Jonathan Rogers v. M. L. Pendleton, Officer M. G. Vinyard, OfficerJonathan Rogers v. M. L. Pendleton, Officer M. G. Vinyard, Officer
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Williams
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
Jonathan Rogers brought this action pursuant to
I.
In summarizing the facts in this case, we resolve all disputed factual issues in Rogers’ favor, as did the district court.
Shaw
Rogers testified that he consumed one bottle of beer between 7:30 and 10:00 and had taken a sip from the beer he was holding at the time Pendleton arrived. The beer in Rogers’ hand was the only alcohol the officers saw at the scene. Pen-dleton, however, asserted that Rogers appeared intoxicated and was “blowing alcohol fumes” in Pendleton’s face. 1 (J.A. at 60, 69.)
Rogers told Pendleton that he was the owner of the property; Pendleton told Rogers that the department had received noise complaints. Rogers stated that any noise problem had ended. Officer Pendle-ton testified that he viewed Rogers as irreverent and intoxicated and wished to speak to someone “who was sober” regarding the noise complaint. (J.A. at 61.) Pendleton told Rogers that he intended to search the premises, whereupon Rogers asked Pendleton whether he had a search warrant and whether he had probable cause for a search. Pendleton stated that he did not need a search warrant, because Rogers was drinking in public. After stating that he owned the premises, Rogers repeatedly asked the officers to leave. During their discussion with Rogers, the officers observed persons appearing to be younger than twenty-one leaving the yard and entering the house. Pendleton testified that Rogers invaded his “personal space” and was stepping into his way, “put[ting] his face in my face.” (J.A. at 61.) Pendleton then stepped around Rogers and continued to look at Rogers, who was then speaking with Vinyard. The officers then arrested Rogers for public drunkenness and impeding an officer, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of a police cruiser. At that point, without making any further investigation on the premises, the officers took Rogers to the police station.
II. •
On March 16, 1999, Rogers filed suit against the officers pursuant to
III.
A district court’s denial of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo on appeal with the court using its “full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.”
Elder v. Holloway,
510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original). The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity is not lost when an officer ‘violates the Fourth Amendment unless a reasonable officer would know that the specific conduct at issue was impermissible.
Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). A “law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may [not] be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment.”
Id.
at 637, 107 S.Ct. 3034. The Supreme Court has held that a right can be deemed clearly established even if there is no prior decision addressing the precise conduct at issue, so long as its illegality would have been evident to a reasonable officer based
Officers are not. afforded protection when they are “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). But, in gray areas, where the law is unsettled or murky, qualified immunity affords protection to an officer who takes an action that is not clearly forbidden — even if the action is later deemed wrongful. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992). The deference given to the judgments of law enforcement officers acting in good faith is “particularly important in cases involving law enforcement officials investigating serious crimes.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir.1998).
To determine whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the steps are sequential: we “ ‘must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all,’ ” before “ ‘proceeding] to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.’ ” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999)). As the precedent of the Supreme Court and this Circuit makes clear, the nature of the right allegedly violated must be defined “at a high level of particularity.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th Cir.1999); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Here, defined at the appropriate level of specificity, the question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that a general search in the curtilage of a private home for evidence of a noise violation and evidence of underage alcohol consumption was permissible based solely upon reasonable suspicion. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the sole issue before us, whether the officers are entitled to summary judgment in this case on the basis of qualified immunity.
A.
The officers argue that they had the right to search the curtilage of Rogers’ home based on reasonable suspicion.
3
Their claimed basis for reasonable suspicion is that (1) they had received noise complaints in the vicinity of the Rogers’ home; (2) Pendleton encountered Rogers holding a bottle of beer; and (3) Pendleton observed people who appeared to be under 21 “scurrying.” Thus, the officers argue that they had an adequate legal basis for conducting a search, and, therefore, their arrest of Rogers for allegedly “impeding” this search was lawful. We will first address the officers’ contention that only reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, is required to conduct a search of the curtilage of a private home. We will then address the question of whether the officers had the required level of justification to conduct the search of Rogers’ curtilage which they contemplated. Finally, we will
The district court held that the protection against warrantless searches of the home extends fully to the curtilage. Thus, the district court held that searches of the curtilage are permissible only when probable cause plus either a warrant or exigent circumstances exist. . Id. The police officers did not have a warrant and do not contend that exigent circumstances justified their planned search. Them planned search therefore was illegal unless mere reasonable suspicion suffices to permit a search of the curtilage, and the officers in fact had reasonable suspicion.
