Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 451 P.3d 675

Seattle amended its Open Housing Ordinance to add a "first-in-time" (FIT) rule requiring landlords to (1) disclose screening criteria and required documentation, (2) timestamp completed applications, (3) screen in chronological order, and (4) offer tenancy to the first applicant who meets the stated criteria (with limited exceptions and accommodations for disabilities).
FIT became effective Jan. 1, 2017 (compliance phased in); City Auditor to evaluate the program.
Plaintiffs (Seattle landlords) brought a facial challenge seeking a declaration and injunction, asserting FIT violates the Washington Constitution's takings clause (art. I, §16), substantive due process (art. I, §3), and free speech (art. I, §5).
On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court held FIT unconstitutional on all three grounds; Seattle appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed: it adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s takings framework (Lingle/Chevron), applied rational-basis review for substantive due process, and treated FIT as a disclosure rule under commercial-speech doctrine (Zauderer), holding FIT does not facially effect a taking, survives rational-basis review, and survives deferential disclosure scrutiny.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
A. Does FIT facially effect a regulatory taking?	FIT is a per se taking because it destroys a fundamental attribute of ownership (right to choose tenants).	FIT does not fit per se categories (no physical invasion; not a total deprivation) and is not shown to be a taking on its face.	No facial taking under Chevron/Lingle; plaintiffs failed to meet their burden.
B. If a taking, is it for private use?	If FIT is a taking, it effects a taking for private use and is invalid.	N/A — City argued no taking.	Court did not reach public/private-use question because no taking established.
C. Does FIT violate substantive due process?	FIT regulates a fundamental attribute of property and thus requires heightened scrutiny.	Property-use regulations are evaluated under rational-basis review; FIT serves legitimate interests.	Rational-basis applies; FIT is rationally related to mitigating implicit bias and survives on its face.
D. Does FIT violate free speech (commercial speech)?	FIT restricts landlords’ commercial speech and should be subject to intermediate scrutiny and fail.	FIT requires factual disclosure of landlords' own criteria (Zauderer disclosure standard), so deferential review applies and is justified.	FIT is a disclosure requirement subject to deferential Zauderer-style review and survives on its face.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005) (definitive statement limiting per se regulatory takings to physical invasions and total deprivation of all economically beneficial use)
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (categorical total-deprivation taking rule)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (multi-factor test for non-categorical regulatory takings)
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (U.S. 2002) (reluctance to adopt broad categorical takings rules; need for fact-specific inquiry)
Manufactured Hous. Communities of Wash. v. State, 142 Wn.2d 347 (Wash. 2000) (state case counseling broad categorical approach—disavowed to the extent inconsistent with Lingle/Chevron)
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (U.S. 1985) (less-deferential review for compelled commercial disclosures tied to preventing deception)
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1980) (intermediate scrutiny framework for restrictions on lawful, nonmisleading commercial speech)
Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (U.S. 2018) (clarifies burden on government to justify compelled factual disclosures)