Christopher Alphonso Benjamin v. U.S. Attorney General
682 F. App'x 725
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Christopher Alphonso Benjamin, proceeding pro se, challenged the BIA’s affirmance of an IJ order finding him removable and denying derivative citizenship.
- Benjamin was born in August 1979, became a lawful permanent resident in June 1989, and his mother naturalized on May 5, 1999 (after he turned 18).
- Benjamin has a 2003 New York conviction for attempted criminal sale of cocaine (N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110, 220.39(1)).
- The BIA concluded Benjamin did not derive citizenship because he was over 18 when his mother naturalized and CSPA/estoppel did not apply to naturalization timing.
- The BIA also concluded Benjamin’s New York attempted sale conviction categorically qualified as an aggravated felony (drug trafficking), rendering him deportable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Derivative citizenship via mother’s naturalization | Benjamin argued he should derive citizenship because his mother’s naturalization process began before he turned 18 (or otherwise because of administrative timing). | Government argued former 8 U.S.C. § 1432 required the parent’s naturalization oath to occur while the child was under 18; CSPA and equitable estoppel do not apply to naturalization to alter that statutory requirement. | Held: BIA correctly denied derivative citizenship — mother’s oath occurred after Benjamin turned 18; CSPA and equitable estoppel do not provide relief. |
| Removability as aggravated felony (drug trafficking) | Benjamin argued the conviction should not be an aggravated felony (implicitly contesting categorical match). | Government argued New York attempted sale of cocaine necessarily matches federal distribution/attempt statutes and thus is a categorical aggravated felony. | Held: BIA correctly found the New York attempted sale conviction is a categorical aggravated felony (matches 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), making Benjamin removable. |
| IJ duties to a pro se respondent / continuances | Benjamin argued IJ failed to advise him of relief options and provide counsel. | Government noted IJ gave multiple continuances to seek counsel and was not required to provide counsel or to advise on available defenses under the INA. | Held: No error — IJ provided continuances; INA does not require providing counsel or advising on defenses. |
Key Cases Cited
- Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (review of BIA decisions and scope of appellate review)
- Tovar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 646 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011) (deference to BIA interpretations and limits on CSPA application)
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (categorical/modified categorical approach for aggravated felony analysis)
- Pascual v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 2013) (state drug-sale convictions can qualify as federal drug-trafficking aggravated felonies)
- I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988) (courts cannot confer citizenship contrary to statutory limits)