Chief of Police of the City of Worcester v. Holden
470 Mass. 845
Mass.2015Background
- In 2005 Raymond J. Holden was reported for physically assaulting his wife; criminal charges were filed then dismissed at the complainant's request.
- The Worcester chief of police suspended Holden's firearms license based on the arraignment, then reinstated and immediately revoked it relying on the police incident report and the victim's written statement.
- Holden obtained various District Court rulings restoring his license or finding procedural error; the Superior Court later remanded for an evidentiary hearing, which was held in 2011.
- After a full hearing the District Court found the chief reasonably suspended/revoked the license for the 2005 incident but ordered issuance of a new license in 2010, concluding the chief lacked a reasonable ground to deny renewal after passage of time.
- The chief sought certiorari in Superior Court; on cross motions the Superior Court ruled for the chief, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Holden) | Defendant's Argument (Chief) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Second Amendment as-applied (Class A concealed carry) | Holden: suitability standard cannot bar his right to carry for self-defense outside the home | Chief: concealed-carry licensing/regulation falls outside core Second Amendment; prohibition/licensing is presumptively lawful | Denial/revocation of Class A license falls outside Second Amendment core; rational-basis review applies; upheld |
| Second Amendment as-applied (Class B / open carry) | Holden: still protected right; suitability discretion impermissible | Chief: public-carry rights are peripheral; regulation may be subject to intermediate scrutiny and is substantially related to public safety | Even under intermediate scrutiny, suitability standard is substantially related to important government interests; upheld |
| Vagueness (facial and as-applied) | Holden: "suitable person" is subjective and void for vagueness and overbroad | Chief: statutory standard has judicial gloss and prior decisions clarify scope; applied to specific violent conduct here | Term is not unconstitutionally vague as applied or facially; Holden's domestic violence falls within the statute's legitimate core; upheld |
| Procedural due process (pre-deprivation hearing, hearsay, burden) | Holden: statute lacks pre-suspension/revocation hearing; reliance on hearsay; McDonald shifts burden to state | Chief: public-safety summary action permissible; statute provides prompt, full postdeprivation judicial review with evidentiary hearing; hearsay reliability acceptable; burden on applicant in district court is appropriate | Predeprivation hearing not required given public-safety interest; §131(f) provides adequate postdeprivation process; hearsay and burden allocation acceptable; upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to possess arms for self-defense in the home; lists presumptively lawful firearm regulations)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applies Heller to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment)
- Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256 (1984) (describes §131 purpose to limit access to firearms by irresponsible persons)
- Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012) (recognizes the home as the core of the Second Amendment and upholds licensing/regulation outside the home)
- DeLuca v. Chief of Police of Newton, 415 Mass. 155 (1993) (holds conduct underlying convictions may inform suitability even after pardon; guides application of "suitable person")