Chase v. United States Postal Service, 149 F. Supp. 3d 195

Background

Chase was a USPS letter carrier (1997–2011); he suffered an on‑duty car accident July 2010 and was out on injured leave and workers’ compensation.
USPS’s North Carolina office approved FMLA leave concurrent with workers’ compensation for the first 12 weeks (July 21–Oct 12, 2010), but Chase’s supervisor King believed Chase was only on paid workers’ compensation leave.
While on leave Chase was arrested on drug charges (Sept. 18, 2010); King learned of the arrest and later initiated a Pre‑Disciplinary Interview (PDI) after Chase declined to answer based on counsel.
King sought Chase’s removal (January–February 2011) citing the arrest and PDI refusal; an arbitrator later affirmed removal after Chase’s criminal charge was reduced/dismissed contingent on probation.
At trial the court found King harbored animus toward employees he believed abused injury leave, and that King treated Chase more harshly than comparators; but King did not know (and reasonably believed he did not know) Chase had invoked FMLA.
Court applied Department of Labor regulation (29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)) under Chevron deference (rejecting a but‑for requirement) and held no FMLA retaliation because the decision‑maker reasonably believed FMLA was not invoked and thus FMLA leave was not a negative factor in the termination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper causation standard for FMLA retaliation (but‑for vs. negative‑factor)	Chase argued he need only show FMLA leave was a "negative factor" in termination per DOL regulation.	Defendants argued Nassar requires but‑for causation for retaliation claims.	Court applied Chevron deference to DOL regs and held the "negative factor" standard governs (not but‑for).
Whether employer had required notice/knowledge of FMLA leave	Chase argued he invoked FMLA and thus was protected; termination followed protected leave.	Defendants argued the decision‑maker (King) reasonably believed Chase was only on workers’ compensation and did not know FMLA was invoked.	Held King reasonably believed FMLA was not invoked; inquiry/notice did not put him on notice of FMLA in this factual context.
Whether termination was pretextual/retaliatory	Chase pointed to timing, King’s anti‑leave remarks, disparate treatment of comparators, and Labor Relations pressure to show FMLA motivated termination.	Defendants maintained legitimate non‑retaliatory reason: arrest and PDI refusal; arbitrator upheld removal.	Held termination motivated by animus toward workers’ compensation/FMLA‑like absences, but not by FMLA leave specifically because King lacked (and reasonably lacked) knowledge that FMLA was invoked.
Relief / outcome	Chase sought damages for FMLA retaliation (lost earnings).	Defendants sought judgment in their favor.	Court entered judgment for defendants; Chase’s FMLA retaliation claim dismissed.

Key Cases Cited

University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (Sup. Ct.) (Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation; discussed for its potential impact)
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 1998) (First Circuit framework for FMLA retaliation and deference to DOL regs)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S.) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation cases)
Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S.) (agency deference standard)
Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (U.S.) (when court precedent conflicts, reasonable agency interpretation controls)
Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001) (DOL regulation § 825.220(c) reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference)
Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2009) (employer may be liable even if FMLA not invoked by name where notice of qualifying condition exists)
Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc., 777 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2015) (First Circuit post‑Nassar practice applying preexisting FMLA retaliation standards)