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Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana
982 N.E.2d 417
Ind. Ct. App.
2013
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*1 recklessness, Kovats has also violated her criminal intoxication. and Class D felony It probation multiple apparent times.3 is OWI constituted jeopardy double because possess that Kovats does not a stellar on, all three convictions were based character. by, elevated bodily the same serious inju- ry. Merging these convictions for pur-

Nevertheless, say we are unable to poses sentencing was insufficient to cure she among is the “worst offenders.” Most the double jeopardy problems because the of Kovats’s offenses are related to her trial already court had entered judgments obvious addiction to Although narcotics. remand, of conviction on all counts. On factor, necessarily mitigating this is not the trial court is instructed to vacate Ko- it does her behavior in place perspective. vats’s felony convictions for Class D Too, crimi- there is no indication that Kovats has OWI, nal recklessness and D felony Class long-term ever served a executed sen Instead, judgment and to enter a of conviction consistently given tence. she was suspended in the concurrent sentence on the past. sentences See lesser-included (Ind. Powell v. offense of A Class misdemeanor OWI. Ct.App.2001) (concluding Lastly, that where de Kovats’s maximum executed sen- previously fendant had not been incarcer tence twenty years for her conviction ated, nothing and where in the record B felony inappropriate, Class and we otherwise, indicated the presumptive sen remand with instructions that the trial tence give should be sufficient to defen court enter a sentencing order reflecting dant adequate correctional and rehabilita our revision of Kovats’s sentence to fifteen treatment). Also, tive since her arrest in years executed on that conviction. case, the present sought she out treatment Reversed and remanded with instruc- jail.

for her addiction in See Tr. p. 828. tions. children, Kovats also has four one of whom cystic suffers from fibrosis. BAKER, J., BAILEY, J., concur. giving After due consideration to the decision, trial sentencing court’s and con-

sidering the nature of Kovats’s offense and character, Kovats’s disagree we with Ko- vats that she should receive the advisory years.

sentence of ten The horrific nature JONES, Appellant-Defendant, Edwin of her offense alone supports imposi- tion of a greater sentence than the adviso- time, ry. At the same we are unable to Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE of conclude among that Kovats is the worst offenders. We therefore exercise our con- No. 49A02-1204-CR-292. authority stitutional to revise Kovats’s sen- of Appeals of Indiana. years. tence to an executed term of fifteen

Conclusion Feb. Kovats’s convictions for B felony Class neglect of a D dependent, felony Class 13, 2011,

3. On October after her sentencing, arrest date of Kovats had not been con- case, present charged charges. the State Kovats with pp. victed of these See Tr. 856-57 felony forgery six counts of (noting charges "pending” Class C and two that these were But, felony counts of D sentencing). Class theft. as of the the time of *3 Schumm, Karle,

Joel M. Brian A. Certi- Intern, Clinic, Legal fied Appellate India- IN, napolis, Attorneys Appellant. for Zoeller, Gregory Attorney F. General of Indiana, Meilaender, H. Deputy Ellen At- General, IN, torney Indianapolis, Attor- neys Appellee.

OPINION

BROWN, Judge. Edwin appeals his conviction sentence for operating vehicle while in- toxicated as a class A misdemeanor.1 9-30-5-2(b) (2004). Ind.Code registra- license and asked Jones for his we revise issues which three Jones raises tion, speech his when and Jones slurred restate as: get through “fumbled responding and abused its trial court I. Whether Id. at 42. Jones his driver’s license out.” Jones’s con- and violated discretion registration. his could not locate also a cer- by admitting rights frontation step Jones to out Trooper Madison asked asserting the inspection tificate of “swung himself and Jones of the vehicle testing equipment; accuracy police on the feet and “tumbled turning out” both its dis- court abused II. Whether Id. at 43. up.” and then stood ground first certain eviden- ruling cretion *4 rear of led Jones to the Trooper Madison matters; tiary and and stagger noticed Jones the vehicle and erred in sen- the court III. Whether steady his bal- the vehicle to against lean tencing him. Trooper Madison then administered ance. We affirm. sobriety including the One three field tests Walk, Stand, and the Step the Nine Leg FACTS (“HGN”) test, Nystagmus Horizontal Gaze 29, 2010, approximately 8:26 May at On each of which Jones failed. Dan Trooper Police Indiana State p.m., behaviors, driving upon Based Jones’s on Em- traveling northbound Madison was Jones, Trooper Madison’s observations at a traffic stopped and was erson Avenue sobriety failure of the field and Jones’s Avenue Marion light at Southeastern tests, he determined that Trooper turned Madison light After the County, Indiana. cause to believe that Jones proceed probable to had began Madison green, Trooper Jones the intersection, intoxicated and he read noticed a car was through the and asked Implied Indiana Consent Law from his approaching Jones driven on a Southeastern, to take a chemical breath test had to Jones right side on Ex- machine. State’s Jones “BAC DataMaster” pass let Jones because brake and Trooper Madi- passed agreed, hibit 4. Jones light. the red Jones stop did not at Arresting Pro- po- transported him to the Trooper Madison’s son “right in front” (“APC”) cessing where the closest to head north- Center right turned lice car and was located. Emerson, testing certified breath device Trooper Madison bound on APC, Jones stated While en route to Transcript him. at 38. began to follow have listened to his that “he should weaving Jones Trooper Madison observed lane, not want him to drive and crossing the center friends” who did in and out of his their Tran- attempt stay place. asked Jones to at He also observed Jones line twice. adminis- Trooper at 69. Madison script zone and drift onto pass no-passing in a resulting in road, tered the breath test to Jones hitting almost the shoulder of the “subject sample” reading of .18. Id. attempted parked Jones vehicles. When zone, placed was under arrest. Trooper 65. Jones no-passing in the pass into oncom- was forced to swerve Madison the drivers Jones to alert

