Chris Lawry v. Pecan Plantation Owners Association, Inc. and Pecan Plantation Volunteer Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services, Inc.
02-15-00079-CV
| Tex. App. | Aug 18, 2016Background
- Pecan Plantation Owners Association (Association) is a nonprofit HOA that amended its bylaws (effective March 1, 2008) to impose an additional $10/month assessment per lot "for providing financial support for fire protection and emergency services."
- The Pecan Plantation Volunteer Fire Department (Fire Department) and the Association entered a 2006 Agreement for Emergency Services; that Agreement included an indemnity in favor of the Association and required the Fire Department to bill insurers for EMS charges.
- Homeowner Chris Lawry sued the Association (2012) challenging the bylaw amendment as conflicting with the Declaration and seeking return of past EMS assessments; later he added the Fire Department and claims for indemnification and unjust enrichment.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the Association on Lawry’s Declaration/bylaw conflict claim and granted summary judgment for the Fire Department on Lawry’s indemnity and unjust-enrichment claims; trial and appellate attorney’s fees were tried to a jury.
- The jury awarded the Association and the Fire Department significant trial and appellate fees; the trial court denied findings of bad faith by Lawry. Lawry appealed, challenging the summary judgments, exclusion of testimony, and sufficiency of fee evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lawry) | Defendant's Argument (Assoc./Fire Dept.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2008 bylaw amendment conflicts with the Declaration | Bylaw exceeds Declaration’s grant and is therefore void; assessments for EMS are not authorized | Declaration authorizes assessments for "other services" and later bylaws control assessment amounts; EMS assessments benefit all owners | No conflict; summary judgment for Association affirmed |
| Whether Lawry can enforce Agreement indemnity (standing) | As an Association member, Lawry is a party or intended third‑party beneficiary entitled to indemnity | Lawry is not a signatory and the indemnity plainly benefits the Association only; no donee/creditor beneficiary status | No standing; summary judgment for Fire Department affirmed on indemnity claim |
| Whether Fire Dept. was unjustly enriched by receiving assessments | Members received no benefit; EMS available from others; assessment was a forced donation to Fire Dept. | Assessment was authorized, Association paid the Fire Dept. for EMS, and members benefited (staffing, reserves, improved rating) | No unjust enrichment; summary judgment for Fire Department affirmed |
| Admissibility of Lawry’s pre‑suit attempts to resolve dispute (relevance to fees) | Evidence of pre‑suit settlement attempts is relevant to reasonableness/necessity of fees and equity | Pre‑suit conduct irrelevant to reasonableness of fees after suit; trial court already considered affidavits in summary judgment context | Exclusion not an abuse of discretion; evidence about pre‑suit efforts was properly excluded from jury trial |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Fire Dept. trial attorney’s fees | Jury award unsupported because fee testimony lacked task-by-task allocation / specific hours per attorney | Fire Dept. offered attorney testimony of reasonable total fee and billing summary; testimony was sufficient | Trial fee award legally insufficient under Long v. Griffin; trial fee award reversed and remanded for redetermination |
| Sufficiency of appellate fees (Association and Fire Dept.) | Appellate fees speculative and unsupported | Experienced attorneys testified to reasonable appellate-fee amounts; evidence uncontroverted | Appellate fee awards supported but must be made contingent on appellees’ prevailing on appeal; judgment modified accordingly |
Key Cases Cited
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment)
- Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. 2010) (defendant conclusively negating an element entitles to summary judgment)
- Buckner v. Lakes of Somerset Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (apply contract rules to restrictive covenants)
- Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003) (appellate review principles for summary judgments)
- MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1999) (distinguishing donee vs. creditor beneficiary for third‑party enforcement)
- Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) (lodestar method requires record of hours per attorney; insufficiency may require remand for segregated fees)
- Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) (remand appropriate when attorney‑fee evidence is legally insufficient but some evidence exists)