Christeson v. Roper
135 S. Ct. 891
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- Mark Christeson was convicted and sentenced to death in Missouri; his AEDPA one-year federal habeas deadline was April 10, 2005.
- Court-appointed counsel (Horwitz & Butts) were appointed before the deadline but failed to meet Christeson until after the deadline and filed his federal habeas petition 117 days late.
- The district court dismissed the habeas petition as untimely; Christeson later sought substitute, conflict-free counsel (Merrigan & Perkovich) to investigate and pursue equitable tolling via a Rule 60(b) motion.
- Horwitz & Butts conceded a conflict: arguing equitable tolling would require them to impugn their own conduct; they also resisted sharing file access with proposed counsel.
- The district court denied substitution primarily because of delay, lack of abandonment, absence of prior appellate substitution, and concern about creating abusive delay; the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding the district court abused its discretion by failing adequately to account for counsel’s conflict of interest under the “interests of justice” standard from Martel v. Clair.
Issues
| Issue | Christeson’s Argument | Roper’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court should appoint substitute counsel under 18 U.S.C. §3599 and Martel v. Clair | Substitute counsel should be appointed in the interests of justice because appointed counsel had a conflict and could not pursue equitable tolling | Denial justified by delay, absence of total abandonment, and risk of abusive delay | Granted: substitution should have been allowed given counsel’s conflict; district court abused its discretion |
| Whether appointed counsel had a disqualifying conflict preventing them from arguing equitable tolling | Counsel conceded an ethical conflict: arguing equitable tolling would require denigrating their own performance | Counsel claimed their miscalculation was defensible and characterized tolling arguments as "ludicrous" | Held conflict was real and significant; conflict alone warranted substitution consideration |
| Whether timing of substitution motion and potential for delay justified denial | Motion was filed soon after outside counsel learned of the case and before execution date; sought limited time to investigate | Motion was untimely (filed in 2014) and could cause abusive delay in capital cases | Timing and delay concerns insufficient here given the conflict and the limited, non-abusive nature of the request |
| Whether substitute counsel should be appointed to investigate equitable tolling and pursue Rule 60(b) relief | Christeson entitled to conflict-free counsel to investigate possible equitable tolling and present a Rule 60(b) motion | State argued courts should not automatically replace counsel absent the narrow circumstances previously recognized | Held Christeson is entitled to opportunity to pursue tolling with conflict-free counsel; appointment appropriate for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (Congress granted indigent capital defendants a right to qualified counsel in habeas proceedings)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled in extraordinary circumstances)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) may be used to seek reopening of final judgment but requires extraordinary circumstances)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (standard for reopening final judgment requires extraordinary circumstances)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (discusses conflicts of counsel requiring substitution)
- Lambrix v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 756 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2014) (discussion of standards for substituting federally appointed counsel)
- Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) (attorney conflict and abandonment can establish grounds for relief when counsel’s interests diverge from client’s)