ing traffic with OF PROCEEDINGS COURSE vehicle, and he then initi- Jones’s avoid 30, 2010, charged the State May On of Jones. stop ated a traffic I, operating a vehicle Jones with Count A intoxicated as a class misdemean- approached the while Trooper As Madison II, or; operating a vehicle he noticed a and Count driver’s of the vehicle side A misdemeanor. On and that above .15 as a class strong beverages odor of alcoholic 26, 2012, jury held a trial He March the court eyes were bloodshot and red. Jones’s foregoing consistent with the Near the end of the State’s direct and evidence exami- Madison, nation of trial, Trooper it Trooper At Madison introduced presented. was as State’s Exhibit 5 the probable cause as a chemical testified that he was certified Trooper affidavit Madison completed operator by Department the Indiana waiting “while was for the twenty [he] chemical Toxicology at the time Jones’s minutes at Id. at 72. object- APC.” administered, the State ad- test was hearsay, ed to the exhibit as the State objection mitted State’s Exhibit without responded Trooper Madison “authen- which a list of officers who were police exhibit, ticated” the and the court over- certified to administer chemical breath objection. ruled Jones’s Id. at 74. The tests and contained Madison’s question State did not Trooper Madison The then name. State introduced as regarding probable contents of the a certificate of inspection State’s Exhibit 3 affidavit, cause and it rested soon after the “Certification”) (the stating that in- “[t]he probable cause affidavit was admitted. condition, in good operating strument trial, At the conclusion of the the jury *5 accuracy satisfying requirements the set guilty found Jones charged. as The court by Department out State of Toxicology judgment entered its of conviction and 3, Regulations” May as of 2010. State’s merged II Count into Count I. On April objected Exhibit 3. Jones to the exhibit 18, 2012, the court held a sentencing hear- preliminary questions Troop- and asked ing days and sentenced Jones to 365 demonstrating er Madison that he was not forty days executed to be served on home Neerman, Ph.D., Michael F. Acting the detention and 325 days suspended pro- to Director of the Department State of Toxi- bation. cology, signatory who was the on the Cer- tification, argued and Jones that the Certi- ISSUES/ANALYSIS rights fication was a violation of Jones’s I. under the Confrontation Clause. The The first issue is whether objection court overruled Jones’s and ad- court abused its discretion and violated mitted the Certification. rights by Jones’s confrontation admitting The proceeded question Troop- State Generally, Certification. we review the er regarding procedures Madison he trial ruling court’s on the admission of test, in administering used the chemical in evidence for an abuse of discretion. Noo which at the requested outset the State State, (Ind. jin 672, v. 730 N.E.2d 676 judicial the court take notice of the 2000). only We reverse where the decision procedures chemical test enacted Ind. clearly against the logic and effect of the Administrative Rule 260 and the court did State, facts and circumstances. Joyner v. so. The State proceeded to ask 386, (Ind.1997), 678 N.E.2d reh’g 390 de Madison a questions series of to determine nied. Even if the trial court’s decision was whether he followed the procedures in ad- discretion, an abuse of we will not reverse ministering Jones’s point at one if the admission constituted harmless er objected questions the State’s 957, ror. Fox v. 966 The leading. objec- court overruled the denied, (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh’g trans. de tion, the State proceeded, and Jones en- However, nied. here because the issue is continuing objection tered a to the law, State’s one of constitutional we review questioning which the court noted King Jones’s claim de novo. See v. 518, overruled. 877 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) N.E.2d 521 422 denied, is the (Ind.Ct.App.2010), 214 tra/ns. reviewed de

(constitutional challenges are which has considered the is only 480 decision novo); Aguila-Urbay, v. see also U.S. Cir.2012) (“We (11th 564, Supreme States sue since United 566 Fed.Appx. v. Mas opinion an abuse of Melendez-Diaz evidentiary rulings for Court’s review 2527, However, sachusetts, 305, review ‘de 129 S.Ct. we 557 U.S. discretion.... hearsay (2009), whether at this 314 and that question 174 L.Ed.2d novo purposes testimonial to reconsider this stage appropriate are “it is statements ”) (quoting Clause.’ light Bullcoming of’ the Confrontation line of cases — 1214, Caraballo, —, F.3d Mexico, States v. United New U.S. (11th Cir.2010)); (2011). States v. 2705, United Appellant’s 180 L.Ed.2d 610 Cir.2007) (7th