The district court had a strong basis for its holding that probable cause is required for a search of the curtilage of a home. The Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), stated that “the curtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ . . . and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735 (internal citation omitted). The Court reaffirmed this position in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), stating that “[in Oliver ] we recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.” 4 Id. at 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134. Thus, two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions have stated that the curtilage is entitled to the same level of Fourth Amendment protection extended to the home, so that, as with the home, probable cause, and not reasonable suspicion, is the appropriate standard for searches of the curtilage.
B.
We next address whether Rogers’ right to be free from a search of the curtilage of his home premised only upon reasonable suspicion was clearly established at the time of the incident. Faced with the above case law, the officers attempt to argue that their planned search was permissible, or at a minimum, that the law in this area was not clearly established because some cases hold that an officer may, based upon reasonable suspicion, enter the curtilage for the purpose of approaching the home to speak to its inhabitants. By extension of that principle, the officers contend that they had the right to conduct a comprehensive search for evidence of a noise violation’ — such as a band or amplifying equipment — as well as a right to pursue evidence of underage alcohol consumption, based only upon reasonable suspicion.
In determining whether a right is clearly established, we may rely upon cases of controlling authority in the jurisdiction in question, or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.”
Wilson,
526 U.S. at 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692. While a consensus- of cases of persuasive authority may clearly establish a right for qualified
This Court’s decision in Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 354 (4th Cir.1998), fails to create any doubt as to the illegality of the officers’ planned search. In Alvarez, the officers received a complaint alleging underage drinking at a party, and went to the house that was the subject of the complaint. Id. at 356. When they approached the front door, the officers observed a sign stating, “Party in Back”; an arrow on the sign pointed towards the backyard. Id. at 357. The officers followed the arrow, entered the backyard, and asked to speak to the owner. Id. While waiting to speak to the owner, the officers observed a person who appeared to be below the legal drinking age consuming a cup of beer. Id. After questioning the suspected underage drinker, who produced a suspicious identification card while the officers continued to wait to speak to the owner, the officers went back to the front of the home and spoke further to the suspected underage drinker, who admitted that she was underage and stated that the party’s host, knowing her age, had invited her to the party. Id. The officers then issued a citation to the host. Id. Alvarez stated that officers may enter a person’s yard without probable cause if they have a “legitimate reason . . . unconnected with a search of [the] premises,” id. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted), and held that a desire to speak to the party’s host was such a legitimate reason. In this case, the officers spoke to Rogers, the host, immediately, and were asked to leave. At that point, they no longer had a legitimate reason unconnected with a search of the premises, and the reasoning of Alvarez thus indicates that they would have exceeded the legitimate reasons for their entry had they proceeded to conduct a general search of the curtilage.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[r]easonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can justify the agents’ approaching the house to question the occupants.”
United States v. Tobin,
923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991). The officers rely on
Tobin
for the proposition that their contemplated search of Rogers’ curtilage was reasonable in light of clearly established law. Their reliance on
Tobin
is misplaced. First, the
Tobin
opinion cited as authority
Davis v. United States,
327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.1964), in which the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]bsent express orders from the person in possession,” officers may “walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s ‘castle,’ with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof.”
