Dake v. TuellDake v. Tuell
Lead Opinion
The sole issue in this case is whether discharged at will employees can maintain a suit for wrongful discharge against their former employers by cloaking their claims in thе misty shroud of prima facie tort. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ petitions for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm.
Defendants Eldon Tuell and Robin Hubbard are the owners of a Lowrey Organ Center where plaintiffs were employed. Plaintiff Dake was employed as a manager and plaintiff Fausett as an orgаn instructor. In June of 1982, plaintiffs were fired after informing defendants that other employees at the store were making fraudulent misrepresentations to customers.
Plаintiffs each brought suit against defendants in the Circuit Court of Clay County — alleging in count one of each petition that their dismissals were intended to cause injury and were withоut justification and in reckless disregard of plaintiffs’ rights. The second count in each petition repeated these allegations, along with the additional avеrment that defendants had discharged plaintiffs in complete disregard of their state and federal constitutional rights.
Defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 55.27(a)(6) — arguing that both petitions had failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. This motion was sustained, and plaintiffs sought review in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western Distriсt.
In Missouri it is firmly established that absent a contrary statutory provision, an at will employee
Here, plaintiffs would have us render near impotent this long standing legal principle — by establishing a rule that would permit an at will employee to bring an action for wrongful discharge under the guise of the prima facie tort doctrine.
Under Missouri’s employment at will doctrine an employer can discharge— for cause or without cause — аn at will employee who does not otherwise fall within the protective reach of a contrary statutory provision and still not be subject to liability for wrongful disсharge. Amaan v. City of Eureka, supra, at 415. Therefore, it follows that unless there is a contrary statutory provision upon which to base his claim, an at will employee must set forth in his petition for wrongful discharge “the essential elements of a valid contract, and a discharge in violation thereof.” Maddock v. Lewis,
In the present case, it is conceded by all that plaintiffs were at will employees. Their pleadings are completely barren of any allegations concerning the existence of an emplоyment contract and a discharge in violation of its provisions. Nor have plaintiffs attempted to ground their claims on a contrary statutory provision. Absent suсh allegations, the petitions do not invoke substantive principles of law sufficient to entitle them to relief in a Missouri court of law.
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
. The court of appeals, for purposes of appellate review, ordered the two cases consolidated.
. See generally, Maddock v. Lewis,
.
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute,
. The prima facie tort doctrine was first recognized in Missouri in Porter v. Crawford & Co.,
In Lundberg v. Prudential Insurance Company of America,
It should be noted that in deciding the narrow question before it — whether the plaintiffs evidence warranted submitting the case to the jury on a prima facie tort theory — the court of appeals expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of allowing an at will employee to freely avail himself of a prima facie tort theory in circumvention of the well-established employment at will doctrine. The court of appeals recognized that "judicial invasion of management decisions and impingement upon agreed terms of employment emerge, when as herе, the prima facie tort doctrine is resorted to by a discharged employee to impose liability against an employer where the employment is terminable at will."
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in result.
The alleged reason for the discharge of plaintiff Dake is set forth in his petition as follows:
Plaintiff had reported improper sales practices and fraudulent misrepresentations being made by another employee of the defendants.
Plaintiff Fausett’s petition contains similar allegations.
I agree that the alleged discharges for “whistle blowing” should not give rise to a claim for damages for wrongful termination. Such a holding is supported by the great weight of modern authority. See Krauskopf, “Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule,” 51 UMKC Law Review 190, 237-239. The principal opinion need go no further than this.
The principal opinion, however, purports to establish an ironclad rule that there may be no action for wrongful termination in the absence of contract or statute. I do not believe that it is desirable to circumscribe futurе courts in this manner. Professor Krauskopf, in the article cited above, sets forth numerous exceptions to the “common law rule” of discharge at will. I want to bе free to consider these situations as they arise.
In Lucas v. Brown and Root, Inc.,
The principal opinion cites Amaan v. City of Eureka,
Our Court has been very willing to consider modern developments in the law of torts and to overrule or distinguish earlier cases which seemed to stand in the way. See, e.g., Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co.,
. It makes no difference that the legislature, in its wisdom, superseded the Court’s opinion. That is its privilege in the constitutional scheme.