Chavers v. State
304 Ga. 887
| Ga. | 2019Background
- Victim Jasperin Armstrong, a Rollin' 20s (Bloods) member, was found shot to death after attending a late-night meeting in Cordele on Sept. 11–12, 2014.
- Quinton Chavers was a high-ranking Rollin' 20s leader; evidence showed repeated communications with other gang members (calls, Facebook messages) criticizing Armstrong for not fighting and discussing "somebody's got to die."
- Witnesses placed Chavers at the meeting; Harper drove with Chavers and Armstrong, then reported a shooting after Chavers and Armstrong exited the car; Chavers later admitted driving Armstrong and claimed he dropped him off, while other evidence (forensic, GPS, fiber) tied Chavers and the car to the scene.
- Indictment charged Chavers with malice murder, conspiracy to commit murder, violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (predicated on the conspiracy), and weapons offenses; he was convicted on all counts, sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive terms, and appealed.
- On appeal Chavers challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence for the Street Gang Act conviction (as predicated on conspiracy), (2) admission of hearsay testimony (statements by Jackson), and (3) ineffective assistance for failure to object to certain hearsay testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Street Gang Act (predicate: conspiracy to murder) | State: evidence (Chavers' rank, statements about killing violators, meetings, communications, driving/shotting Armstrong) supports conspiracy and that the act furthered gang interests | Chavers: insufficient proof he agreed with others to kill Armstrong; statements could refer to rival gang; he denied participation in key conversations; co-conspirator evidence (Little) did not implicate him | Court: Evidence, viewed in favor of jury, was sufficient to infer a tacit agreement and to support the Street Gang Act conviction |
| Admissibility of Henton's testimony repeating Jackson's statements (co-conspirator exception) | State: Jackson's statements admissible as co-conspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy; conspiracy proven at trial by preponderance | Chavers: trial court erred because the State hadn't shown Jackson was a co-conspirator before admitting the hearsay | Court: Conspiracy (including Jackson) was proven at trial; admission proper under co-conspirator exception |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to object to Harper testifying about Jackson's statements | State: counsel strategically declined objection to use testimony to implicate Jackson; even if objectionable, conspiracy proof made objection meritless | Chavers: counsel deficient for not objecting to hearsay from Harper about Jackson | Court: Counsel's choice was a reasonable tactic; and objection would have been meritless because conspiracy was established; no Strickland prejudice shown |
| Sufficiency of evidence for other convictions (murder/weapons) | State: presented forensic, GPS, fiber, witness testimony connecting Chavers to killing and weapons | Chavers: contested some factual inferences; challenged some witness credibility | Court: Routine sufficiency review upheld jury verdicts as supported beyond reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Faust v. State, 302 Ga. 211 (2017) (merger of conspiracy into murder sentence and related mootness principle)
- Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385 (2018) (requirements to admit co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E))
- Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60 (2017) (trial court may consider co-conspirator statements plus independent evidence to establish conspiracy)
- Grissom v. State, 296 Ga. 406 (2015) (tacit agreement/conspiracy may be inferred from conduct and circumstances)
- Giddens v. State, 299 Ga. 109 (2016) (association with a gang alone insufficient; defendant must personally commit a predicate offense)