Nettles, 476 F.3d argues that the Brief at 4. Jones Certifica (“We ruling court novo district review de “represents testimonial because it tion is Amend Sixth affects a defendant’s under circum ‘statements that were made rights.”). ment objective which would lead an wit stances that the state reasonably ness to believe Amendment to the Unit The Sixth ment would be available for use at a later Constitution, applicable made States ed ” trial,’ Crawford, Id. at 10 (quoting Amendment, Fourteenth the States via the 1364), he 124 S.Ct. at prosecutions, “In all criminal provides: 9-30-6-5, directs us to Ind.Code ... to be enjoy right accused shall certification, requires statute which against the witnesses confronted with (c) subsection which particular *6 Const, “A witness’s amend. VI. him.” U.S. ... copies states: “Certified of certificates thus inad a defendant is testimony against proceeding in a under this are admissible appears witness at trial unless the missible ” 9-30-5.... Id. at 9-10. chapter, IC unavailable, or, is the defen if the witness argues “[proceedings that under Jones for cross- opportunity prior dant had a prosecutions 9-30-5’ are criminal TC Pendergrass v. 913 examination.” OVWI, charged very individuals (Ind.2009) 703, (citing Craw N.E.2d subjected,” to which was proceedings [he] 36, 124 541 U.S. S.Ct. Washington, v. ford analyst signs that thus “the who (2004)), 1354, cert. de L.Ed.2d 177 that the Certification is on notice Certifica — —, nied, 130 S.Ct. in prima tion constitutes evidence (2010); v. facie also Davis L.Ed.2d 323 see that the proceeding criminal for OVWI and 813, 821-822, 126 Washington, 547 U.S. ... of a chemical test cannot be results (2006). 165 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. analyst ... certifies admitted unless the are at is- testimonial statements “Where working order.” that the instrument is sue, reliability suffi- only indicium argues Id. Jones also that the Certification demands is satisfy cient to constitutional according that is a “formal document” and actually pre- the one the Constitution ly, Bullcoming, it is testimonial. Id. under Crawford, 541 scribes: confrontation.” at 11. 68-69,124 at 1374. U.S. at “[tjhis has argues The State that that the Certification argues are held that such certifications implicating repeatedly his is a testimonial statement in Bull- nothing not testimonial” and that rights Clause and under the Confrontation analysis. Appellee’s coming that alters this previous that this court’s statements argues Brief at 6. The State certifica nontestimonial are such certifications are quali here “are incorrect, that our tions like the one issue particular noting types hearsay tatively different from holding Ramirez Supreme partment that the Court has described as of Toxicology indicating that they pre because “are not testimonial” breath test equipment good operating any with reference to pared particular case condition are admissible at trial and consti- defendant; rather, any particular they prima tute facie evidence that the equip- serve a ministerial or administrative func (1) ment was inspected approved by prepared tion and are a routine matter Department of Toxicology and regard they without to whether are ever in proper working condition on the date case, any any particular used in much less the breath test was administered if the Id. at 7. The State argues case.” that the date of approval was not more than 180 States Supreme United Court Bullcom days before the date of the test.” ing holding reiterated the of Melendez- 30—6—5(c)). (citing § Ind.Code We also 9— laboratory Diaz and underscored that 9-30-6-5(b) observed that Ind.Code nature, are testimonial in results and it did mandates that such certificates “shall be not alter the definition of what is testimo sent to the clerk of the circuit court in previous nial or cast doubt on this court’s county each where the opera- breath test any decisions. The State also tor, equipment, or chemicals are used to error is harmless because the State did not administer breath tests.” Id. at 216-217 prove particular need to blood alcohol omitted). (quotations presented overwhelming level and it evi In addressing whether such certificates dence intoxication. testimonial, are we observed that Craw- Ramirez, In this court addressed wheth “provide did not a comprehensive def- ford inspection er certificates of are testimonial ” ‘testimonial,’ inition of and in the years implicating thus the Confrontation Clause. following this court has ad- Crawford began by observing We Indiana dressed this issue and “routinely concluded statute chemical breath test results are that the certificates are nontestimonial.”2 inadmissible “unless the test operator, test Id. at 217. We summarized three ratio- equipment, chemicals in the used *7 nales behind those decisions and articulat- techniques have in approved been ac ed them as follows: promulgated by cordance with the rules (1) prepared the certificates are not at a University the Indiana School of Medicine judicial proceeding during police or in- Department Pharmacology of and Toxicol (2) terrogation!;] the certificates are not ogy.” (citing 928 N.E.2d at 216 Ind.Code 30—6—5(d) sworn affidavits § and do not contain for- (subsequently by amended 9 — materials!;] (eff. malized testimonial 158-2011, 1, and Pub.L. No. 2 July 2011))). although inspection pre- certificates are particular We noted that the pared purposes litigation, of criminal person administering the test must be cer tified, certification of equipment the have breath-test machines is must been in spected approved by Department investigation the removed from the direct or Toxicology, operator proof and the must fol direct any particular of whether low procedures approved, operated the and we ob defendant has a vehicle while by intoxicated; served that the “Certificates issued De- the pre- certificates are not 144, denied; State, provided following 2. The court the 820 N.E.2d Napier trans. v. Ramirez proposition: citation for this "See Johnson v. (Ind.Ct.App.2005), 150 part on modified 649, State, (Ind.Ct.App.2008); 879 N.E.2d (Ind.Ct.App.2005). 827 N.E.2d 565 reh’g, 1022, (Ind. 852 N.E.2d cert, Jarrell v. 1215, denied, denied, 546 U.S. trans. Ct.App.2006); 979, Rembusch 1437, 134(2006).” 164 L.Ed.2d denied, (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh’g entirely accuracy depends that result’s litigation anticipation of pared calibration. The cali- impli- to the machine’s respect or with case particular turn, only by bration, proved can be any specific defendant. cating that he or certification the contractor’s (citations quotations Id. at 217-218 That certifica- job properly. she did the omitted). that “[o]ur also observed We state- to be a testimonial appears tion substantially in accord with holdings were It is definition: ment under Court’s Id. at jurisdictions.” of other the decisions statement, formal, offered out-of-court asserted, matter for the truth of the the Ra acknowledged by parties, As prosecu- of later purpose made for the following handed down mirez decision clear, It not under Court’s tion. pronouncements Supreme Court’s the U.S. contractor ruling, why independent “elaborated on which in Melendez-Diaz analyst. an is not also of ‘testimonial’ within meaning testing.” Id. In chemical realm of forensic Melendez-Diaz, (quoting at 218-219 Melendez-Diaz, the State of Massachu (Kenne- at 2545 557 U.S. at 129 S.Ct. which were documents introduced setts J., majority The of the dy, dissenting)). laboratory analysts be state sworn responded: indicating that a sub notary public fore a suggestion, we Contrary to the dissent’s was co from the defendant stance seized case, hold, and it is not do weight. Id. The Court caine of a certain testimony may be rele- anyone whose testimonial documents were held that such custody, the chain of establishing vant in Sixth Amendment triggering in nature authenticity sample, accuracy of the they “plainly” were af protections because device, testing appear must fact, fidavits, declarations of or sworn prosecution’s person part as prove were admitted “which Additionally, pre- documents case.... cocaine, and the documents substance was equip- course pared regular in the which ‘“made under circumstances were may qualify well ment maintenance objective reasonably witness would lead an records. nontestimonial would be the statement believe Melendez-Diaz, 557 (quoting Id. at 219 trial,’ they use at a later available for 1) n. at 311 n. 129 S.Ct. at 2532 prepared purpose in fact for the sole were added). (emphases subsequent in a providing evidence *8 (quoting Id. Melendez- prosecution.” held that Melendez-Diaz did not We 2532) Diaz, 311, 129 at 557 U.S. at S.Ct. prior precedent this court’s disturb 52, 124 Crawford, 541 U.S. at (quoting that, exchange the cited particular, 1364))). at S.Ct. prior our decisions “appears above to leave specific our attention to We then turned the although intact.” Id. We noted which ad- language Melendez-Diaz certifying equip- that documents statement at dressed concerns similar to those issue “may qualify well ment maintenance Ramirez, noting that the dissent in Me- decisive,” “not it “at a nontestimonial” is the concern for expressed lendez-Diaz unre- question leaves the ] minimum [ as follows: rule of that ease type the same of scru- solved and demands since have undertaken Craw- tiny contractor we independent Consider prior precedents our and as such testing calibrated the machine. who has ford” holding, we stated case, valid. Id. In so where the remain At least in a routine unmistakable, as follows: appears machine’s result comprise The do not ex Id. at 2709-2710. The Supreme certificates functional parte testimony in-court or its Court held that such “surrogate testimony are equivalent. They not formalized ... does not meet the constitutional re- testimonial materials like sworn affida- quirement” and that right accused’s “[t]he Moreover, vits. while the certificates is to be confronted analyst with the who trials, contemplate they use in criminal certification, made the unless that analyst are completed any specific advance of trial, is unavailable at and the accused had alleged drunk-driving incident opportunity, an pretrial, to cross-examine breath test administration and are not particular scientist.” Id. at 2710. prosecution any created for the par- In holding, so the Court reasoned that ticular defendant. testimony such would be akin allowing an officer other than the one who observed To suggests the extent that Jones Bull- factual events and recorded them in a po- matters, coming changes we observe that lice report testify to such facts “so long case, in that began by reiterat- as that officer was equipped to testify ing its holding Melendez-Diaz that “a about technology the observing officer laboratory report forensic stating that a deployed and the police department’s stan- suspect substance was cocaine ranked as which, dard operating procedures,” testimonial purposes of the Sixth Court has stated “emphatically” is not al- Amendment’s Confrontation be- Clause” lowable. Id. at 2714-2715. The Court report cause had been spe- “[t]he created went on to reiterate that in Melendez- cifically to serve as evidence in a criminal Diaz, it held that “[t]he ‘certificates of proceeding” and that stipulation “[a]bsent analysis’ prepared by analysts who ... prosecution may not introduce tested the evidence ... were ‘incontrover- a report offering such without a live wit- tibly ... made for the pur- affirmation[s] ness competent testify to the truth of pose establishing or proving some fact’ the statements made in report.” in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 2716 at S.Ct. 2709. The Court noted that in the added). (emphasis It noted that it, case before defendant Bullcoming was arguments State’s in that case no “fare[ ] intoxicated, driving arrested for while Melendez-Diaz, better here” than in be- evidence was submitted in the form of a cause solely document “[a] created for an laboratory report “forensic certifying that ‘evidentiary purpose,’ ... made in aid of a [his] blood-alcohol concentration was well police investigation, testimonial,” ranks as above aggravated the threshold for DWL” and it addressed argument an advanced Below, at the New Mexico report State that the at issue in Bull- Supreme Court had ruled that Melendez- “unsworn,” coming was rather than when, trial, Diaz was satisfied “the notary “sworn to before a public” as was State called another analyst who was fa- Melendez-Diaz, case holding that miliar laboratory’s with the testing proce- *9 the document was still considered formal dures, but had participated neither in nor and was an unavailing distinction which observed the test Bullcoming’s on blood did not “remove from [the certificate] Con- sample,” holding that “although the blood- frontation governance” Clause because ‘testimonial,’ alcohol analysis was the Con- such a rule right “would make the to con- frontation require Clause did not the certi- easily frontation erasable.” Id. at 2717. fying analyst’s in-court testimony” and Thus, that “live testimony analyst of another sat- Bullcoming the Court was not isfied the requirements.” constitutional concerned with whether the certificate of

