Christa Reed v. The Curators of the University of Missouri
2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 1169
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Reed was an at-will senior veterinary technician at University of Missouri (2004–2011) assigned to the VHC ophthalmology service and supervised/evaluated by Drs. Giuliano and Pearce.
- Over 2009–2011 Reed received progressively poorer performance evaluations, was placed on probation, suspended, and terminated in March 2011 for unsatisfactory performance and unprofessional behavior.
- Reed filed internal grievances alleging her discipline/termination was retaliation for reporting alleged fiscal irregularities; after termination she sued the University and Drs. Giuliano and Pearce for wrongful discharge (Count I), tortious interference with business expectancy (Count II), and MHRA age discrimination (Count III).
- At close of Reed’s evidence the trial court granted directed verdicts for defendants on Counts I and II; a jury later returned verdicts for defendants on the MHRA claim. Reed appealed the directed verdicts.
- The court’s decision turned on (1) whether Reed’s wrongful-discharge claim could be treated as a breach-of-contract (avoiding sovereign immunity) rather than a tort; (2) whether the University’s anti‑retaliation policy (HR‑520) created an enforceable bilateral contract; and (3) whether supervisors (Giuliano, Pearce) could be liable for tortious interference with a business expectancy when acting as employer agents.
Issues
| Issue | Reed's Argument | University/Doctors' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reed’s wrongful‑discharge/whistleblower claim is a contract claim (avoiding sovereign immunity) | HR‑520 and appointment materials contain a clear, binding promise not to retaliate; this is a contractual promise separable from at‑will status | Reed was an at‑will employee; HR‑520 is precatory/unilateral and does not create mutual contractual obligations; the claim is a tort and sovereign immunity applies | Court: No contract. Reed’s employment was at‑will; HR‑520 is not a bilateral contract; claim sounds in tort so University retains sovereign immunity. |
| Whether HR‑520 created a binding contractual modification of at‑will status | HR‑520’s anti‑retaliation language is specific and enforceable as a contractual promise | HR‑520 uses encouraging/precatory language, lacks mutual consideration; appointment notice expressly preserves at‑will status and overrides inconsistent documents | Court: HR‑520 is non‑binding policy language; appointment notice controls; no mutual promises = no contract. |
| Whether defendants’ directed‑verdict motion complied with Rule 72.01(a) | Motion failed to state specific grounds required by rule | Motion identified specific grounds (sovereign immunity, absence of a valid contract, insufficiency of evidence) and was argued with factual support | Court: Motion was sufficient under Rule 72.01(a). |
| Whether supervisors can be liable for tortious interference with business expectancy | Giuliano and Pearce retaliated (criticized, sought her dismissal) and thereby interfered with Reed’s expectancy | As Reed’s supervisors/agents of the University they were not a third party; supervisors have the right to critique and manage employees; Farrow controls | Court: Claim fails. Supervisors acting for the employer are not third parties for tortious interference; Farrow is dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342 (Mo. banc 2010) (public‑policy exception and limits on at‑will termination)
- Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. banc 1985) (at‑will employment may be terminated without liability absent contract/statute)
- Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. banc 1988) (elements required for enforceable employment contract)
- Luethans v. Washington Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. banc 1995) (absence of duration creates at‑will status)
- Farrow v. Saint Francis Medical Center, 407 S.W.3d 579 (Mo. banc 2013) (supervisors acting for employer are the employer for tortious‑interference purposes)
- Holmes v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 364 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (distinguishing contract vs. tort pleading in whistleblower contexts)