Id.
at 303. Thus,
Tobin
itself, on which the officers rely, cites approvingly as the basis for its holding a case stating that the right to approach the home and knock on its door to question the occupants is inapplicable in the presence of contrary “express orders from the per
The officers also rely upon United States v. Searle, 974 F.Supp. 1433 (M.D.Fla.1997), a case in which officers received a report of gunshots from a house on a given street, and noticed only one house on the street in question with lights on. Id. at 1435. The officers knocked on the front door, received no answer, went around to knock on the back door, knocked, and spoke to an inhabitant who came to the door. Id. The Searle court found that probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the entry onto the curtilage of the home but held alternately that “[w]here police have a reasonable suspicion and approach a house to question the occupants thereof, their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1440. Searle, however, fits neatly within the obvious rationale of Tobin: just as private citizens may approach a home, absent contrary instructions from the owner, to knock on a door, so may the police approach without probable cause, a warrant, or exigency. Searle clearly did not hold that, after speaking to the owner of a house and being asked to leave, officers may continue to probe the entire curtilage of a home and speak to anyone within the curtilage based merely upon reasonable suspicion.
The officers argue that the district court “failed to recognize the right of officers to enter upon curtilage to make an investigation based on reasonable suspicion.” (Reply Brief of Appellants at 3.) The district court failed to recognize this right because no such right exists; instead, the right secured by
Tobin
and similar cases is the right to “knock and talk,” that is, to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants, not the right to make a general investigation in the curtilage based on reasonable suspicion. A contrary rule would eviscerate the principle of
Oliver
and
Dunn
that the curtilage is entitled to the same level of Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself. Indeed, the cases the officers rely upon say simply that police officers do not need a warrant to do what any private citizen may legitimately
C.
Rogers was arrested for obstruction of justice under
1. Obstruction of Justice
The officers contend that their arrest of Rogers was lawful because Rogers’
A Virginia appeals court has held that a defendant involved in an automobile accident who told an officer that he was too drunk to have been driving and that he did not remember who was driving did not violate
Rogers’ version of the encounter, which the district court credited for summary judgment purposes, would indicate clearly that Rogers’ behavior did not obstruct the ability of the officers to conduct their planned search. While Pendleton testified that Rogers was “stepping in front of him” and “getting in his face,” Pendleton also testified that he simply stepped around Rogers without difficulty and then stood without interference for a period of time while observing Rogers speaking to Vin-yard. Rogers, on the district court’s account of the evidence, did not make it difficult or impossible for the officers to enter the curtilage and perform their planned illegal search; the information in the record, construed favorably to Rogers, indicates that they easily could have ignored him. We thus conclude that Rogers’ behavior, if indeed it was of the sort described by Rogers and implicitly credited by the district court for summary judgment purposes,
see Behrens,
516 U.S. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, was not a violation of
2. Public Intoxication
The officers next contend that their arrest of Rogers was lawful because he was allegedly intoxicated in public in violation of
While the officers attempt to use
Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill,
161 F.3d 782 (4th Cir.1998), as authority for the proposition that only the officers’ perception of Rogers’ intoxication matters legally, and thus his testimony cannot, as a matter of law, create an issue of material fact, they misread
Sigman. Sigman
does not stand for the proposition that the objective facts of an encounter are always legally irrelevant whenever an officer asserts that his perception of an encounter was such as to justify his action. Instead, the
Sigman
court addressed a situation in which officers had uncontroverted evidence of a suspect’s dangerousness and knew that the suspect was armed and was behaving violently within a residence.
Sigman
held that the statements of persons who claimed to have observed, from a cheering mob on the other side of the street, that the suspect was unarmed did not create a triable issue of material fact where the officers closest to the encounter unanimously testified that they perceived the suspect to be armed.
Id.
at 787. The
Sigman
Court concluded that given the volatile and dangerous atmosphere and the
Further, even if the officers could reasonably have perceived Rogers to be intoxicated, they could not have reasonably perceived him to be “in public” as required by
IV.
In addition to his false arrest and false imprisonment claims, which are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Rogers brings a malicious prosecution claim and a claim alleging that the officers’ entry into his driveway for the purpose of speaking to him constituted an illegal search. Rogers’ malicious prosecution claim is so intertwined legally with his false arrest claim as to stand or fall with that claim for qualified immunity purposes.
