Christina Schermerhorn v. State of Indiana
61 N.E.3d 375
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Nov. 10, 2013, Christina Schermerhorn allegedly assaulted her husband Stanley after an argument about alcohol; he sustained a one- to two-inch cut to his left arm and was treated at a hospital.
- Police found blood on a kitchen knife and observed Schermerhorn appearing intoxicated at the home; she was arrested and charged with multiple counts including criminal recklessness and domestic battery.
- Schermerhorn asserted an "effects of battery" defense (a statutory variant of self-defense tied to prior repeated abuse) and sought to introduce broad evidence of Stanley’s prior misconduct.
- The trial court allowed evidence of prior abuse by Stanley against Schermerhorn but excluded certain proffered evidence, including an August 2011 audio recording allegedly capturing Stanley choking his teenage son.
- The jury convicted Schermerhorn of Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; she appealed, arguing evidentiary exclusion and instructional errors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admissibility of 2011 audio recording | Schermerhorn: the recording is relevant to show effects of battery and supports her defense | State: recording is inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rules; constitutionality not implicated | Court: recording irrelevant under Rules 401/402 because effects-of-battery statute is limited to repeated physical/sexual abuse of the defendant by the victim; exclusion did not violate constitutional right to present a defense and was harmless |
| 2. Exclusion of testimony about third-party abuse (victim’s son) | Schermerhorn: such acts in her presence show she reasonably feared imminent unlawful force | State: third-party abuse is outside statutory "past course of conduct" limiting effects-of-battery to abuse of defendant | Court: excluded evidence was not required by statute; trial court did not err |
| 3. Jury instructions on self-defense and effects of battery | Schermerhorn: requested instructions (battered-person sensitivity and appearance-of-danger) better explain subjective/objective interplay and battered-person syndrome | State: final instructions tracked statutory language and pattern instructions | Court: Final Instructions 6 and 7, read together, correctly stated law, adequately conveyed subjective and objective components, and did not impermissibly shift burden of proof |
| 4. Constitutional claim that evidentiary/instruction rulings deprived due process | Schermerhorn: rulings infringed Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth Amendments and state constitutional rights | State: evidentiary rules governed admissibility; instructions correct as law | Court: federal constitutional arguments rejected as meritless; state constitutional arguments waived for lack of separate analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. 2011) (trial court has broad discretion on evidentiary rulings)
- Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (de novo review when evidentiary claim raises constitutional issues)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (U.S. 1986) (criminal defendant’s right to present a meaningful opportunity to present a defense)
- Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1988) (right to present a defense is not absolute; must follow evidentiary rules)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (competing interests of reliability and fairness govern admissibility)
- Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 2013) (pattern jury instruction on self-defense adequately explains subjective/objective elements)
- Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (standard for harmless error in exclusion of evidence)
- Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123 (Ind. 2001) (effects-of-battery defense does not shift burden of proof)
- Price v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 2002) (jury instructions considered as a whole)
- Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 2007) (victim’s prior violent acts against third parties may be relevant in ordinary self-defense contexts)