426 Also, based arguments to Jones’s rather similar unsworn but sworn or

analysis was document, the not the second rationale Bullcoming nature of the examined created Ramirez, formal document was a scrutinizes the third ing that it from establishing proving of purpose for the the U.S. Su rationale and To that proceeding. in a criminal a fact this rationale in rejected has preme Court — in Ramirez we were end, we observe —, Illinois, 132 v. Williams document’s with the similarly concerned (2012), 2221, specifi 183 L.Ed.2d 89 or un- status as sworn not its nature and majority jus of the cally arguing that a Indeed, holding in our we stated sworn. ‘targeted’ “that a individual is agree tices such as the Certification that documents required to invoke the Confrontation they because “are not testimonial were not at 15 Appellant’s Brief n.6. Jones Clause.” like sworn testimonial materials formalized exchange an in Williams directs us to (emphasis at 219 928 N.E.2d affidavits.” the stated:3 plurality which a of added). observed, and we Bullcoming has identified The abuses that the Court an affidavit is not the fact that agree, that prompting adoption of Con- as protections granted remove sworn will not following frontation Clause shared Clause, but we dis by the Confrontation (a) they involved two characteristics: of the characterization agree with Jones’s having the pri- out-of-court statements Indeed, an as affidavit. Certification mary purpose accusing targeted of a Ramirez, the Court we observed in criminal con- engaging individual of a an affidavit as Melendez-Diaz defined (b) they involved formalized duct written down and of “declaration facts affidavits, deposi- such as statements before an officer by the declarant sworn tions, prior testimony, or confessions. at administer oaths.” Id. authorized to Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at (quoting Kagan at 2242. Justice authored 132 S.Ct. 310, (quoting at 2532 129 S.Ct. Black’s dissent, Sealia, joined by a Justices Gins- 2004))) Dictionary (8th (empha ed. Law which burg, Sotomayor, disagreed added). Also, has defined an this court sis language “accusing a Court’s of fact as “a written statement affidavit targeted individual:” to as the truth before an which is sworn stab, plurality As its first states Paternity officer.” In re authorized issue, at which was [document H.R.M., (Ind.Ct.App. prepared “not report] a DNA was 2007) Deery, Jordan (quoting accusing a tar- primary purpose (Ind.1993)) (emphasis N.E.2d Ante, geted individual.” added). Here, was of the Certification anyone’s from is Where that test comes merely satisfy statutory require fered rightly Justice THOMAS shows guess. equipment was ment that the breath that it derives neither from the text nor condition, satisfying the good operating “in history from the Confrontation out the State accuracy requirements set ante, (opinion at 2263 con- Clause. See Toxicology Regulations,” as Department of curring judgment). And it has no for in evidentiary foundation part precedents. pre- basis in our We have Exhibit 4. the results as State’s troducing a statement viously asked whether 3; § 9- see also Ind.Code State’s Exhibit primary purpose of estab- made for 30-6-5. *10 Williams, Kennedy. plural- Breyer, and Justice 132 a Justice 3. In Justice Alito authored judg- Thomas concurred in ity S.Ct. at 2227. Justice and announced the Court’s decision Roberts, judgment. by the joined Chief Justice ment and was

