966 F. Supp. 2d 1335
N.D. Ga.2013Background
- Jennifer Chavez, a transgender former employee, was terminated on January 11, 2010 and alleges Title VII sex-discrimination based on gender identity/expression.
- Chavez visited the EEOC on January 12, 2010 and September 2010 giving a Department of Labor separation notice and handwritten notes, but did not file a verified charge then; she was allegedly told EEOC would not accept a transgender-based sex claim.
- Chavez filed a verified EEOC charge on April 25, 2012; EEOC initially dismissed it as untimely, reconsidered, then ultimately dismissed and issued a right-to-sue; Chavez sought EEOC Chair review which declined further review.
- Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for improper § 1981 claim; Chavez amended to remove the § 1981(a) claim.
- Magistrate Judge Fuller recommended denying dismissal as to Title VII without prejudice to allow discovery on equitable tolling; District Judge Duffey adopted the R&R and denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chavez’s Jan/Sep 2010 EEOC submissions constituted a timely "charge" that could be cured by later verification under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) | Chavez contends her submissions were sufficient to notify EEOC and thus relate back when she later filed a verified charge. | Defendant argues the documents lacked verification and did not manifest intent to activate EEOC investigation or notify employer, so they were not a charge. | Court: Jan/Sep 2010 submissions were not a charge as a matter of law; they did not satisfy charge requirements. |
| Whether equitable tolling excuses Chavez’s late filing | Chavez says EEOC personnel misled her in 2010 by telling her transgender status was not protected, preventing timely filing. | Defendant disputes the factual basis and contends Chavez failed to file a timely charge regardless. | Court: Equitable tolling may apply; factual development is needed. Denied dismissal without prejudice to allow discovery on tolling. |
| Validity of Chavez’s § 1981(a) claim | Chavez initially pleaded § 1981(a) relief for Title VII damages. | Defendant argued § 1981(a) does not cover sex discrimination. | Court: Amended complaint removed § 1981(a) theory; motion to dismiss as to § 1981(a) denied as moot. |
| Motions to strike exhibits/declarations and request for surreply | Chavez sought to strike certain defendant exhibits and requested surreply re: Macy decision; Chavez submitted declarations to support tolling. | Defendant moved to strike Chavez’s declarations as hearsay/self-serving and opposed surreply. | Court: Motions to strike and for surreply denied; court considered exhibits and allowed discovery rather than dismiss. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (standard for district judge review of magistrate judge R&R)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions; plausibility pleading standard)
- Pijnenburg v. W. Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (when an EEOC submission qualifies as a charge and cure provision limits)
- Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (charge must manifest intent to activate EEOC investigation)
- Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002) (importance of EEOC charge for initiating investigation and notifying employer)
- Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination against transgender person as sex-based/gender-nonconformity discrimination)
- Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979) (circumstances permitting equitable tolling of Title VII filing period)