the contested test, and (3) the City can be liable for discriminatory acts by contracted examiners; remanded for discovery.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Gibbs alleges a disability under the ADA/Rehab Act	Psychologists regarded his ADHD as a disability and fixated on it	ADHD controlled; not a disabling condition	Plausibly alleged a "regarded-as" disability; claim survives pleading stage
Whether Gibbs was a "qualified individual" despite failing the psych exam	He was otherwise qualified (conditional offer; hired elsewhere); failure resulted from biased examiners	He lacked the statutorily required psychological qualification, so unqualified	A plaintiff can challenge a qualification applied discriminatorily; Gibbs plausibly alleged he was qualified
Whether the City can be liable for discrimination by contracted psychologists	Employer liable for discriminatory third parties it uses in hiring	Only the psychologists (not the City) were biased	Employer liability attaches if it relied on discriminatory third-party examiners; City not excused by contracting out
Whether compliance with state law screening shields the City from federal liability	Federal anti‑discrimination law controls; state-law compliance is not a defense	City argued state law required screening and discharge	State-law compliance does not excuse violations of federal ADA/Rehab Act; no defense

McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995) (substantive standards under ADA and Rehabilitation Act are the same)
Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (elements of prima facie disability discrimination claim)
Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981) (challenged job criteria may be subject to discrimination claims)
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (employer cannot evade ADA by contracting out personnel functions)
EEOC v. Allegheny Cty., 705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1983) (federal anti‑discrimination law not displaced by state law)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard requiring plausible claim that discovery may uncover evidence)
Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2021) (pleading and notice requirements for discrimination claims)
Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2009) (federal disability law displaces conflicting state rules)
Cook v. City of Philadelphia, [citation="649 F. App'x 174"] (3d Cir. 2016) (psychological test may be a valid qualification only absent allegations of bias)
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (de novo review standard for dismissal)