Cherlyn Bethel, Individually, and as the Representative of the Estate of Ronald J. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., and James H. Moody, Iii, 595 S.W.3d 651

Ronald Bethel died in a car crash; his wife Cherlyn Bethel sued the trailer manufacturer alleging defective brakes caused the accident.
Law firm Quilling (and attorney James Moody) represented the manufacturer and, during discovery, allegedly disassembled and tested the trailer brakes before Bethel could inspect or document them.
Bethel sued Quilling for fraud, trespass to chattel, and conversion based on the alleged destruction/spoliation of evidence.
Quilling moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, asserting attorney immunity as an affirmative defense; the trial court granted the motion and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court considered two questions: (1) whether Rule 91a may be based on an affirmative defense, and (2) whether the alleged destruction of evidence was conduct protected by attorney immunity. The Court affirmed the court of appeals on both points.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an affirmative defense may support dismissal under TRCP 91a	Bethel: Rule 91a forbids considering defendant pleadings; courts may rely only on plaintiff's pleading, so affirmative defenses cannot be the basis for dismissal	Quilling: Rule 91a limits factual inquiry to plaintiff's pleading but permits legal inquiry (including defendant pleadings and motion) to show no legal basis for relief	Held: Rule 91a permits dismissal based on an affirmative defense when the plaintiff's own allegations, taken as true, conclusively establish the defense; courts may consider defendant pleadings for legal issues but may not consider extraneous evidence
Whether alleged destruction/spoliation of evidence is protected by attorney immunity	Bethel: Allegedly criminal destruction of property is not the type of conduct covered by attorney civil immunity	Quilling: Examining and testing evidence during litigation are conduct connected to client representation and fall within attorney immunity	Held: No categorical criminal-conduct exception; because the alleged conduct (examining/testing key evidence in litigation) was the kind of conduct taken in connection with client representation, attorney immunity barred Bethel’s civil claims; immunity is not absolute for acts outside representation's scope

Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015) (establishes general rule that attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients for conduct taken in connection with representing a client in litigation)
Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2018) (immunity inquiry focuses on type of conduct, not alleged fraudulence)
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2019) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid reading provisions in isolation)
Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. 2019) (consideration of affirmative defenses in Rule 91a context)
City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. 2016) (de novo review standard for Rule 91a motions)
Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2012) (principles for interpreting procedural rules)
Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134 (Tex. 1882) (historical recognition that immunity does not protect acts intended to consummate a fraud)
Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., 921 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2019) (predicting that Texas law allows immunity to apply to criminal acts when performed within scope of representation)