Christian Cruz v. State of Florida, SC20-60

Background

On April 26, 2013, Christopher Jemery was beaten, bound, placed in the trunk of his rental car, driven to a remote field, shot in the head, and died the next day; blood, duct tape, and other physical evidence tied the scene together.
Christian Cruz and codefendant Justen Charles were tried separately; evidence at Cruz’s trial included Cruz’s fingerprint on duct tape from the victim, Cruz’s DNA in the victim’s car, bloody footprints matching Cruz’s shoes, and ATM footage showing Cruz withdrawing cash on the night of the killing.
Cruz was arrested on unrelated charges two weeks after the murder and made unsolicited statements (e.g., “Why don’t you just kill me now”); the trial court denied Cruz’s motion to suppress those statements and allowed them as consciousness-of-guilt/flight evidence.
A jury convicted Cruz of first-degree premeditated and felony murder, burglary while armed, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping; special verdicts found Cruz possessed and discharged a firearm.
At sentencing the judge found multiple aggravators (including prior violent felony, murder during robbery/burglary/kidnapping, avoid arrest, financial gain, HAC, and CCP), assigned weights to 37 mitigators, and followed the jury’s recommendation of death.
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court relied on evidence from codefendant Charles’s trial (including a stipulation and testimony not introduced in Cruz’s trial) when imposing death.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Cruz)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1) Motion to suppress post-arrest statements	Stop was unlawful; statements inadmissible	Stop supported by reasonable suspicion; arrest lawful; statements admissible	Denied — officers had reasonable suspicion; statements admissible
2) Motion in limine to exclude arrest statements	Statements irrelevant to homicide; prejudicial	Relevant to consciousness of guilt/flight	Denied — statements relevant to flight/consciousness of guilt
3) Trial judge advising jurors they generally couldn’t ask witnesses questions	Court’s statement improperly curtailed juror participation	Judge has discretion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.371; no prejudice	No fundamental error — judge’s exercise of discretion upheld
4) Prosecutor’s guilt-phase comments	Opening statements improperly inflammatory/sympathy appeals	Comments tied to evidence; not reversible without contemporaneous objection	No fundamental error
5) Sufficiency of evidence that Cruz possessed/discharged firearm	No competent evidence that Cruz possessed or fired the gun	Even if not shooter, Cruz is liable as principal; convictions supported	Jury findings that Cruz possessed/discharged firearm unsupported; convictions otherwise supported as principal; error harmless
6) Omission of explicit Enmund–Tison instruction in penalty verdict	Jury should have been instructed to make Enmund–Tison major-participant/reckless-indifference findings	Record and verdict support Enmund–Tison culpability; omission not fundamental	No fundamental error — record supports required findings
7) Sentencing court relied on facts not in Cruz’s trial (dispositive)	Judge considered evidence from Charles’s trial (stipulation that Cruz was shooter and girlfriend’s testimony) — improper reliance requires resentencing	Trial court heard both trials; court considered evidence but convictions stand	Reversed as to death sentence — resentencing required because judge relied on nonrecord evidence; convictions affirmed
8) Challenges to Florida’s death-penalty scheme (vagueness, jury guidance, victim-impact, etc.)	Scheme permits overbroad aggravators and inadequate jury guidance	Precedent upholds scheme and related jury instructions	Rejected — Court declines to revisit established precedents

Key Cases Cited

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (U.S. 1982) (limits death penalty for non-killers absent major participation and culpable mental state)
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1987) (death penalty permissible where defendant was a major participant and exhibited reckless indifference to human life)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable-suspicion standard for investigatory stops)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (unprovoked flight in high-crime area is factor supporting reasonable suspicion)
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) (Spencer hearing procedure in capital cases)
Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2008) (prosecutor may argue for minimal weight on proven mitigators)
Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 2008) (Florida Supreme Court conducts independent review where death penalty imposed)