959 F. Supp. 2d 1279
D. Colo.2013Background
- Plaintiff received medical services from Parkview and provided her cellular number when requesting services; Parkview assigned the unpaid debt to defendant for collection.
- Plaintiff alleges defendant called her cell using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) without prior express consent, violating the TCPA.
- Defendant moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the TCPA claims; court assumed arguendo that the dialing system might be an ATDS but focused on consent and related legal issues.
- Defendant relied on the FCC’s 2008 Ruling that providing a cell number to a creditor evidences prior express consent to be contacted about the debt.
- Plaintiff argued she did not consent (and relied on Mais to challenge the FCC ruling) and alternatively argued she revoked consent orally by telling defendant to stop calling.
- The court concluded plaintiff had given prior express consent by providing the number and that oral revocation is ineffective under the TCPA; it granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the TCPA claims with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant used an ATDS | Chavez disputes or questions capacity; evidence suggests system may be predictive | Defendant contends its system lacks ATDS capacity | Court assumed arguendo ATDS exists (genuine fact issue remains) but resolved case on consent grounds |
| Whether provision of cell number constituted prior express consent under TCPA | Chavez argues FCC 2008 Ruling is reviewable and does not control; she did not consent | Defendant argues supplying the cell number to creditor constitutes express consent per FCC ruling | Court held supplying the number constituted prior express consent and that the FCC ruling binding on district courts |
| Whether district courts may review FCC’s 2008 Ruling | Chavez (relying on Mais) argues district courts can review and decline deference to FCC ruling | Defendant argues only courts of appeals have authority to set aside FCC orders; district courts must follow FCC ruling | Court held it lacked jurisdiction to set aside FCC order and declined to adopt Mais; treated FCC ruling as binding on district courts |
| Whether oral revocation of consent is effective | Chavez asserts she orally revoked consent by telling collectors to stop calling | Defendant argues consent cannot be withdrawn orally under TCPA; any revocation not effective absent statutory basis | Court held oral revocation ineffective; prior express consent could not be withdrawn and TCPA provides no mechanism for oral revocation |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (genuine-issue-of-fact standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (materiality and summary judgment standard)
- Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (ATDS capacity interpretation)
- Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (district court review of FCC ruling; court declined to follow)
- Saunders v. NCO Financial Sys., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 464 (holding express consent under TCPA cannot be withdrawn)
- Beal v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 962 (discussing oral revocation permissibility; court here disagreed)
- Adamcik v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 744 (permitting revocation under certain theories; court here rejected)