427 lishing “past potentially particular events relevant case or respect impli- with prosecution” cating any criminal other specific later defendant. —in words, providing for the of evi purpose omitted). 928 N.E.2d at (quotations 218 Davis, U.S., 822, dence. 547 at 126 To the extent wording the of this 2266; Bullcoming, see also S.Ct. rationale “accusatory” resembles the —, 131 U.S., S.Ct., 2716-2717; at at set forth by plurality opinion in U.S., [Michigan Bryant, 562 v.] at Williams, we are inclined to agree that —, —, [1143], at S.Ct. 1165 any rationale which relies upon the fact (2011)]; L.Ed.2d 93 Melendez- [179 piece that a of evidence target does not a Diaz, U.S., 310-311, at 129 S.Ct. particular defendant as a basis for deter- 2527; U.S., 51-52, Crawford, 541 at 124 mining that such evidence is nontestimoni- S.Ct. 1354. None of our cases has ever al appears by to be disapproved a ma- that, addition, suggested the state jority of the Justices of the Supreme U.S. ment be previ must meant to accuse a Court. individual; indeed, ously identified However, we any find that confusion

Melendez-Diaz, rejected we a related wording with the of the third Ramirez argument laboratory “analysts are rationale indicating it contains an “ac subject not to confrontation because cusatory” element can by be rectified ex they ‘accusatory’ are not witnesses.” amining other statements the Court U.S., regarding a statement’s “primary pur above, pose.” As noted the Court held in J., Id. at 2273-2274 (Kagan, dissenting). Davis that statements are “testimonial” that the third Ramirez ratio- where “the primary purpose of the interro nale substantially similar to the “accusa- gation is to establish or prove past events tory” test expressed by plurality, potentially relevant to later criminal prose justices fact that three agreed with the 822, 126 cution.” 547 U.S. at S.Ct. at 2274. expressed Kagan’s views in Justice dis- Also, Bryant the Court stated: sent, plus the fact that Justice Thomas did informal, Whether formal or out-of-court join plurality’s reasoning re- statements can objective evade the basic garding “accusatory” indicates Clause, of the Confrontation which is to majority that a of the Supreme prevent the being deprived accused from disagree with this rationale as valid Con- opportunity to cross-examine the frontation jurisprudence. Clause declarant about statements taken for above, As noted pro- third rationale When, Davis, use at trial. as in vided Ramirez as to why certificates of primary purpose of an interrogation is inspection including the Certification at is- to respond “ongoing to an emergency,” sue this case are nontestimonial was purpose its is not to create record for as: stated trial and thus is not scope within the although inspection pre- certificates are may the Clause. But there be other pared circumstances, for purposes litigation, of criminal aside ongoing from emer- certification of gencies, breath-test machines is when a statement is not pro- investigation removed from the direct primary cured with a purpose of creat- proof direct any particular whether ing an out-of-court substitute for trial defendant has operated testimony. a vehicle while making primary In pur- intoxicated; determination, pre- pose certificates are not standard rules of pared in anticipation litigation hearsay, designed identify some state- *11 that the Certification reliable, edents and conclude will be relevant.

