Christopher Covey v. Assessor of Ohio County, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1113

Background

Cristopher and Lela Covey sued under § 1983 and Bivens after government agents and a county tax assessor entered their property, the attached walk-out basement patio (curtilage), and the home, and seized evidence of marijuana.
The tax assessor (Crews) ignored posted “No Trespassing” signs, entered the house to leave a pamphlet, then allegedly searched the curtilage and discovered marijuana; he reported this to law enforcement.
Deputies (Espejo and DEA Special Agent Manchas) later arrived, parked on the private driveway, entered the curtilage (patio), encountered and seized Mr. Covey at his workbench, re-entered the patio to photograph and seize evidence, detained Mrs. Covey, and later obtained a warrant and arrested the Coveys.
Mr. Covey pleaded guilty to manufacturing marijuana and was sentenced to home confinement; Mrs. Covey was not prosecuted. The Coveys filed this civil suit challenging the warrantless intrusions and seizures.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), relying in part on materials outside the complaint; the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint must be construed in the plaintiffs’ favor and that plausible Fourth Amendment claims were pleaded.

Issues

Issue	Covey(s)’ Argument	Defendant(s)’ Argument	Held
Whether officers’ entry into curtilage was lawful under knock-and-talk	Officers only saw Mr. Covey after entering curtilage; entry was a warrantless search of curtilage and thus unreasonable	Officers claim they observed Mr. Covey from a lawful vantage outside curtilage, giving implied license to approach	Reversed: complaint plausibly alleges officers only saw Mr. Covey after entering curtilage, so knock-and-talk defense not resolved at dismissal stage
Whether tax assessor’s entry/search was reasonable for tax-collection purposes	Crews ignored “No Trespassing” signs and entered curtilage/home, exceeding administrative authorization and intruding on high privacy interest	Crews asserts his data-collection duties justified entry and any regulatory violation is not per se constitutional violation	Reversed: complaint plausibly alleges an unreasonable intrusion into home/curtilage; resolution requires factual development
Qualified immunity for officers and assessor	Plaintiffs: officers and assessor violated clearly established Fourth Amendment protection of homes/curtilage	Defendants: reasonable officers/assessor entitled to qualified immunity given disputed facts and regulatory context	Denied at dismissal stage: factual record undeveloped; officers not entitled to immunity on face of complaint; assessor’s immunity is closer but not granted pre-discovery
Whether Heck bars Covey’s civil claims given guilty plea and sentence	Plaintiffs: civil claims for unreasonable search do not necessarily negate the conviction and thus are not Heck-barred	Defendants: success on civil claims would imply invalidity of Mr. Covey’s conviction/sentence and therefore are barred	Court: Heck does not bar search claims that do not necessarily imply invalidity; some claims (e.g., challenging the lawfulness of confinement) could imply invalidity — district court must decide Heck’s applicability on remand

Key Cases Cited

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (curtilage and knock‑and‑talk principles)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (curtilage vs. open fields)
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (expectation of privacy analysis)
Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001) (probable cause standard for curtilage searches)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (favorable‑termination rule for § 1983 claims)
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (warrantless searches of home presumptively unconstitutional)
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012) (qualified immunity standard)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (questioning Heck’s application to those no longer in custody)