See Lambert v. Williams,
223 F.3d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir.2000),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 889, 148 L.Ed.2d 797 (2001) (stating that “there is no such thing as a
Rogers also claims that the officers conducted an unlawful search when they pulled into his driveway in order to speak to him regarding the noise violation. The cases cited by the officers for the “knock and talk” rule, while inapplicable to their planned comprehensive search of Rogers’ curtilage after he asked them to leave, find their proper application relative to this claim. The officers had a right, based on reasonable suspicion, to approach Rogers’ home in order to speak to him regarding the noise complaints. Their error is in converting this limited license to do what any citizen may do — approach the house and speak to the inhabitant or owner- — -into a license to search for “evidence” and speak to various guests at a party after speaking to Rogers and being asked to leave. In anything more than a de minimis sense, however, they did not in fact search Rogers’ curtilage after being asked to leave; instead, after Rogers asked them to leave, they arrested him and left. The actual “search” conducted by the officers thus did not violate the Constitution, for the reasons stated in Alvarez. Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir.1998).
As regards their planned search of the curtilage for evidence of alcohol and noise violations, which they did not in fact conduct, the officers are correct that if the district court had found that they violated
Y.
In examining each constituent part of the officers’ qualified immunity claim, we do not lose sight of the possible inference from the evidence that Rogers’ arrest was motivated by the officers’ anger at his “irreverent” refusal to consent to their search. In short, crediting Rogers’ version of disputed factual issues, as we must, it appears that this may not be a case in which police officers acting in good faith made a “bad guess” in a confusing area of the law, but instead, may be a case in which police officers, angered by a homeowner’s correct statement of his legal rights and refusal to permit a search which was clearly illegal absent his consent, arrested a homeowner in a fit of pique. The officers now seek to justify their arrest with an implausible reading of cases establishing a simple right to approach a home to speak to the owner without a warrant, assertions that verbal objection to an illegal search is an independently arrestable offense, and claims that a suspect was intoxicated in public when it is disputed whether he was intoxicated and the clear evidence indicates that he was not in public. The police do not have a right to arrest citizens for refusing to consent to an illegal search. The decision of the district court is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Following Rogers’ arrest for public intoxication, no officer asked Rogers to conduct any sobriety test, either at the time of the arrest or at any time thereafter, and all of the charges against him eventually were dismissed.
. A district court’s conclusion that a disputed issue of fact exists is not immediately appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine; instead, on an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, we must ask whether, assuming “all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment,” the officers are, nonetheless, entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (stating that a district court‘s determination that the evidence at the summary judgment stage raises a genuine issue of fact is not immediately appealable). When the district court, in denying summary judgment, does not identify the specific conduct that it finds adequately supported to create a genuine issue for trial, we must “review . . . the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, likely assumed.” Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 834 (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151). In determining what the district court “likely assumed,” this Court “determines what the evidence [properly before the district court on summary judgment], viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrated.” Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc).
. We address here the officers’ planned, but not completed, comprehensive search of Rogers’ curtilage for evidence of noise and alcohol violations. Rogers also contends that the officers’ entry into his driveway for the purpose of speaking to him constituted an illegal search. We address that contention in section IV infra.
. The officers do not claim that the area they planned to search was outside the boundaries of the curtilage.
. We note that the officers do not claim that any exigency — such as the need to prevent the destruction of evidence — -justified their planned warrantless search in this case. The officers do contend that Rogers was intoxicated, and thus their planned search was justified by the need to speak to a responsible adult at the party. (Brief of Appellants at 9 (stating that Officer Pendleton was simply looking for a “responsible adult at the house.”)). Our discussion at § II.C.2 infra demonstrates that, granting Rogers the benefit of all factual disputes as we must, it is clear that a reasonable officer would not have perceived Rogers as intoxicated.
. The district court did not extensively discuss the conflicting evidence regarding this issue. However, the district court’s denial of summary judgment coupled with its recitation of the evidence and statement that all factual disputes must be resolved in Rogers’ favor at summary judgment lead us to conclude that we must, under Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996), survey the record to determine the facts the district court likely assumed for summary judgment purposes.
. Further, Sigman is based in part on the proposition that officers need not in all cases actually perceive a suspect to be armed before firing. See Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 788 (4th Cir.1998).
. We do not contend that the precise boundaries of the meaning of “in public” for purposes of