ments that the court did exists, nontestimonial and was primary purpose no such Where admitting in it. not err is the admissibility of a statement federal rules of and concern of state Moreover, the State agree we with evidence, Clause. not the Confrontation the admis regarding that such error at 1155. 131 S.Ct. and the attendant sion of the Certification harmless. As noted analysis breath relevance is Here, the Certification’s prove have to a by the it did not aimed at es- of statute merely a creature level to sustain certain blood alcohol breath reliability of chemical tablishing the conviction, from and it elicited Jones’s re- as a foundational analysis results test explicit Madison extensive Trooper submitting test re- breath quirement demonstrating oper that Jones testimony note, sults, which, safeguard is a we Trooper while intoxicated. ated a vehicle for the benefit of place in legislature put instances in multiple identified Madison end, we note that To that the defendant.4 driving unsafe be displayed which Jones can- testing equipment the status of breath in person being consistent with a havior past a event relevant not be termed including nearly hitting Trooper toxicated if way, Put another prosecution. Jones’s car, weaving and twice police Madison’s exist, the § did not 9-30-6-5 Ind.Code line, in a no- crossing passing the center have a need submit State would not zone, nearly hitting parked passing simply introduce and could Certification parked on the shoulder vehicles subject, the breath the results of noted that he road. Madison course, defendant’s Confrontation to the he encountered smelled alcohol when that We also note protections. Clause Jones, eyes that Jones’s were red relevant hearsay exceptions are not even bloodshot, li Jones fumbled with his that § because Ind.Code 9-30-6- this matter registration, locate his cense and could not 5(c) certifi- provides such specifically his vehicle he dis that when Jones exited are admissible to estab- inspection cates balance, stag a lack of that Jones played is equipment breath test lish that certain against and leaned his gered as he walked good operating condition. himself, steady and that Jones vehicle to Thus, and other upon based Williams sobriety tests. See Tim failed three field Supreme (Ind. recent statements from 243, 255 berlake v. Court, the third rationale ar- we reframe 1997) (holding that if trial court “[e]ven al- provide ticulated Ramirez admissibility on the ruling errs in a kept inspection are though certificates evidence, if error only reverse we will may be by on file the court clerk and justice” with substantial is inconsistent court, primary harmless), their duplicated reh’g for use that the error was denied. that certain breath purpose to ensure II. equipment good operating is in condi- is whether the court 9-30- The second issue compliance tion Ind.Code certain However, ruling its discretion prior prec- reaffirm our abused 6-5. we matter, that, may admit- before breath test results be policy as a were trial 4. We observe ted, legislature respond remov- could agree we to with Jones and find that certifi- statutory requirements currently in ing inspection the Certification at cates of such as accuracy of such place which ensure the evidence and re- issue here were testimonial judging undue burden on inspected equipment, it as an quire person who equipment testify every OWI law enforcement. breath test *12 above, Affidavit; matters. As noted this able evidentiary Cause and we do feel evidentiary rulings for an that this is admissible. court reviews discretion, rulings and such are abuse of 73-74; Transcript Appellant’s Brief at subject analysis. harmless error Noo argues 16-17. Jones that a review of the Fox, 676; N.E.2d at 717 N.E.2d at jin, 730 transcript probable reveals that the cause argues Jones that the court abused prove affidavit was offered to the truth of (A) when it: admitted the its discretion the facts contained therein and “Authenti- (B) affidavit; and allowed probable cause hearsay exception. cation” is not a Appel- leading questions. the State to use We lant’s Brief at 17 (citing Ind. Evidence arguments sepa address each of Jones’s 803). Rule

rately. The argues although agrees State that it that “authentication” is not a valid re- A. Probable Cause Affidavit sponse hearsay objection, to a this court may affirm argues evidentiary ruling Jones that the court erred an any allowing probable apparent the State to admit the basis in the record and here the probable cause affidavit because it constitutes inad cause properly affidavit was ad- hearsay. present missible Jones notes that the mitted as a impression sense un- 803(1). responded objection by stating State to his der Ind. Evidence Rule The State Trooper argues hearsay that Madison “authenticated” the that this exception applies specifically points Trooper document and to the because Madison “testified that he following colloquy: probable filled out the cause affidavit while waiting he was the prescribed twenty-min- Honor, Your at this time

[The State]: ute period performing before the chemical Ex- the State moves to admit State’s breath test on at the [Jones] APC and hibit 5 into evidence. part finished the last pertaining to the test THE Any Objection? COURT: results before he left the Appellee’s APC.” Yes, Judge, the De- [Jones’s Counsel]: argues Brief at 18. The State objects; hearsay. fense this is harmless, error was at most noting that Honor, trooper [The Your State]: “probable merely cause affidavit was compiled the individual who this docu- cumulative of the testimony officer’s de- ment; testimony he filled it out. His scribing stop, his observations during you’ve prior heard that he filled it out it, tests, sobriety failed the results of while he waiting at the APC wait- the breath and [Jones’s] admissions” [Jones], ing with So we do feel that and that the State presented overwhelm- he has it. authenticated ing independent evidence oper- that Jones hearsay.... [Jones’s It’s still Counsel]: ated a vehicle while intoxicated “such that It doesn’t matter whether present he’s possibility there is no probable cause no, today; here there’s no foundation affidavit contributed to the verdict.” Id. at any exception has been laid for to the 18-19. general rule.... brief, In his reply that the [A]ny

THE ... response COURT: to State cites no case law for admitting a that? probable present cause affidavit under the [The Your Honor we do feel that impression hearsay exception State]: sense witness, his appears individual documents it to be an issue of first

it’s all testimony impression, authenticated. His Madison indicat- does mirror what is noted in the testimony Prob- ed his he did not fill out the *13 State, v. 536 N.E.2d about an harmless. Cornett affidavit cause probable until (Ind.1989). initial interactions to his subsequent hour time to ample had and thus with Jones events, and that Ind. Evi- Questions on the Leading

reflect B. 808(8), hear- public records Rule dence 611(c) Rule Indiana Evidence prob- states that specifically say exception, “Leading questions should not provides: qualify under affidavits do able cause a examination of be used on direct Rule accordingly “[r]eading the rule necessary to except may witness be whole, make little sense a it would 803 as testimony.” A lead develop the witness’s cause af- affirmatively probable exclude to the de ing question suggests is one that only to allow exception, one fidavits from the witness. sired answer to Williams under another.”5 them to be admitted (Ind.2000). The 14-15 n.8. Reply Brief at Appellant’s in leading questions is limited order use Here, direct end of the State’s at the the substitution of the attor prevent Madison, it intro- Trooper examination of ney’s language thoughts for the objec- over the court admitted duced and dispute. material facts in witness as to affidavit. Even probable cause tion the The trial court is afforded wide discretion affidavit probable that the cause assuming allowing leading questions, and the the truth and the State’s for was offered only will be reversed for court’s decision au- Trooper trial that Madison reply at Bussey v. an abuse of discretion. not a viable the document was thenticated (Ind.1989). 1027, 1029 N.E.2d any error its admission reply, we find argues Jones that the court erred when above, Trooper As noted was harmless. leading ques- it the State to use allowed alone demonstrated testimony Madison’s during its direct examination of tions a vehicle while intoxi- operated that Jones objected to Trooper Madison which were specific instances of cated. He identified in- by highlights examples Jones. Jones by driving displayed behavior unsafe “(1) cluding you ‘Did observe [Jones] Jones, alcohol and noted that he smelled (20) prior administering minutes to the of intoxication displayed signs (2) test?’; you began the chemi- ‘When eyes and a including red and bloodshot green light cal was the Led on the balance, that Jones failed three lack of lit?’; displayed instrument ‘When [sic] sobriety tests. field please message appeared blow trial was presented The evidence display, you place piece did a new mouth indeed, and, Jones does not overwhelming the breath tube and instruct the defendant that the State admit- identify single a fact ” Brief at 17- Appellant’s to blow into it?’ probable via cause ted into evidence argues following objec- his 18. Jones not cumulative of evi- affidavit which was why explain leading tion the court did not law- Trooper dence admitted via Madison’s and the State questions appropriate were extent testimony. ful To the question Trooper attempt made no admitting probable court erred in non-leading fashion. Madison affidavit, “only to disclose a cause it tends The that the court did not proven by properly fact other admitted State evidence,” allowing the State’s any error abuse its discretion accordingly 803(8) by gative reports police and other law en- provides in rele- Ind. Evidence Rule except when offered following personnel, part are not within forcement .vant that "[t]he ” (a) hearsay in a criminal case.... exception rule: investi- an accused this to the line because Madi- questioning you [The Did then press Prosecutor]: switch, already son “had testified that he was the “run” password, enter the breath perform certified to tests and had and enter the evidence tape? procedures followed the established for a A: Yes. the court judi-

breath had taken [Jones’s The Defense is going Counsel]: procedures cial notice of what those were.” object point. at this It sounds like *14 Appellee’s Brief at 21. The State just we’re going to hear a string of regardless, Jones “has not and cannot leading questions about what he did. any injury’ any show ‘substantial and thus They need to be in proper format. harmless,” error noting specifically THE COURT: Overruled. Proceed. closing Jones’s counsel in his argument you [The Did Prosecutor]: then follow argued “never that the test per- had been the display request for information improperly.” formed Id. at 21-22. The and enter requested information arguing State also notes in harmless error keyboard? into the that “the breath test evidence was unnec- A: Yes. essary to sustain a conviction for operating intoxicated_” [The When the please Prosecutor]: blow while at 22. Id. message appeared in the display, did trial, At the State testimony elicited you place a new mouth piece Madison, Trooper from objected breath tube and instruct [Jones] as follows: blow into it? Madison, Trooper [The Prosecutor]: Judge, objection. [Jones’s Counsel]: At you what time did administer this time the Defense would enter a chemical test to the defendant? continuing objection to each of these (20) twenty A: It was after the minutes questions. transported once I him to the APC. THE COURT: Noted for the record. My twenty minutes started once Overruled.... we walked into the blood test room Transcript at 61-68. The State asked and sat down. I used the clock on the Trooper Madison a few yes/no ques- more instrument. tions related to administering the chemical Prior [The Prosecutor]: to administer- breath test to Jones. ing you did inspect [Jones’s] above, As noted policy behind Ind. objects? mouth for foreign 611(c) Evidence Rule is to an prevent at A: Yes. torney from substituting his or her own you [The Did find anything Prosecutor]: language “for the thoughts of the witness mouth? [Jones’s] as to material dispute.” facts A: No. Williams, 733 N.E.2d (emphasis at 922 you Did [The Prosecutor]: observe added). The Indiana Supreme Court has eat, smoke, drink, or place [Jones] emphasized likewise that a leading ques anything his mouth during this “which, tion is one embodying a material time? fact, admits of a conclusive answer in the ” A: No. simple ‘yes’ form of a or ‘no.’ Doerner v. you When began [The Prosecutor]: the State, (Ind.1986). green chemical test was the light Led Also, where a testimony witness’s is not on the displayed instrument lit? possibilities distorted to conform to the A: Yes. suggested by question, any error re- of the sentence defendant portion executed is harmless. question

suiting from days for 825 placed probation to be at 1183. order of set forth special conditions ques- line of Here, the State’s prior date,” in- on this which probation issued issue, Madison testified tioning at alcohol and cluded that Jones not consume a chemical breath he was certified abuse evaluation and undergo a substance Department Indiana by the operator and follow the a mental health evaluation then asked: The State Toxicology. recommendations, impaired attend an driv- Madison, procedures did what “Trooper eighty impact panel, perform ers victim the chemical test?” administer you use to service, incur a community hours of to follow the got replied: “[Y]ou and he day suspension. Appellant’s license ninety right above ev- They’re posted guidelines. Thus, the court ordered Appendix at 25. it, instrument, you right up look ery *15 con- probation to serve his term of Jones Tran- you go.” line as and follow each portion of his suspended current with the exchange, the Following this script at 61. sentence. judicial the court take requested that State that the court erred be- so, Jones the court did procedures, the notice of him “to a combined cause it sentenced Trooper asked State thereafter and the imprisonment probation period questions recited yes/no the Madison year, contrary than one to Indiana greater that he followed the establishing above Brief at 18. Jones ar- Appellant’s law.” Jones’s test. regarding procedures A that he convicted of a class gues was record, of the we upon our review Based sentenced him misdemeanor and the court chal- questioning State’s find that executed, forty days days suspend- material by Jones did not concern lenged ed, days of for a total of probation and 325 Indeed, dispute. were in facts which argues that days. “[i]n Collins argue that Madi- Jones does recognized Appeals the Court of administered the chemical improperly son imprisonment’ that a ‘term of under otherwise demonstrate that breath test or 35-50-3-1(b) in- Indiana Section Code by the State’s deci- prejudiced Jones was suspended both the executed and cludes establishing yes/no questions sion to ask of a sentence. 835 N.E.2d portions complied procedures. that the (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.” recognize that as holding, again In so we Id. at 19. above, to the pertaining evidence noted § provides 35-50-3-2 rele- Ind.Code superfluous chemical breath test person vant that who commits part “[a] sustaining Jones’s conviction as State imprisoned be Class A misdemeanor shall other evidence presented a multitude of (1) not more than one for a fixed term of a vehicle establishing operated that he addition, year....” In 35-50- Ind.Code Accordingly, we con- while intoxicated. 1(b)provides part that: ruling regarding that the court’s clude 3— require does not questioning State’s line of the court in whole suspends [W]henever A, reversal. a sentence for a Class part misdemeanor, B, it Class or Class C III. un- may person probation place of not period 35-38-2 for a fixed is whether der IC The third issue notwithstanding year, one court was invalid. more than imposed by sentence for imprisonment maximum term of the court judgment, In Jones’s abstract of forth in sections the misdemeanor set “following completion stated that However, the through chapter. long 4 of this as the combination of the executed imprisonment term combined sentence the probationary period do may not probation a misdemeanor not exceed the maximum statutory sen- (1) year. exceed one tence for that (quotations offense.” Id. omitted) added). added). (emphases We conclude (Emphasis the court did not err in sentencing Here, language contained in the ab Jones.7 judgment plainly states stract forty days

Jones was ordered to serve reasons, foregoing For the we affirm by a probationary executed followed term Jones’s operat- conviction sentence for days, of 325 which is a combined term ing while intoxicated as a class A misde- encompassing year. one To the extent meanor. suggests

that Jones the court’s sen Affirmed. days suspended tence of 325 should be days probation added to the 325 for a BAILEY, J., concurs. days, total sentence of 690 we observe that (Ind. in Smith v. 621 N.E.2d 325 VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with 1993), a trial court sentenced a misde- separate opinion. days meanant to a term of 110 executed to *16 year probation. be followed one of At VAIDIK, Judge, concurring in result. time, the relevant version of Ind.Code I concur with the majority opinion in 35-50-3-l(b) § was unclear as to whether whole, including that the Certification as- such a illegal, sentence was and the serting accuracy of the breath-testing was, Supreme Indiana Court held that it device is non-testimonial and therefore the stating “that a combined term of probation trial court did not violate Jones’s confron- imprisonment and exceeding year one is rights tation by admitting it into evidence. inconsistent with the maximum term for conviction State, of a misdemeanor.”6 621 I opinion wrote the in Ramirez v. holding, N.E.2d 326. In so the Court 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), which noted that sentencing guide- “fundamental Illinois, was decided before Williams v. — respect U.S. —, 2221, 183 lines with to treatment of felonies 132 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (2012). apply likewise to misdemeanors” and that 89 I agree majority with the trial option, “[t]he court has the in sen- the Supreme Court’s later decision in misdemeanant, tencing a class A to sus- Williams would not affirm the third ratio pend the part However, sentence in whole or in nale articulated in Ramirez. I place probation, on disagree majority’s so with the refraining of defendant Barnes, executed, recently by Judge 6. thirty days As observed days suspended, 150 35-50-3-l(b) 2001 amendment to Ind.Code days probation” 360 of for a B class misde- effectively holding codified the Court’s 1260, meanor conviction. 962 N.E.2d Smith when it added the "combined term of (Ind.Ct.App.2012), granted, trans. 974 N.E.2d imprisonment probation for a misde (2012). This court held that “the statu- language. may year” meanor exceed one tory phrase imprisonment’ ‘term of included 735, v. Peterink suspended portions both the executed and of J., (Barnes, (Ind.Ct.App.2012) concurring in sentence, a misdemeanor and because Jen- part dissenting part), pending. trans. nings 180-day was sentenced to a term of subject currently imprisonment (composed thirty 7. We observe that this is of executed Supreme transfer to the Indiana Court. In days suspended days), and 150 his term of Jennings v. the defendant was sentenced probation days.” could not exceed 185 days, to "the maximum sentence of 180 with a witness would need to be cross- on which light of Williams. rationale third of that the certificates examined. finding Instead of of purposes for “prepared are inspection majority with the agree I therefore pre- ... are not litigation, [but] criminal and the is non-testimonial Certification litigation anticipation pared in not violate Jones’s confron- trial court did implicat- respect with case or particular by admitting it into evidence. rights tation defendant,” 218, id. at ing any specific “primary pur- that the majority would find inspection] the certificates

pose [of equipment breath test that certain ensure compli- condition in good operating is in Op. p. § 9-30-6-5.” ance with Ind.Code I disagree with this. respectfully I certificates of in- these still believe that GRAY, Appellant-Defendant, Michael “prepared pur- generally are spection Therefore, in litigation.” criminal poses of Court’s decision light Supreme Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE Williams, simply eliminate I would articulated Ramirez. third rationale No. 49A02-1205-CR-352. difference, I agree still Despite this Appeals of Indiana. is non- majority that the Certification subject to therefore not testimonial and 11, 2013. Feb. v. Washing under confrontation Crawford 68-69, 124

ton, 541 U.S. *17 (2004). Following the first L.Ed.2d Ramirez, forth in two rationales set inspection prepared was “not certificate of during police or judicial proceeding at a and was not a “sworn affi interrogation,” contain formalized ] do[es] davit Ramirez, materials.” testimonial Instead, 217-18. the certificate N.E.2d at the direction of the prepared of Medicine De University Indiana School Toxicology partment Pharmacology approved proce its and in accordance with was not a dures. The certificate also only re affidavit and contained the sworn test. sults of a machine-calibration Unlike substance, an unknown analysis forensic like that at issue Melendez-Diaz 305, 308, 129 Massachusetts, 557 U.S. (2009), 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 the machine- in this case question calibration test analy required interpretation no human results, run the test or obtain sis to either material making it void of testimonial

Case Details

Case Name: Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Feb 11, 2013
Citation: 982 N.E.2d 417
Docket Number: 49A02-1204-CR-292
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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